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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of the Brisbane sports marketplace 
between 1980 and 1997. In 1980 the Brisbane sports marketplace reflected 
the introspective and conservative attitudes that were typical of Brisbane and 
Queensland culture at the time. These attitudes were concerned largely with 
local issues, and Brisbane's 'place' within the national and international 
environment. But, by 1997, this introspection has largely disappeared as the 
Brisbane sporting public has become aware of their 'place' in the national 
and international sporting landscape. Since 1980 the Brisbane sports 
marketplace has developed a highly sophisticated and commercially active 
structure and focus. 
Instrumental to this process has been the competing tensions of 
localism, nationalism, and globalism. Outwardly, it appears that external 
influences were particularly important in developing the sophistication of the 
sports marketplace. The Brisbane Bullets Basketball Team and the Brisbane 
Broncos Rugby League Club utilised many North American promotional 
strategies to create widespread popular support in Brisbane. However, these 
'international' forms of promotion may not have been as successful as it 
initially appeared. Latterly, more local and national forms of promotion have 
generated greater loyalty and stability in the Brisbane sports marketplace, 
than either the Bullets or the Broncos had in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Ultimately, the three tensions - local, national, and international - have 
competed to create a distinctive sports marketplace in Brisbane today. 
Acknowledgements 
There are a number of people and organisations I would like to thank 
because, without their assistance, I would not have been able to complete 
this thesis. My initial supervisor, John Nauright, was unfortunately overseas 
for much of the second semester in 1997. Daryl Adair kindly offered his 
support and guidance, for which I am entirely grateful. He helped to polish 
the rough edges from the drafts of the thesis. Ian Jobling was also helpful in 
developing the overall structure of the essay. 
The Brisbane Broncos, Brisbane Lions and Queensland Reds all 
supported this project, and provided me with much valuable information. 
Their assistance and self assurance in divulging some quite sensitive 
material was very encouraging. Louis Ramsay of the Broncos, Judy Kilby of 
the Lions, and Jason Greenhaigh of the Reds provided their time and 
assistance in all circumstances. They spoke candidly and honestly about 
their clubs. They are a credit to themselves and their organisations. 
I also interviewed a number of people who all gave freely of their 
valuable time, experience, and knowledge - Andrew Howe, Brian Kerle, Greg 
Milton, Barry Miscifisoni, and Pam Simeone. 
I would like to thank everyone who has helped me to complete this 
thesis. It has been a pleasure to deal with everyone I have come in contact 
with. Thank you all very much for your time and assistance. 
Euan Fisher. 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Average attendance of Brisbane City 1977-1986 
Figure 2.2: Average attendance of Brisbane Lions 1977-1988 
Figure 2.3: Average attendance of Brisbane United/Strikers 1992/92-1996/97 
Figure 2.4: Average attendance of the Brisbane Bullets 1986-1992 
Figure 3.1: Average attendance of the Brisbane Bullets 1991-1996 
Figure 3.2: Average attendance of the Brisbane Broncos 1988-1993 
Figure 3.3: Average television ratings of the Brisbane Broncos 1988-1993 
Figure 4.1: Absolute attendance of the Queensland Reds 1993-1997 
Figure 4.2: Number of Queensland Reds season ticket holders 1994-1997 
Figure 4.3: Number of Queensland Reds sponsors 1994-1997 
Figure 4.4: Average attendance of the Brisbane Broncos 1994-1997 
Figure 4.5: Number of Brisbane Broncos season ticket holders 1994-1997 
Figure 4.6: Number of Brisbane Broncos sponsors 1994-1997 
Figure 4.7: Levels of sponsorship of the Brisbane Broncos 1994-1997 
Figure 4.8: Number of Brisbane Broncos corporate box holders 1994-1997 
Figure 4.9: Average attendance of the Brisbane Bears (Lions) 1992-1997 
Figure 4.10: Number of Brisbane Bears (Lions) members 1992-1997 
Figure 4.11: Number of Brisbane Bears (Lions) corporate box holders 1994-
1997 
Figure 5.1: Average attendance of the Brisbane Broncos 1993-1997 
Figure 5.2: Average attendance of all Brisbane Broncos home matches 1997 
List of Abbreviations 
AFL: Australian Football League 
ARL: Australian Rugby League 
ASF: Australian Soccer Federation 
BCC: Brisbane City Council 
NBL: National Basketball League 
NSL: National Soccer League 
NSW: New South Wales 
NSWRL: New South Wales Rugby League 
QRL: Queensland Rugby League 
QRU: Queensland Rugby Union 
SA: Soccer Australia 
VFL: Victorian Football League 
List of Interviewees 
Greenhaigh, Jason, marketing manager of the Queensland Reds. 
Howe, Andrew, compiles stastistics on the National Soccer League. 
Kerle, Brian, former, and now current, coach of the Brisbane Bullets. 
Kilby, Judy, marketing manager of the Brisbane Lions. 
Ramsay, Louis, acting marketing manager of the Brisbane Broncos. 
Simeone, Pam, secretary of the Brisbane City Soccer Club. 
IV 
Table of Contents 
Abstract 
Acknowledgements 
List of Figures 
List of Abbreviations 
List of Interviewees 
Introduction 
The Development of the Brisbane Sports Marketplace 1 
Chapter One 
The Catalysts for the Development of Brisbane's Sports Marketplace 25 
Chapter Two 
The Emergence of a National Sporting Infrastructure in Brisbane 52 
Chapter Three 
The Ascendacy of Rugby League in the Brisbane Sports Marketplace, 
1988-1995 88 
Chapter Four 
The Hyper-Commercialisation of the Brisbane Sports Marketplace 113 
Chapter Five 
The Changing Nature of the Brisbane Sports Marketplace 147 
Conclusion 




The Development of the Brisbane Sports 
Marketplace 
Since 1980 the Brisbane sports marketplace has emerged from 
insignificance and obscurity to become a sophisticated and commercially 
driven market environment. In 1980, there were only two National Leagues 
in Australia. Brisbane had two representatives in the National Soccer 
League (NSL) and one in the National Basketball League (NBL). National 
Leagues were, however, less significant in the early 1980s because 
Australian sport was largely regionalised. Sports were structured and 
organised to conform to the isolated context of Australian cities, which are 
separated by vast distances. Hence sport in Brisbane reflected and 
reinforced the regional structure of sport in Australia. Indeed, the Brisbane 
rugby league competition had greater local significance and was 
economically stronger than any of Brisbane's National League sports teams 
in the early 1980s. 
By 1997 this situation has become distinctly different. There are now 14 
National Leagues in Australia, and Brisbane has a representative in all these 
leagues during 1997. Today, the local Brisbane rugby league competition is 
largely insignificant in the commercial Brisbane sports marketplace. 
However, not all of the National Leagues are commercially viable. In fact less 
than a third have sufficient commercial resources to pay players as full time 
professionals. Yet these fledgling National Leagues have developed at the 
expense of the former local and regional competitions. 
With these points in mind, this study examines the developments that have 
occurred in the commercial Brisbane sports marketplace from 1980 to 1997. 
It argues that local, national, and international forces have been responsible 
for the development of the Brisbane sports marketplace since 1980. Often 
these forces have competed against one another, creating tensions around 
the nature and structure of local versus regional and national sporting 
interests. Competing economic, geopolitical, and cultural issues have thus 
been instrumental in the transformation of the Brisbane sports marketplace 
from its suburban based beginnings to national and international 
significance. 
There are three themes that help explain the development of the Brisbane 
sports marketplace within the wider context of Australian sport. The first is 
commercialisation. Since 1980, Australian sport has undergone a rapid 
growth in commercialisation, particularly in Australian rules and rugby 
league. Both sports commercialised and nationalised their competitions as 
strategies for survival. These developments had a profound impact on sport 
in Brisbane. Brisbane sport became heavily commercialised through its 
associations with the national sporting competitions. Latterly, however, it 
surpassed and exceeded the general developments in commercial 
Australian sport and instituted changes in its future structure and 
organisation. 
These changes had great influence on other sporting bodies. This leads to 
the second theme of professionalism. Prior to 1995, rugby union was strictly 
an amateur sport. Players did not receive any match payments for playing 
rugby union. Some players, however, were rewarded through indirect player 
payments to keep them in the code. But in 1995, rugby union dispensed with 
its fundamental philosophy of amateurism by embracing professionalism and 
commercialisation. 
The third theme is the North American influence on Australian sport. A great 
many of the changes affecting sport in Brisbane and Australia during the 
1980s and 1990s appeared to be influenced by North American models of 
sports production. Certainly, Rupert Murdoch's Super League concept 
completely replicated these models which was instigated by the Brisbane 
Broncos Rugby League Club. Likewise, Australian rules used North 
American principles of marketing and player based regulation in the 1980s. 
However, in the last decade, Australian rules has developed a unique 
structure, different from the North American model. Today, Australia rules is 
this country's most popular national winter code. It even challenges rugby 
league in the cities of Sydney and Brisbane, the traditional heartland of 
rugby league. 
This thesis will now discuss the themes of commercialisation in rugby 
league and Australian rules, the professionalisation of rugby union, and the 
influence of North American models of sport production in greater depth. 
The commercialisation of rugby league and Australian rules 
Since the late 1970s, there have been great similarities in the commercial 
development of Australian rules football and rugby league in Australia. At 
this time both sports were the most popular winter sport in their respective 
States. In the southern and western States, Australian rules predominated 
the winter sporting culture, although in the two eastern States, rugby league 
captured the popular imagination. However, in 1980, both sports 
represented small, largely local, competitions with little significant 
commercial development. 
Each major Australian city had its own football competition. The Australian 
rules football competition in Melbourne, the Victorian Football League (VFL), 
was separate from its counterparts in Perth, the West Australian Football 
League (WAFL), and Adelaide, the South Australian Football League 
(SANFL). Neither competition supported the other, and there was little 
organised collaboration on issues. Often, in fact, there was great tension 
between the sporting bodies, as each competed to maintain their own 
distinct identity. The VFL was viewed with suspicion and mistrust because its 
competition was the strongest, both economically and commercially. This 
acrimonious relationship was caused partly by VFL clubs attracting players 
to Melbourne from the WAFL and the SANFL. As the best players left to play 
in Victoria, the other competitions were denied their best talent, decreasing 
the spectacle. This relationship of separateness was replicated in the rugby 
league competitions in Brisbane and Sydney. The Brisbane Rugby League 
competition was smaller and less commercially developed than its 
counterpart in Sydney. Large Sydney clubs lured players south with higher 
player salaries. This reduced the competitive standard of the Brisbane 
competition. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the economic viability of local sporting 
competitions in the major Australian capital cities was undermined as new 
tensions developed as threats to the traditional sporting structure in 
Australia. The VFL in Australian rules and the New South Wales Rugby 
League (NSWRL) in rugby league emerged as the governing body of their 
respective codes during this period. These two sporting bodies emanated 
from their local and regional strongholds and embraced the commercial 
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opportunities presented by regional and pseudo-national competitions in 
Australia. 
In 1980, rugby league and Australian rules were commercially and 
economically naive. For approximately 90 years, the teams and governing 
bodies of both sports operated as non-profit organisations. The basic tenet 
that underpinned rugby league from the turn of the century was the concept 
of member-based ownership and non-profit status. It was not until 1983 that 
the NSWRL became an incorporated body. The Memorandum and Articles of 
the League clearly expressed it was a non-profit organisation. In fact, the 
League's main objective was to promote the game of rugby league and its 
competition. The non-profit status of the League also applied to its member 
clubs because they had to abide by the rules and regulations of the League. 
Private ownership was irrelevant during this period because teams were yet 
to embrace a commercially inspired structure. In the 1990s, private 
ownership in rugby league would ultimately undermine the traditional 
organisation of rugby league in Australia. 
The VFL administration and its clubs followed a similar structure of 
ownership as the NSWRL. The clubs members elected officials who 
organised and administered the club. There was no private ownership in the 
VFL before the middle of the 1980s. The first club to become privatised was 
the newly relocated South Melbourne team now playing in Sydney called 
the Sydney Swans. Bob Pritchard raised the idea of private ownership with 
some business men in Sydney. They liked the idea and the VFL approved 
the sale to raise money for the financially strapped clubs in inner city 
Melbourne.1 The move proved disastrous for the VFL, who had to support the 
1 Gary Linnell, Football Ltd: The Inside Ston/ of the AFL: Ironbark, Sydney, 1995, 99. 
team through a series of loans and refinancing packages. Eventually, the 
club reverted to member based ownership when private ownership failed. In 
1987, the League sold two of the three new franchises to private interests. 
These were the Brisbane Bears (now Lions) and the West Coast Eagles. 
Both teams were unsuccessful under private ownership and followed the 
example of Sydney when it reverted to public ownership. The VFL has now 
become the Australian Football League (AFL). In 1997, there is no AFL team 
that is privately owned. The North Melbourne Football Club was partially 
floated in 1986, but no shareholder or group of shareholders can hold more 
than 10%ofthestock.2 
Before 1980, neither the NSWRL nor the VFL had fully embraced the 
potential opportunities presented by commercialism. The NSWRL contracted 
its first sponsor in 1962. The Eastern Suburbs rugby league club was the first 
club to receive corporate sponsorship. This did not occur until 1976. The 
NSWRL could not find a naming rights sponsor for the NSWRL competition 
until 1982. The League did not become an incorporated body until 1983.3 
The clubs were funded by the money received from gate takings, the annual 
membership subscriptions, and the revenue generated from the social club 
which was attached to the rugby league club. 
While the Australian rules clubs relied heavily on similar forms of revenue, 
VFL clubs approached corporate sponsors earlier and were generally more 
advanced commercially than rugby league clubs before 1985. By the mid 
1970s, most Australian rules clubs pursued alternative forms of revenue. 
They realised they could no longer survive on membership subscriptions 
2 John Nauright and Murray Phillips, Us and Them: Australian Professional Sport and 
Resistance to North American Ownership and Marketing Models. Sport Marketing Quarterly: 
6:1, 1997, 35. 
3 The reasons of Justice Lockart et al.: 9. 
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and attendance revenue alone. They actively secured corporate sponsors 
and media attention, although there was little commercial sophistication 
during the first few years of the 1980s. The 1980s, however, was the 
transitional period for the two codes. It was during the 1980s that the 
Leagues and the clubs developed from small regional leagues into pseudo-
national competitions. 
Survival was the major impetus for the commercialism of both premier 
sporting competitions during the 1980s. The NSWRL and the VFL were 
economically unviable at the beginning of the decade. The image and 
structure of the NSWRL was anchored in the past. The code needed 
revitalisation. It needed to attract new supporters, sponsors, and most 
importantly, a new image. The game had to expand beyond its local 
environment. The NSWRL competition was played only in Sydney. But rugby 
league's heartland in the city was becoming undermined as its traditional 
supporters relocated to the outer suburbs of Sydney. The code needed to be 
restructured. Otherwise, as Mike Coleman (1996) explains, it would have 
drifted away and died.4 
The Australian rules competition in Melbourne faced similar problems. The 
competition could no longer support the high number of inner city Melbourne 
teams. The twelve clubs that comprised the VFL competition in the early 
1980s were all based in Melbourne or its close environs. To the uninformed 
observer, the state of the competition might have looked quite healthy. In 
1981, attendance was its highest levels, and the VFL increased admission 
prices by 17%. The increase in admission prices, however, was a symptom 
of the problem rather than a sign of its health. The Victorian Corporate Affairs 
4 Mike Coleman, Super League: The Inside Story: Ironbark, Sydney, 1996, 11. 
Commission declared that five of the twelve clubs were technically bankrupt, 
while another three almost insolvent.5 The admission prices were not 
increased to take advantage of the games success. The increase occurred to 
generate greater revenue for the struggling clubs. 
The NSWRL and the VFL believed the only strategy for survival was 
expansion or relocation. In 1982 the NSWRL expanded the competition to 
include teams from Canberra and Wollongong. In 1983, they did not accept 
the membership of Newtown or Western Suburbs for the following season. 
However, Western Suburbs did compete in the 1984 competition because of 
a technicality in the NSWRL articles of association. The NSWRL were 
determined to exclude Wests from the competition because Wests 
represented all the negative images of the game. West challenged the 
validity of their omission from the competition through the courts. The court 
ruled in favour of the NSWRL, but the League admitted Wests to the 1985 
season on the condition they relocate from Lidecombe to Campbelltown.e 
The NSWRL did not restrict their expansion by limiting the inclusion of teams 
from the greater environs of Sydney. They believed the strategy for survival 
was the creation a national competition, encompassing the strongholds of 
rugby league in Australia. The NSWRL believed a national competition 
would deliver them increased sponsorship opportunities through increased 
television exposure and media attention. By the end of the decade, the 
NSWRL resembled the North American model of profit making sporting 
organisations, rather than a non-profit, member based entity which served its 
members. In less than ten years, the NSWRL has developed into a 
commercially and economically motivated organisation. In 1988, they 
5 Linnell, Football Ltd: 27. 
6 The reasons of Justice Lockart et al.:19. 
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admitted teams from Newcastle, the Gold Coast and Brisbane. 
The Brisbane Broncos became the first privately owned rugby league team 
in Australia. It was established as a strictly commercial entity. It reflected the 
North American model of professional sports teams, namely private 
ownership and profit accumulation. Almost immediately, the Broncos 
enjoyed huge corporate, popular and media support because they were the 
only football team in Brisbane. The Broncos appeared hugely successful. 
The NSWRL believed their organisation and structure represented the 
game's future. This image inspired further expansion by the NSWRL, later 
renamed the Australian Rugby League (ARL). In 1995 the ARL included 
another team from Brisbane and teams from Adelaide, Auckland, Perth, and 
Townsville. 
In the first season of the new ARL twenty team competition, Rupert Murdoch 
and his company in Australia, News Limited, launched their Super League 
concept. He wanted to rationalise the number of Sydney teams in the ARL 
competition and introduce private franchises based on the model of the 
Brisbane Broncos. But Murdoch's proposal was even more closely aligned to 
the North American production of sport than even the ARL's. Murdoch 
wanted to centralise sponsorship of the teams and the competition, media 
rights and all promotional activities to generate greater revenue. In 1997, 
there are two "national" rugby league competitions in Australasia which 
mirrored overseas models of sports production. Rugby league in Australia 
had been transformed between 1980 and 1997. The ARL and Super League 
resembled large, profit focused corporations. They did not represent 
traditional member based sporting organisations. 
The VFL experienced similar expansion during the 1980s. However, the VFL 
expansion was driven out of reluctance, rather than opportunity. In 1984, 
John Elliot, the president of Carlton, proposed a breakaway Australian 
football competition. He proposed that games would be played across the 
entire weekend to increase the potential size of the television contract. A 
player draft would be introduced to distribute the talent more favourably. 
While Elliot never established his competition, a great many of his ideas 
were realised over the following years except the reduction in the high 
number of Victorian clubs. 
There are a number of slight differences in the expansion of the two codes 
expansion. To appease the Victorian clubs, the VFL required each 
expansion club to pay a licence fee to the League. The VFL needed the 
money to support the commercial viability of many of the Melbourne based 
teams. The VFL also allowed the Brisbane and West Coast expansion 
licensees to be purchased by private individuals and the Sydney Swans 
(South Melbourne relocated to Sydney in the early 1980s) to be bought by 
private interests. In all three cases, private ownership did not work, often 
because the fee imposed by the League was too high and servicing the 
interest on the loans was financially impossible. As was noted earlier, all 
three clubs have reverted to the membership model of ownership. 
Between 1980 and 1997, the ARL and the Australian Football League (AFL) 
developed into large corporate entities generating vast sums of revenue from 
national sponsorship contracts and from pay and commercial television 
agreements.7 During their development, both Leagues were influenced by, 
and in some cases fully embraced, the North American model of sports 
7 The VFL changed its name to the AFL to increase the national focus of the league. 
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production. However, since the early 1990s, the AFL has limited the strict 
adoption of these practices because of the failure of private ownership. 
Instead, they have integrated the North American model into the Australian 
commercial marketplace. Conversely, the ARL successfully replicated many 
aspects of the North American model. They relied heavily on these new 
forms of commercialism to drive change in rugby league and were rewarded 
with the success of the Brisbane Broncos. But the Broncos commercial and 
popular success actually proved the catalyst for a commercial takeover of 
rugby league in Australia. Rupert Murdoch wanted to replicate the North 
American model of sports production in Australia with his new concept called 
Super League. 
The 'professionalisation' of rugby union in Australia 
For almost all of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rugby union has 
been inextricably linked to the amateur ideals of middle and upper class 
society.8 Rugby was played by the social elite in England and, when the 
game was developed in Australia, it established similar relationships 
between participation and class. The major characteristic that distinguished 
rugby from most other sports was that it was not played for financial or 
monetary compensation. It was strictly an amateur sport. The concept of 
amateurism was established to exclude the participation of the working 
class.9 Initially, the working class was discouraged from participating through 
the creation of the amateur athlete. Latterly, as this relationship became 
eroded, the governing body of rugby in Britain and Australia strictly enforced 
the amateur ideals to stop the influx, and reduce the numbers, of working 
8 Murray Phillips, 'Rugby' in Sport in Australia: A Social History: Wray Vamplew & Brian Stoddart 
(eds), Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994, 193-212. 
9 For a complete discussion of the use of amateurism as a strategy to exclude the working 
class, see John Hargreaves, Sport. Culture and Power. 
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class participants in the game. The working class developed their own game, 
rugby league, in Britain and Australia to allow financial compensation. 
The game of rugby league emerged from the amateur game of rugby union 
in the early twentieth century in Australia because union administrators 
strongly resisted any player payments. They felt it would diminish the game's 
moral and educational value. This attitude towards player payments has 
continued for much of the twentieth century. However, these same 
administrators who valued amateur status so highly have fought a constant 
battle against player defections for much of the twentieth century. Rugby 
union players have been quite willing to play league if the financial rewards 
were acceptable. Especially in Australia, rugby league clubs have actively 
pursued union players because they were not paid. This created a serious 
dilemma for rugby union officials. 
During the mid 1970s and early 1980, rugby union was under increasing 
pressure to increase commercialism of the code and to relax its strict 
observance of amateurism. Union adopted many characteristics of 
commercialisation that affected other Australian sports during this period.10 
However, rugby league generated more revenue than rugby union because 
of league's greater popularity throughout all social classes. As a 
consequence, rugby league clubs had greater financial power to attract 
union players. They secured rugby union's best players through lucrative 
contracts. In the 1980s, Matthew Burke, Scott Gouley, Ricky Stewart and 
Andrew Leeds all defected to rugby league. 
To counteract this problem, rugby union administrators started to reward 
10 Phillips, 'Rugby', 208. 
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their elite players, although covertly. Rugby union players received money 
from endorsements, employment from major sponsors, and appearance 
fees. However, at no stage did rugby union administrators actually provide 
players directly with match fees. In 1991, the International Rugby Board (IRB) 
institutionalised these changes by redefining its definition an amateur.n 
Players could now earn income from personal promotions, rugby-related 
writing, and advertising. These changes certainly helped to slow the 
movement of players from rugby union to rugby league. 
The Australian Rugby Union (ARU) and its counterpart in New 
Zealand (NZRFU) developed a regional competition that increased the 
commercial opportunities for its players. The Super-six Championship was 
the forerunner of the Super-10 and Super-12 Championships. These 
competitions highlighted rugby union's international strength. Rugby league 
and Australian rules could not play similar international competitions 
because they had fewer countries to compete against. By 1993, teams from 
South Africa were included in the competition. Again, a sport was using 
expansion to generate greater revenue through increased commercial 
opportunities. However, the major transformation in rugby union's governing 
ethos did not occur until 1995. 
In 1995 the basic tenet of rugby union, the now outdated concept of 
amateurism, which was continually undermined throughout the 1980s, was 
overthrown. The concept of amateurism was challenged and ultimately 
rescinded in favour of professionalism to combat the Super League - ARL 
war in rugby league and the threat of a rival professional competition in 
rugby union, the World Rugby Corporation. By the end of 1995 not only had 
11 Phillips, 'Rugby', 212. 
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the off-field commercial development of rugby union been transformed, the 
on-field payment of players had been adopted. Today, rugby union 
represents an internationally and commercially focused sport, something 
which was inconceivable even as late as the early 1990s. 
The Influence of North America on Australian sport since 1980 
The commercialisation of Australian sport since 1980 has been labeled by 
some academics in Australia as "Americanisation". Professional sport in 
North America is built on one basic principle: the principle of capital 
accumulation. Every single professional sports team in the USA, except the 
Green Bay Packers, is privately owned. The owners of all sports teams want 
to make a profit. That is their primary purpose. Yet the teams do not compete 
against one another because of the structure of the individual leagues. The 
teams are, however, in competition with other forms of entertainment.12 This 
was the fundamental difference, at least until the introduction of Super 
League, between the North American and Australian professional sports 
production models. In Australia, they were run as non-profit organisations 
whose primary goal was to win the Grand-Final or the Flag. Professional 
sport in North America, however, was a business: the accumulation of profits 
through the hyper-commercialisation of the sporting team and the 
competition. 
A. The North American Model 
It was not until the 1980s and early 1990s, argue James Quirk and Rodney 
Fort (1992), that professional sports in North America developed into big 
business. Prior to 1970, three of the four professional sports leagues in North 
America were commercially unstable. Baseball was the only widely popular 
12 George Sage, Power and ideology in American Sport: a critical perspective: Human 
Kinetics, Champaign (111.), 1990, 138. 
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sport prior to World War Two. It established itself in the late nineteenth 
century, and by the late 1920s it had formed two leagues through a series of 
mergers. The pattem of challenges from rival leagues was repeated in the 
formative years of the three other professional sports.13 But by the early 
1970s, the four major sports leagues had established themselves as the 
dominant leagues in their sport in North America. They were the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL), National 
Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Baseball (MLB). 
Once each League had stabilised its position as the premier competition, it 
began to expand the competition and capitalise on its popularity. From the 
mid-1950s to 1990, baseball increased from 16 to 26 teams, the NFL from 12 
to 28, the NBA from 7 or 8 to 29 and the NHL from 6 to 21.14 The popularity of 
the professional sports started to increase in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Attendances climbed slowly during this period. But it was not until the mid to 
late 1970s that professional sports become very popular. NFL attendances 
exploded after the merger between the NFL-AFL in the early 1970s, and then 
flattened out in 1980. The boom sport of the 1980s was basketball.15 
The increase in attendance figures is paralleled by the growth in the amount 
the league received for the sale of television rights between the 1960s and 
the 1990s: 
NFL 1962 $5.8 million per year (first tv contract) 
1970 $49 million multi-year 
13 James Quirk and Rodney Fort, Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports: 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992, 2-7. 
14 Sage. Power and Ideoloqv in American Sport:. 142. 
15 Quirk & Fort, Pav Dirt: 7-9. 
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1980 $167 million multi-year 
1991 $940 million multi-year 
MLB 1979 $40 million multi-year 
1985 $290 million multi-year 
1991 $615 million multi-year 
NBA 1980 $20 million multi-year 
1985 $125 million multi-year 
1991 $323 multi-year 
NHL 1991-1992 $5.5 million 16 
As the attendance and television contracts increased, so did the cost of the 
average major league baseball franchise. During the 1980s, a baseball 
franchise increased in price by approximately seven hundred percent. 
The professional sports leagues operated as cartels to maximise profits for 
themselves and their teams. A cartel is "an organisation of independent firms 
that has as its aim some form of restrictive or monopolistic influence on the 
production or sale of a commodity as well as the control of wages".17 The 
Leagues operated as cartels in three major ways: to restrict the player talent, 
to control the number and location of teams and to combine their negotiation 
strength. 
Player talent restriction 
The League restricts the inter-team competition for players through the use of 
16 Quirk & Fort, Pav Dirt: 11-15. 
17 Sage, Power and Ideology in American Sport:. 143. 
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player drafts, trades and the overall salary cap of a team. The four major 
professional sports competitions institutionalised a draft to distribute the 
talent across the competition. Players must enter the draft. OthenA/ise they 
cannot be recruited by a team to play. A player can only play for the team that 
selected them in the draft. This reduces the negotiating leverage a player 
has with the team. This makes it difficult for the player to negotiate a high 
salary. 
The salary cap was introduced to limit the overall expenditure of the 
professional sports teams. Theoretically, no team could pay its players more 
than the preset upper limits determined by the League. Total player 
payments could not go beyond the salary cap. This restricted the amount any 
one player could receive. 
The ruling bodies also controlled the movement of players between clubs. 
Trades are rare because they involve penalties imposed by the League. 
Owners of professional sports teams restrict the salaries of players and the 
destination of players through these three League rules. In a free market, the 
players could move to the club prepared to pay the most for their services. 
However, a free market would decrease the overall profits of the sporting 
franchise. 
Franchise restriction 
The League increases franchise profits by controlling the relocation of 
existing teams and the introduction of new teams. This creates a scarce 
commodity in the marketplace. If an NFL franchise wants to relocate to 
another city or region, three quarters of the owners need to agree to the 
move. Another clause prevents the relocation of a rival team within a 70 mile 
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radius of another's stadium. As most of the professional sports teams in 
North America are located in the areas of the highest population density, 
owners do not have many options if they want to relocate.18 
The owner of the Oakland Raiders (an NFL team), Al Davis, challenged this 
rule in the early 1980s. His contract with the Oakland Colosseum was under 
negotiation when the Los Angeles Rams relocated from the Los Angeles 
Colosseum to a new purpose built stadium in Anaheim. Consequently, the 
Los Angeles Colosseum had no major tenant. Davis approached the LA 
County Authority, the Colosseum's controlling body, to investigate the 
possibility of relocating. At the time, Davis was also in negotiations with the 
Oakland Municipal Authority. However, the Oakland Authority could not 
match the offer Davis received from Los Angeles. Colosseum management 
guaranteed Davis a better commercial deal to relocate to Los Angeles. Los 
Angeles is the second largest city in North America and provides a much 
larger marketplace to sell a sporting team. However, Davis needed the 
approval of three-quarters of the owners before he could relocate to the 
Colosseum. The other owners rejected Davis's proposal because it would 
impinge upon the Rams 70 mile exclusivity area. Davis took the League to 
court. The court found in favour of Davis, and he relocated to Los Angeles in 
1984.19 
Davis was not the first franchise owner to relocate. Between 1953 and 1990, 
there were over 60 franchise relocations in the four major professional sports 
in North America.20 Nor was he the first to use the artificial scarcity of 
18 Paul Staudohar, 'Team Relocation in Professional Sports', Labor Law Journal: 36, 1985, 
728-733. 
19 Robert Berry & Glenn Wong, Law and the Business of the Sports Industries: Volume One: 
Professional Sports Leagues: Auburn House, Dover (Ma.), 1986. 
20 Sage, Power and Ideology in American Sport:. 148. 
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professional sports teams to increase his profits. When negotiating new 
stadium contracts, owners threaten the city with relocation if they do not 
increase the commercial benefits to the team. The owners want the public 
body either to build a new facility, or improve the existing one, or provide a 
better financial package. The threats carry greater credence because 
communities know that the task of finding another franchise would be 
exceedingly difficult. The League limits the introduction of new teams, 
thereby creating a scarce commodity. By controlling and limiting the number 
of teams, the resale price of each team increases dramatically. Thus, owners 
exercise substantial influence by extracting concessions from cities 
desperate to retain their franchises.21 
As the League controls the introduction of new clubs into the competition, it 
leaves prospective professional sports team owners with few options. Other 
than the purchase of an existing franchise, the only option for these 
individuals is to establish a new league. Each of the four professional sports 
leagues in North America have encountered a rival league. On each 
occasion, the two competitions have merged, leaving the more established 
ruling body in control. However, only the strong clubs of the rival league 
usually survive. 
Combined negotiation strength 
The League and teams operate as a cartel by combining their bargaining 
strength for the sale of national television rights and sponsorship. As a result, 
the League is able to negotiate a higher fee for these rights. However, it also 
places greater power in the hands of the League because it controls the 
amount of money that it distributes to the individual teams. This system 
21 Sage, Power and Ideoloov in American Sport:. 151. 
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protects the smaller teams because they do not have the same barginning 
strength as the larger teams. For example, the Chicago Bears have a 
stronger barginning position within a population of approximately 7 million 
than the Green Bay Packers have in Green Bay. Similarly, national 
sponsorship deals are developed in the same way. However, the teams are 
free to negotiate local and regional media contracts.22 
B. North American Influences in Australia 
North American professional sport is organised and administered as a 
business. The League and the franchises are structured to make profits. 
Since the early 1980s, professional sporting organisations and clubs in 
Australia have adopted and embraced the concepts utilised so successful in 
North America. The development of commercialisation by the central 
administrative sporting bodies who control large revenue streams now 
dictate the overall structure of the Australian professional marketplace. 
In 1994, News Limited attempted to establish a rival rugby league 
competition to compete against the ARL organised competition. The 
competition was, in almost every detail, a complete replica of the North 
American professional sports model. Teams would be privately owned; they 
would be based on geographic areas; and, most importantly, they were 
designed as profit making ventures.23 The News Limited proposal would 
reduce the number of teams from 20 to 12, rationalising the Sydney teams 
from 11 to 4 and creating new franchises in the AFL cities of Melbourne and 
Adelaide. The clubs would collaborate on marketing, media and player 
contracts.24 Super League planned for more than a partial implementation of 
22 Sage, Power and Ideology in American Sport:. 143. 
23 The reasons of Justice Burchett: 17. 
24 Nauright & Phillips, Us and Them: 38. 
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the North American model. News Limited wanted to transplant the entire 
concept to the rugby league code in Australia. 
On 23 February 1996, Justice Burchett thwarted the News Limited venture 
when he ruled against them in a court of law. News Limited appealed 
against this decision, and their appeal was upheld, in the full Federal Court. 
The appeal court's decision gave News Limited permission to establish 
Super League. During the first weekend of March 1997 the Super League 
competition began. There are now two rival competitions of rugby league in 
Australia: the ARL run competition and Super League. The Super League 
proposal outlined by News Limited in 1995 is very similar to the actual 
organisation of the current competition. The only difference is in the 
geography of the teams. There is no team playing in Melbourne. But Super 
League plans to establish one in the near future. 
The Brisbane Sports Marketplace 
Between 1980 and 1997 the three dominant winter sports in Australia 
developed from naive and commercially unsophisticated beginnings into a 
highly mature environment where profits and commercial survival have 
influenced the decisions of the controlling bodies and teams. Some 
academics have insisted that these changes are the result of the adaption of 
the North American Model (Americanisation). However, Jim McKay, Geoffrey 
Lawrence, Toby Miller, and David Rowe (1993) insist that the global 
processes affecting sport in contemporary Australia are wider than 
Americanisation.25 They argue that Australian sport adopted and modified 
American ideas to satisfy the Australian economic and cultural environment. 
They concluded that labelling changes in Australian sport as 
25 Jim McKay, Geoffrey Lawrence, Toby Miller, & David Rowe, 'Globalization and Australian 
Sport', Sports Science Review: 2(1), 1993, 15. 
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Americanisation is too simplistic. 
Located within the framework of increasing commercialisation is the 
Brisbane sports marketplace. Local, national and international forces have 
been responsible for the development of the Brisbane sports marketplace 
since 1980. They have competed against one another to influence the 
development of Brisbane. However, in the development of the Brisbane 
sports marketplace there has been greater emphasis on local issues and 
local successes but operating within the wider national and international 
environment. Thus it has been predominantly local Brisbane and 
Queensland issues that have been paramount in transforming the Brisbane 
sports marketplace. 
During the 1980s, Brisbane hosted a series of sporting and cultural events 
that helped transform the city. Chapter one discusses the impact of the 1982 
Commonwealth Games, the annual State of Origin Contests, the 1986 
Olympic Bid, and Expo 88. Each event helped shape and develop the 
confidence of the residents of Brisbane. They set aside their introspective 
and local beliefs and developed a more national and perhaps international 
view of the wortd. 
Chapter two highlights the impact of these events on local and national 
sporting competitions. As Brisbane residents view of the wortd altered, so too 
did their preference for national sporting competitions and for specifically 
Bnsbane teams in these competitions. The Brisbane Bullets became the first 
team to capture the popular imagination of the Brisbane sporting public 
through borrowed North American forms of marketing and promotion. 
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To ensure the codes survival, the NSWRL established a team from Brisbane 
in its competition. The Brisbane Broncos were the first team from outside 
NSW to compete in an exclusively southern competition. Chapter three 
argues that their popular success was based on "Queensland" forms of 
promotion. Conversely, their commercial success was driven by the North 
American model of sports production. 
The Broncos appeared to generate large popular support in their first seven 
years. However, it is argued, there is evidence that questions the universality 
of this support. Undeniably, the Broncos yielded very large profits for a 
privately run sporting team in Australia. Rupert Murdoch was impressed by 
their success and decided to establish a separate rugby league competition 
in Australia after his joint venture proposal with the ARL was rejected. Super 
League, as Murdoch's competition was called, was the catalysts for the 
hyper-commercialisation of sport in Australia. Chapter four discusses these 
issues and argues that while Super League's impact altered the structure 
and commercialism of sport, it did little to affect the popularity of any one 
sport in Brisbane. Instead the decline in rugby league support in Brisbane 
was attributable to a different factor: namely the characteristic of the public as 
entertainment consumers rather than as spectators of rugby league contests. 
Chapter five explains the theory of entertainment consumers at rugby league 
matches in 1997 and investigates the parallel between the Broncos 
promotional techniques and the increase of these spectators. The Broncos 
support in 1997 fluctuated enormously, while attendances at the other 
professional sporting teams were very consistent. None of the other 
professional sports teams have relied on North American forms of promotion 
to attract a crowd. 
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The Brisbane sports marketplace has been transformed enormously since 
1980. It has been influenced by changes in, and it has also brought about 
changes in Australian sport. These developments in Brisbane, Queensland 
and Australia, have responded to dynamic variations in priorities in other 
countries, especially North America. The relationship between these 
dynamic interchanges is examined in detail in the following chapters. 
24 
Chapter One 
The Catalysts for the Development of 
Brisbane's 
Sports Marketplace 
In the 1970s Brisbane was an insignificant state capital in Australia. The 
estimated population of the city was just over 700,000, while the metropolitan 
population was closer to 1 million in 1979.1 Brisbane was not visible on the 
international cultural, economic or tourist stage. Unfortunately, Queensland's 
most recognisable tourist features are not located in Brisbane. The closest 
beaches to Brisbane are situated more than 60 kilometres north and south of 
the city, on the Gold and Sunshine Coasts. In the 1970s Brisbane was only a 
transit destination for visitors to major tourist destinations in Queensland. The 
two Australian cities that had 'international' reputations were Sydney and 
Melbourne. Brisbane was generally considered a backwater, a haven for 
conservative attitudes and opinion. It was depicted colloquially as a sedate 
country town.2 Reflecting this slow-changing culture, shop opening and 
closing hours were tightly regulated. During the week shops were not 
allowed to open after 5.30pm; Saturday morning shopping was tolerated, but 
rarely encouraged; while Sunday shopping was almost exclusively 
prohibited. Today, by contrast, there are numerous cafes and restaurants that 
spill on to the pavements. Brisbane's temperate climate offers the perfect 
opportunity for outdoor dining, which is now strongly promoted. Yet until 
1988, public health authorities prevented cafes and restaurants from outdoor 
1 Encyclopedia Britannica, The New Encyclopedia Britannica: Micropedia: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Chicago, 1983, 2, 273. 
2 John Wanna & Janice Gaulfield, 'Brisbane: A City in Transition', in Power and Politics in the 
City: Brisbane in Transition: Janice Gaulfield & John Wanna (eds), MacMillan, Melbourne, 
1995, 35. 
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dining. These regulations left the CBD an uninspiring and deserted place at 
the close of each business day.3 
Brisbane was a socially conservative city. Little happened in the small, 
sleepy, Queensland capital. Typically, residents were in bed before 9pm. 
School uniforms were reminiscent of mid-nineteenth century Victorian 
England, rather than those that symbolised a progressive, multicultural 
Australia. Popular entertainment was strictly consigned to the 'Big Band' and 
the dance hall.4 Brisbane was not an international city. It was not even a 
prominent national city. It was a large country town. It did not attract multi-
national or national investment. Writer David Malouf (1975) reflects these 
sentiments about Brisbane: 
Have I been shaped in this way - fearful prospect! -
by Brisbane? Our big country town that is still mostly 
weather board and one-storeyed, so little a city that 
on Friday morning the CWA ladies set their stalls up 
in Queen Street and sell home-made cakes and 
jam, and the farmers come in with day-old chicks in 
wire baskets. Brisbane is so sleepy, so slatternly, so 
sprawling unlovely! I have taken to wondering 
around after school looking for one simple object in 
it that might be romantic, or appalling even, but there 
is nothing. It is simply the most ordinary place in the 
3 Wanna & Caulfield, 'Brisbane: A City in Transition', 44. 
4 Wanna & Caulfield, 'Brisbane: A City in Transition', 45. 
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world.5 
In the mid to late 1970s, influential civic leaders in Brisbane made a 
concerted effort to alter their city's peripheral relationship with Sydney and 
Melbourne. One of the most important decisions in the history of the city was 
when Brisbane bid for the 1982 Commonwealth Games. The Brisbane City 
Council (BCC) used the Games to reposition the city within the Australian 
tourism, leisure, and business marketplace. Brisbane would represent the 
dynamic, progressive future of Australia. Additionally, Brisbane business 
interests wanted to compete with Sydney and Melbourne as major Australian 
metropolises. However, New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria questioned 
Brisbane's capacity to host the Games.6 A city as backward and conservative 
as Brisbane could never host a Commonwealth Games, they argued. 
Despite this negativity, or maybe because of it, the Games generated huge 
public support in Brisbane, and as a result they were very successful. The 
Games were the catalyst for Brisbane to develop improved sporting facilities, 
upgraded transportation systems, and a more positive collective self image. 
The BCC even used the euphoria following the Games to examine the 
possiblity of hosting the 1992 Olympic Games. This suggests a fundamental 
transformation of attitude among Brisbane's civic leaders, moving from a 
slow-changing culture, to a more open, liberal, and dynamic 
commercial/leisure culture. 
During the early 1980s the State Government of Queensland had also 
5 David Malouf, Johnno: University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1975, 51-52, quoted 
from Glyn Davis, 'Conclusion: Power and Politics in the City', in Power and Politics in the City: 
Brisbane in Transition: Janice Caulfield & John Wanna (eds), MacMillan, Melbourne, 1995, 
271. 
6 Rory Sutton, 'On Being the Host Broadcaster: Producing the Games', The 1982 
Commonwealth Games: A Retrospect: compiled from papers presented at the Australian 
Studies Centre seminar held in Brisbane on 19-20 March 1983, 13. 
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been concerned about negative representations of the state as a cultural 
backwater. So the Government proposed to use an international exposition 
to announce Queensland's arrival on the international cultural and tourism 
stage. It wanted to demonstrate to Australia and the 'world' that 
Queenslanders were capable of 'putting on a show'.7 Expo 88 provided 
Brisbane with the opportunity to present itself to the world. Typically, the 
Brisbane public thought Expo 88 was a great success and they basked in the 
reflected glory of this hosting achievement. 
The 1982 Commonwealth Games, the 1986 bid for the 1992 Olympic 
Games, and Expo 88 provided Brisbane with an opportunity to create to the 
wider world a positive and confident self-image. As I will show, this helped to 
transform Brisbane from a large peripheral country town, into an emergingly 
dynamic Australian city. Brisbane used these events to challenge long held 
negative images about it among outsiders. The Games, the Olympic Bid, and 
Expo 88 were, of course, only temporary events to Brisbane. But collectively 
they had a profound impact on the popular image and cultural representation 
of the city. As isolated events they would not have created such an impact. 
There was, nonetheless, one local sporting event held in Brisbane each year 
that was also pivotal to the city's self-image. The annual State of Origin 
contest between Queensland and NSW helped break down Queensland's 
inferiority complex, and encouraged the evolution of an alternative, more 
self-confident, public image. 
7 Tony Bennett, 'The Shaping of things to come: Expo 88', in Tony Bennett, Pat Buckridge, 
David Carter & Colin Mercer (eds). Celebrating the Nation: A critical study of Australia's 
Bicentenarv: Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, 125. 
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The Creation of the State of Origin Concept 
Queensland suffered from an inferiority complex in various ways. 
Queenslanders did not generally compare themselves positively with people 
from NSW or Victoria. This lowly self-image was perpetuated, and indeed 
accentuated, by the 'inevitable' defeat of the Queensland Rugby League side 
in their annual grudge match against NSW. Between 1908 and 1961, 
Queensland managed to win 50 out of 154 games. But the results worsened 
after 1961. From 1961 to 1979, NSW won 53 of 57 games. Indeed, during the 
the 1970s, NSW completely asserted its dominance with Queensland 
winning only one game.8 This decline in the competitiveness of Queensland 
caused a decrease in public attendance at State representative matches in 
Brisbane by the late 1970s. In 1971, 10,000 fans were turned away when the 
police were forced to close the gates. Minutes later they were prised open as 
the exuberant crowd outside heard Lang Park's famous kick-off roar. Yet just 
eight years later the crowds had virtually disappeared.9 
The serious crisis facing rugby league in Queensland in the late 
1970s was exacerbated by the contrasting success of the Queensland Rugby 
Union Team. The rugby union team not only defeated their NSW 
counterparts (something the Queensland Rugby League team failed to 
achieve) but they were also considered one of the best provincial teams in 
the world. Queensland fans could support a winner when the rugby union 
team played. As a result, crowds flocked to Ballymore. By contrast the 
Queensland Rugby League team was not even competitive against NSW. 
They could only win one game for the entire 1970s. In the 1979 series, NSW 
8 Bret Harris, Winfield State of Origin: 1980-1991: Pan Macmillan, Sydney, 1992, 3. 
9 Hugh Lunn, 'The Origin of the Origin' in League of a Nation: David Headon & Lex Marines 
(eds), ABC Books, Sydney, 1996, 62. 
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outscored Queensland 96 to 32 over three matches.10 
In typical Queensland tradition, the administrators and public blamed 
outside factors for the poor on field performance of the state rugby league 
team. Yet on this occasion their criticisms seemed justified. The team's poor 
results were attributed to the player drain of Queensland's best talent to the 
Sydney rugby league competition, the New South Wales Rugby League 
(NSWRL) premiership. The competition rules did not allow Queenslanders 
who played with Sydney clubs to play for their home state. To compound 
Queenslanders' sense of injustice, Queensland players who had relocated to 
Sydney now became eligible for the NSW Rugby League team. A player's 
eligibility was determined by the competition in which they played, rather 
than their place of birth. Year after year the Queensland team was depleted 
after the annual state representative fixtures as Sydney clubs bought all the 
best talent and relocated them to Sydney.11 Queensland annoyance and 
sense of injustice was justified. Not only did they receive a thrashing from 
NSW, many of the players who could make Queensland more competitive 
were handing out the thrashing. 
The interstate fixtures reached a crisis point in 1979. NSW had won 
the series comfortably. The Queensland Rugby League (QRL) administrators 
wondered if the concept was still viable. The media and the public called for 
Queensland players who played in NSW to return and play for their home 
state. They argued that players' birth place should determine which state 
they represented, not the state where they played. The return of the 
10 Harris, Winfield State of Origin: 3. 
11 Max & Reet Howell & Peter Hastie, State of Origin: The First Twelve Years: Herron, 
Brisbane, 1992, 7-9. The other minor states of Australia shared similar frustrations to 
Queensland. Leading Australian Rules players from South Australia, Western Australia, and 
Tasmania were lured to the Victorian Football League, seriously depleting the local 
competitions in these regions. 
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'southern' Queenslanders back into the Queensland team would make the 
Queensland team competitive. Hopefully, more than competitive. But Senator 
Ron McAuliffe, the President of the QRL in 1979, was concerned about the 
NSW-based players' attitude and commitment to the local 'cause'. He felt the 
players may not give their all for the maroon jersey. Moreover, he was 
extremely worried that if the southern Queenslanders did return and played, 
but Queensland lost, than rugby league in Queensland would not survive.12 
McAuliffe illustrated typical Queensland mentality. He was a pessimist. 
On a plane tnp between Brisbane and Canberra in November 1979, 
Brisbane local media identity Hugh Lunn (1996) believes he convinced 
McAuliffe to try the 'Origin' concept. Lunn countered McAuliffe's anxieties by 
claiming that Queenslanders are similar to Catholics: like Catholics, they are 
only ever lapsed Queenslanders.13 McAuliffe now concurred: 
Once those Queenslanders playing in Sydney 
heard the bugle call they'd react, react like opera 
stars. I do believe the Queensland spirit would win 
the day.i4 
McAuliffe agreed to organise an Origin style match for the third fixture the 
following year if Queensland was well beaten in the first two. 
The first two games of the 1980 series continued the NSW pattern of 
superiority. So McAuliffe arranged a State of Origin game to replace the third 
12 Lunn, 'The Origin of the Origin', 64. 
13 Hugh Lunn was working for The Australian as a reporter. He went to Canberra to collect a 
Wakely Award for Best Sports Feature story in 1979. 
14 Lunn, 'The Origin of the Origin', 64. 
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traditional interstate match. All Queenslanders, even those who played south 
of the border in NSW, would be eligible for their home state. For the first time 
Queensland could field its 'best' side. The Origin game was now a true test of 
the two states. The winner could 'prove' they were the best team. The 
Queensland team were, however, still considered hopeless underdogs 
before the match started. Yet with a surge of passion, Queensland won the 
first State of Origin contest 20-10. 
A former Brisbane mayor believed the victory dispelled the "urban 
inferiority complex" of Queenslanders. He argued that Queenslanders were 
raised with notions of NSW and Victorian superiority. But the victory 
challenged this stereotype.i5 It 'proved' that Queenslanders were as good as 
anyone else, possibly even better.ie Queensland's victory in the first State of 
Origin match meant much more to Queenslanders than just a victory over 
NSW in a game of rugby league. The victory dispelled myths of Queensland 
inferiority. It 'proved' that Queenslanders could compete with NSW. In fact 
they were more than competitive, they had won. In the succeeding decade, 
the Queensland State of Origin team continually undermined the myth that 
Queensland was backward and inferior to NSW. Interstate sport was, 
therefore, more than just a game: it was a symbolic means by which rival 
Australian cities 'measured' themselves against each other. 
Queensland's relationship with State of Origin 
The commercial and competitive success of the first State of Origin game in 
1980 institutionalised a series that became the most watched and anticipated 
sporting event in Queensland and NSW during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
15 This relationship was similar to the southern and western states of Australia in State of Origin 
Australian Rules contests - particularly during the 1980s. 
16 Jim McKay & lain Middlemiss, 'Mate against Mate, State against State: A case study of media 
constructions of hegemonic masculinity in Australian sport'. Masculinities: 3(3), 1995, 31. 
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The three games each year allowed the two states to compete against one 
another in full view of their state's population. Bret Harris (1992) described 
the importance of State of Origin to Queenslanders in this way: 
Civil war breaks out in Australia every winter. 
Instead of launching missiles and firing machine 
guns, the tribes of New South Wales and 
Queensland engage in ceremonial warfare. Warriors 
line up on opposite sides of a rectangular field to 
take part in the Australian war game - rugby league. 
When the sirens sound the combatants depart, 
victorious or vanquished. The primeval rite allows 
the neighbouring States to resolve their ancient 
conflicts without engaging in actual battle.i7 
A Queensland victory each year took on great importance. To win 'proved' 
that Queensland was not inferior. To lose perpetuated the myth of inferiority 
to Queenslanders and the stereotype of Queensland inferiority within NSW. 
With a State of Origin victory Queenslanders did not feel they were inferior, it 
was just a myth. Queensland continually undermined stereotypes of 
inferiority throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. Between 1980 and 1991, 
Queensland won 20 games to NSW's 12. They scored considerably more 
points than NSW, 553 to 410. Most importantly, they won 9 series to NSW's 
3.18 Queensland had beaten NSW by an average of 3 games to 1 in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Just 12 years before Queensland had no chance of 
winning. In the early 1990s, they had broken down old myths. This was 
precisely the image the media and politicians focused upon. 
17 Harris, Winfield State of Origin: 1. 
18 Howell, Howell & Hastie, State of Origin: 254. 
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Politicians and the media used the Origin series as evidence to 'prove' 
that Queensland had changed. In 1991, Courier-Mail journalist Lawrie 
Kavanagh attributed the increased confidence of Queenslanders to 
numerous Queensland victories in State of Origin contests: 
I believe that [Wally] Lewis, through the medium of 
Ongin football, has played a major role in 
transforming Queensland from a bunch of uncertain 
people wandering around like Brown's cows, 
unsure of where they were heading, into a pretty 
confident mob who can take on the world and 
deliver the goods when we have to.is 
Kavanagh was not alone when he wrote of a Queensland transformation 
from a 'Brown Cow' to 'a pretty confident mob'. The Sun also linked success 
on the sporting field with the state's new positive outlook.20 The Queensland 
team became the icon that fought the 'evil forces' of NSW. They were the 
underdogs who tnumphed over adversity. They provided a successful 
example that Queenslanders felt they could translate into any other 
enterprise. 
The State of Origin contests were popular. While not every 
Queenslander was an ardent supporter of the State of Queensland and the 
19 Wally Lewis was the captain of the Queensland team for 29 of the 32 games between 1980 
and 1991, the year he retired from representative rugby league. Lewis was called the 'King' by 
the media and politicians. He represented the 'true' embodiment of the Queensland Spirit. He 
was described by the media as the typically Queenslander. Howell, Howell & Hastie, State of 
Origin: 255; McKay & Middlemiss, 'Mate against Mate, State against State', 39. 
20 The Sun. 1991, 12, cited in McKay & Middlemiss, 'Mate against Mate, State against State', 
36. 
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Queensland Rugby League Team, the Origin contests provided a great deal 
of meaning in many Queenslanders' lives.21 The three matches from the 
1991 series were watched by six million people. The third game of that series 
rated between 63 or 65 in Brisbane and 55 in Sydney. This match was the 
most watched program in the history of television in Brisbane.22 |n 1994, the 
three Origin matches filled the first three places in the 1994 Australian 
television ratings.23 The Origin matches drew a very large percentage of the 
Queensland population together to watch each game. The state basked in its 
self-reflected glory when the team won. It 'proved' symbolically that 
Queensland had been transformed. 
Rugby league, and State of Origin particularly, holds a sacrosanct 
place in the Queensland psyche.24 |n 1992 Helen Yeates (1992) wrote an 
article critiquing relationships between women, the media, and football 
violence.25 The article examined the events surrounding the players off field 
activities in the week of a State of Origin game. While the activities before the 
contest, the game itself, and the aftermath were covered by the media with 
unprecedented significance, Yeates argued that the players' off-field 
misbehavior was left unreported in the groundswell of public adulation and 
21 McKay and Middlemiss argue that the State of Origin concept excluded a vast percentage 
of the population. The construction of the contests in the media legitimated violence, 
heterosexuality and femininity, while it excluded women, homosexuals and Aborigines. 
Despite their assertions, a number of Aborigines did play in the State of Origin contests with 
Queensland and NSW. Moreover, at least one homosexual played for NSW (though covertly). 
Undoubtedly, a large proportion of Queenslanders did find the Origin concept appealing, 
including women. 
22 There is some debate over the ratings figures for the third game in the 1991 series. McKay 
believes 65% of Brisbane households had at least one television tuned to the match. The 
game was the most watched television program in Queensland and NSW television history. 
Harris claims the figure was 63%. McKay & Middlemiss, 'Mate against Mate, State against State, 
32 and Harris, Winfield State of Origin: 3. 
23 McKay & Middlemiss, 'Mate against Mate, State against State', 32. 
24 McKay & Middlemiss, 'Mate against Mate, State against State', 43. 
25 Helen Yeates, 'Women, the media, and football violence'. Social Alternatives: 11 (1), April, 
1992, 17-20. 
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media promotion.26 Yeates concluded that the football field creates an 
environment that legitimates aggression and violence in wider society. 
The media's hostile reaction to Yeates' criticisms highlighted the 
strength of feeling for rugby league, and State of Origin in Queensland. 
Yeates criticised one of the most popular events in Queensland society. For 
80 minutes a large proportion of the Queensland population watches just 
one event. There are few other occasions that attract such large popular 
support in Queensland. Yeates' criticisms challenged traditional ideas of 
Queensland masculinity and physicality. The media treated her with great 
contempt because, as they put it, she did not 'understand' the passion and 
emotion that rugby league evoked within broad elements of the general 
community. The media reacted by diluting, distorting, trivialising, and 
satirising her views.27 The media commotion created by Yeates in 1992 
crystalises the deep-seated attachment that State of Origin held in the hearts 
and minds of most people in Queensland. Only a brave individual would 
challenge the notion that State of Origin was the only game that counted. 
The 1982 Commonwealth Games 
Brisbane's bid for the 1982 Commonwealth Games began in November 
1973. The Lord Mayor, Clem Jones, discussed the idea with leading state, 
local, and civic representatives. They concluded that the Commonwealth 
Games would enhance Brisbane's and Queensland's national and 
international reputation.28 The Games would act as a standard for Brisbane's 
development. It would highlight Brisbane's movement from a large country 
26 Helen Yeates, 'The State of Origin: The media state of play', Australian Journalism Review: 
14(2), July-December, 1992, 131. 
27 Yeates, 'The State of Origin', 135. 
28 BCC Administration, XII Commonwealth Games. Brisbane 1982: Brisbane's Bid for the 
Games: 31 May 1977, 1. 
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town into a large, vibrant, captivating city. As a result of the meeting, the 
council formed a Commonwealth Games Steering Committee to oversee the 
bid process. The Steering Committee sent a number of its members to the 
Christchurch Commonwealth Games in 1974 to express Brisbane's 
intentions to host the 1982 Games. Brisbane's bid gained official 
endorsement from the Australian Commonwealth Games Association in 
March 1975.29 
In March 1975, Brisbane entered the pursuit of global capital, tourism, 
and economic development. The BCC linked the city's economic growth to a 
sporting festival. Brisbane's use of sporting events to attract economic 
investment was common in North America. This process first began in North 
America in the 1960s and 1970s. Peripheral North American cities wanted to 
share in the redistribution of capital, the resource boom, and the rise of new 
information-based industries. There was a large migration of people away 
from the old industrial cities to the 'boom' cities of Dallas, Houston, Denver, 
Phoenix, Atlanta, Vancouver, Calgary and Edmonton.so The new boom cities 
competed with each other, as well as the traditional international cities of 
Chicago, Los Angeles, Montreal, Toronto, and New York for global capital 
and stimulus to economic growth. An important strategy by politicians and 
local business people was the use of major league sport and world class 
sporting and entertainment festivals to announce their 'arrival' as a major 
international city. Without a major league professional sporting franchise, 
argued William Hudnut, the Mayor of Indianapolis, a city would not be 
29 BCC Administration, XII Commonwealth Games. Brisbane 1982:1. 
30 David Whitson & Donald Macintosh, 'Becoming a World-Class City: Hallmark Events and 
Sport Franchises in the Growth Strategies of Western Canadian Cities', Sociology of Sport 
Journal: 10, 1993,226. 
37 
considered developed and thus not receive international recognition.3i But 
once a city acquired a wortd class event, the city itself was said to be 
transformed.32 |t would gain international stature from its association with the 
event, and it would deliver global prestige. 
The BCC pursued the 1982 Commonwealth Games to counter the 
negative stereotypic images of Brisbane. It wanted to show the world, or at 
least the Commonwealth countries who would attend, that Brisbane was a 
progressive, dynamic, and buoyant city. By successfully hosting the 
Commonwealth Games, Brisbane would alter outsiders' negative images of 
the city. The BCC claimed the Commonwealth Games held great importance, 
second only in stature to the Olympics Games.33 The Commonwealth Games 
are a global event because they include competitors and officials from many 
regions throughout the world, the BCC argued. Conversely, multi-event 
Games of similar size to a Commonwealth Games, such as the Asian or 
European Games, draw their participants from one region, not a number of 
regions. These events do not attract the attention of the global media 
because they provide only regional interest.34 But the Commonwealth 
Games would capture the world's media attention because of its international 
structure. The international television coverage would highlight Brisbane's 
'perfect' climate, relaxed lifestyle, and physical beauty to an audience of over 
five hundred million people. 
31 Bernard Frieden & Lynn Sagalyn, Downtown Inc: How America Rebuilds Cities: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 1989, 279. 
32 Whitson & Macintosh, 'Becoming a World-Class City', 227. 
33 Brisbane City Council Archives (BCCA): Commonwealth Games Collection (CGC) Box 1. 
BCC, Internal Audit Report on the Commonwealth Games Project: prepared by G. Bierton, 
Senior Internal Audit Clerk, submitted by M. Duce, Chief Internal Auditor, 14 January 1981, 5. 
The BCC disregarded the Soccer World Cup in their comparison between the Commonwealth 
Games and the Olympics. The World Cup even rivals the Olympics for international attention 
and prestige. Although the World Cup is hosted by a country, rather than an individual city. 
34 BCC, Internal Audit Report on the Commonwealth Games Project: 5. 
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The Games were an avenue to emphasise Brisbane's positive image 
to the wortd in a locally controlled way. However, even the BCC 
acknowledged that Brisbane did not conform to the structure or form of many 
other international cities. It did not have the world's tallest building, a 
distinctive harbour bridge, ancient monuments, or castles. Other Australian 
cities suffered from similar problems. Like Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth have 
no readily distinctive features to promote the city. The BCC promoted 
Brisbane through its 'clean and neat' and relaxed image. In 1981, the BCC 
asked the residents of Brisbane to take pride in Brisbane through the Image 
82 campaign.35 The campaign's objectives were threefold. First, to stimulate 
the interest of Brisbane in the Commonwealth Games. Second, to motivate 
residents to improve the physical appearance of their property before the 
Commonwealth Games. Third, the BCC would improve the city, or the parts 
of the city that would be seen by tourists and the international media. 
Significantly, Image 82 was not designed to improve the overall appearance 
of the city. It was designed to give the impression to outsiders that Brisbane 
was a clean, lush, and attractive tropical city.36 The BCC concentrated its 
improvements on Kingsford Smith Drive, the arterial road that links Brisbane 
with the airport, the marathon route, and the roads surrounding the sporting 
facilities.37 The BCC spent over $1.5 million on this project.38 Image 82 was a 
calculated plan to alter outsiders' negative image of Brisbane. 
35 Brisbane City Council Archives (BCCA): Image '82 Collection (lmage82C) Box 1. Brisbane 
City Council, Image '82 Project: Draft Terms of Reference: 1981, 1. 
36 BCCA: lmage82C Box 1. Brisbane City Council, Brisbane Citv Council: Games Citv Update 
No.2: 1981, 1. 
37 BCCA: lmage82C Box 1. Memorandum to Mr. A.T. Philbrick, Town Clerk, from the Forward 
Planning Officer, 14 December 1981, 1-3. 
38 BCCA: General Files. Department of Health and Community Services, 'Department of 
Health and Community Services: Internal Annual Report for 1981-82', Internal Annual Report 
1981/82: Brisbane City Council, 11. 
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The BCC confidently claimed the 1982 Commonwealth Games would 
stimulate economic growth in Brisbane and alter the city's reputation in 
Australia and overseas. Former Lord Mayor, Bryan Walsh, believed the 
Games would be a catalyst for international recognition: 
the City will gain international headlines and 500 
million viewers will watch the event on television...as 
a result Brisbane would be on the map.39 
The Staging of the 1982 Commonwealth Games 
The BCC needed to construct a large number of sporting facilities in order to 
host the 1982 Commonwealth Games. Prior to 1982, there was no tartan 
athletic track, indoor aquatic complex, or international standard velodrome in 
Brisbane. The lack of high quality sporting facilities in Brisbane in the 1970s 
perpetuated the city's backward and archaic image. The Valley Pool, the 
RNA showgrounds, Lang Park, and the Gabba represented the most 
advanced sporting facilities in Brisbane and none of those could claim to be 
of world standard. The construction of new sporting facilities was essential if 
Bnsbane wanted to host the Games successfully. The BCC agreed with the 
Commonwealth Games Foundation (CGF) to provide all the facilities for the 
Games.40 Each of these new facilities had to conform to CGF standards. 
In the mid 1970s there was much debate between and within the CGF, 
the BCC, and the Queensland State Government over the type and style of 
the new Games facilities. The BCC prepared three different construction 
39 The Telegraph. 23 June 1982. 
40 BCCA: CGC Box 2. The deed of agreement made on the 20th of February 1978 between 
The XII Commonwealth Games Australia (1982) Foundation Limited and the Brisbane City 
Council, 1978, 1. 
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options. Each one differed in cost and permanency of the facilities.41 The first 
two options were largely temporary. These options would not give Brisbane 
the legacy of international sporting facilities that the BCC had anticipated. 
The BCC chose the most expensive and most permanent option, even 
though they were supposed to be constrained by financial and political 
limitations. The Council built three international sporting facilities: first, an 
athletics stadium at Nathan, an outer suburb of Brisbane in 1982. However, 
the majority of the seating was temporary because the BCC could not 
foresee any reason to construct 60,000 permanent seats in Brisbane. It was 
thought that the city did not have the population or sporting competitions to 
sustain crowds of that size. Second, an indoor aquatic and indoor sports 
complex was built at Chandler, a south-eastern Bnsbane suburb. Third, a 
velodrome was constructed adjacent to the sports complex at Chandler. 
Unfortunately, construction costs of these facilities left a large debt to 
the ratepayers of Brisbane. In 1977, the BCC estimated the Games facilities 
would cost $30 million. The funding of the facilities would be divided equally 
between the Local, State, and Federal Governments. All costs above $30 
million, however, were the responsibility of the BCC. The BCC badly 
underestimated their initial projections. Building costs escalated as the 
construction process developed. Prior to the start of development, the BCC 
guaranteed to the ratepayers of Brisbane that the cost of the Games facilities 
would not exceed $10 million. As costs climbed, though, the BCC hid the 
actual costs from the ratepayers of Brisbane. The facilities eventually cost the 
ratepayers of Bnsbane at least $23.8 million, or $13.8 million more than the 
initial estimates in 1977.42 However, this over-expenditure was hidden by 
41 The three models were the economy model, projected cost in 1982 dollars was $11.5 
million; the standard model, cost $25.5 million; the deluxe model, cost $30 million. John Cole, 
Shapino a Citv: Greater Brisbane 1925-1985: William Brooks, Brisbane, 1984, 354. 
42 Cole, Shaping a Citv: 369-371. 
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BCC officials from the ratepayers of Brisbane during the euphoria 
surrounding the Games' success. 
Despite the excessive costs incurred in the construction of the Games' 
facilities, the media, politicians, and Games officials emphasised the positive 
effects of the Games, whilst dismissing the downside of public expenditure. 
The BCC insisted the Games were a remarkable success: 
The successful staging of the XII Commonwealth 
Games was without doubt the greatest ever 
spectacle ever presented in Bnsbane. World 
acclaim for both the standard of the outstanding 
facilities and the organisation of the entire program 
was received from many officials of participating 
countries.43 
Politicians, media, and Games' officials equated this success with what they 
took to be Brisbane's developing role as a major national and international 
city. Roy Harvey, the Lord Mayor during the Games, asserted that the Games 
gave the residents of Bnsbane a new self assurance. The city had 
successfully hosted a major international event. Brisbane had shown the 
doubters. As a consequence, Brisbane was now linked symbolically to other 
international cities that had hosted the Games. According to Harvey, 
therefore, Brisbane was now an international city.44 
Despite BCC assertions that the Games would attract large numbers 
43 BCCA: General Files. Department of Health and Community Services, 'Department of 
Health and Community Services Internal Annual Report for 1982-83', Internal Annual Report 
1982/83: Brisbane City Council, 1983, 1. 
44 Cook, Shaping a Citv: 372. 
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of international tourists, internal BCC reports suggest it was predominantly a 
localised affair in terms of patrons. Prior to the commencement of the Games, 
the BCC predicted the Games would attract an additional 100,000 tounsts to 
south-east Queensland.45 These Council estimates prior to the event were 
extremely optimistic. After the Games the BCC considered that only 6,500 
overseas tourists, of which 2,200 were athletes and officials, attended the 
Games.46 Lynch and Jensen (1984) estimated that there were 5,000 inter-
state and 15,000 intra-state visitors who attended the Games.47 However, a 
random sample of spectators' origins at the OEM Stadium did not support 
these estimates. Approximately 95 to 99 percent of the spectators at OEM who 
completed the survey were from the south-east corner of Queensland.48 So 
the Games were essentially a localised affair in terms of spectators. 
Angus Innes (1983), a State Member of Parliament, believed Brisbane 
and Queensland's 'new' image had profound financial ramifications. Innes 
claimed that Brisbane was not as affected by the nation-wide recession of the 
early 1980s. Instead Queensland continued its economic growth.49 National 
corporations viewed Brisbane differently. Manufacturing industries, financial 
institutions, and other businesses were surprised by the change in Brisbane. 
It continued its economic growth, in spite of declining turnovers in other 
45 BCC, Internal Audit Report on the Commonwealth Games Project: 5. 
46 BBCA: Olympic Games Collection (OGC) Box K457. Anthony Philbrick, Preliminarv Report 
to Council on the Possibility of Holding the 1992 Olympic Games in Brisbane: report 
presented on 19 November 1982, 42. 
47 p. Lynch & R. Jensen, 'The Economic Impact of the Xll Commonwealth Games on the 
Brisbane Region', Urban Policy and Research: 2(3), 1984, 14. 
48 BCCA: CGC Box 5. R. Sherman (Public Transport Co-ordinator Xll Commonwealth Games) 
Report on Public Transport Co-ordination for Xll Commonwealth Games Brisbane 1982: 1982, 
Annexure E: OEM Spectators: point of origin. 
49 Angus Innes, 'The Political Impact of the Games on Queensland: I', The 1982 
Commonwealth Games: A Retrospect: compiled from papers presented at the Australian 
Studies Centre seminar held in Brisbane on 19-20 March 1983, 39. 
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regions and cities of Australia.so innes attributed the increased economic 
activity to the Commonwealth Games. 
John Garnsey (1983) asserted that the Games were the catalyst for an 
altered identity and new progressive future for all Queenslanders. The 
Games created a new self-confidence in business and political leaders of 
both Brisbane and Queensland. This, he claimed, would allow the state to 
progress and grow. The other states of Australia began to acknowledge this 
transformation in Queensland's status.5i The state had moved to another 
level in its relationship with NSW and Victona. Unhindered by previous 
negative images, and self conscious of its changing relationship with other 
Australian states, Queensland would develop future economic growth. The 
city and state were destined, it was said, for a great future.52 
The BCC spoke of an image of civic unity throughout Brisbane during 
the Games. However, not all Brisbane residents thought the Games were 
'theirs'. In anticipation of political protest, the state Government passed the 
Commonwealth Games Act. It allowed individuals to be arrested and 
detained without being charged. A number of Aboriginal protesters gathered 
outside OEM stadium before the opening ceremony to protest against their 
unjust treatment as basically second class Australian citizens. They were 
taken away by the police and held in the Holland Park watchhouse for over 
eight hours.53 Terry O'Gorman (1983) believed the Commonwealth Games 
50 Innes, The Political Impact of the Games on Queensland: I', 39. 
51 John Garney, 'Queensland and Brisbane as a Focus for Advertising Strategies and the 
Games', The 1982 Commonwealth Games: A Retrospect: compiled from papers presented at 
the Australian Studies Centre seminar held in Brisbane on 19-20 March 1983, 23. 
52 Garnsey, 'Queensland and Brisbane as a Focus for Advertising Strategies and the Games', 
23. 
53 The Political Impact of the Games on Queensland: II', The 1982 Commonwealth Games: A 
Retrospect: compiled from papers presented at the Australian Studies Centre seminar held in 
Brisbane on 19-20 March 1983, 43. 
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Act and the ban on all street marches in metropolitan Brisbane effectively 
discouraged any opposition to the Games.54 Despite the BCC rhetoric, the 
Games did not unify all Brisbane residents. 
Brisbane's Bid for the 1992 Olympics Games 
Immediately after the 1982 Commonwealth Games, the BCC investigated the 
possibility of hosting the 1992 Olympic Games. The BCC wanted to use an 
Olympic Games to reinforce Brisbane's development as a national city, and 
cultivate its reputation as an international city. The Olympics are a much 
more internationally recognised event than the Commonwealth Games. The 
Commonwealth Games do not capture attention outside of member 
countries. The Olympics, however, include far more countries at their Games. 
This allows the host city to promote itself to an international audience. The 
Olympics offer the host city the possibility of world-wide recognition and 
acceptance. Chnstopher Hill (1992) argues that the Olympics are better at 
promoting an individual city than even the historical route of hosting an 
exposition.55 
On 19 November 1982 the BCC Town Clerk, Anthony Philbrick, 
presented his preliminary report investigating the possibility of hosting the 
1992 Olympics Games to Council.56 He concluded that the Olympic Games 
were an event that would bring great benefits to Brisbane. Before the 
Commonwealth Games began, the southern states did not believe Brisbane 
was experienced enough to host such a high profile event. But as the Games 
drew closer and once they began, Brisbane residents, and to an increasing 
54 O'Gorman, 'The Political Impact of the Games on Queensland: 11', 43-48. 
55 Christopher Hill, Olympic Politics: Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, 219. 
56 Philbrick, Preliminary Report to Council. 
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extent the rest of Australia, become excited supporters.57 |n Brisbane, the 
Games developed a sense of collective belonging for residents, a sense of 
shared expenence within the city. Philbrick argued an Olympic Games would 
create a similar, but substantially larger, impact than the Commonwealth 
Games.58 Civic leaders were persuaded. Hence the City of Brisbane formally 
announced to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) it wanted to host 
the 1992 Olympic Games. 
Ultimately, the Brisbane bid was unsuccessful. In October 1986 the 
IOC chose Barcelona as the host city for the 1992 Olympics. The Brisbane 
bid had failed. Yet in her speech to Council in February 1987 Brisbane's 
Lord Mayor, Sallyanne Atkinson, spoke of a symbolic victory for the people of 
Brisbane. The bid, she asserted, strengthened spirit and pride in the city, 
generated tourist and investment potential through world-wide media 
attention, provided new sporting facilities, and reinforced Brisbane's new-
found stature for excellence in sporting administration.59 Atkinson concluded 
that Brisbane's bid was not beaten by the strength of Barcelona's bid, but by 
their 'emotional' argument. She claimed Barcelona had won because it was 
the birthplace of the IOC president, Juan Antonio Samaranch. Brisbane had 
only lost because of his influence, not the quality of their bid.60 
One of the drawbacks of the Brisbane bid was that the city was not 
recognised widely as a major international city. The city was too small, it was 
not a globally recognised city, despite the rhetoric from the Brisbane media 
and politicians. Brisbane's Olympic failure supported the doubters. Brisbane, 
57 Sutton, 'On Being the Host Broadcaster: Producing the Games', 13. 
58 Philbrick, Preliminary Report to Council: 1. 
59 BCCA: OGC Box W. Lord Mayors Report to Council presented on 20 February 1987 by 
Sallyanne Atkinson, Report: Brisbane's Bid for the 1992 Olympic Games: 5. 
60 Atkinson, Report: Brisbane's Bid for the 1992 Olvmpic Games: 6. 
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Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney all sought Australian Olympic Federation 
(AOF) approval to host the 1996 Olympic Games. The AOF endorsed the City 
of Melbourne as Australia's representative for the 1996 Games, despite 
Bnsbane's apparent early favouritism.6i Like the IOC, the AOF chose another 
more internationally prominent city instead of Brisbane. It seems likely 
Brisbane had not repositioned itself adequately within the Australian context. 
It was still only the third most 'important' Australian city, well behind Sydney 
and Melbourne. 
Expo 88: The Transformation Continues 
From the mid 1970s, the Queensland Government was concerned that 
negative images were affecting the economic development of the state. To 
alleviate these images, the State Government pursued an international 
exposition, an historical signifier of a city's importance on the world 'cultural 
map'. Tony Bennett (1992) argues that an exposition marks the passage of 
progress. It symbolises the socio-economic advancement of a nation. Usually 
the capital or dominant city of the nation hosts the event. In this way, both the 
nation and the city display their claim of self-importance through the medium 
of the exposition.62 However, the relationship is different when a peripheral 
city hosts an exposition. The peripheral city breaks down the typical 
relationship between major city and its embodiment as a symbol of the 
nation. Instead, cities like Brisbane tend to pursue local, more so than 
national objectives. An exposition in an emergent city signifies the progress 
of that particular city, placing less emphasis on the nation. The provincial city 
uses an exposition to symbolise greater progress than rival cities within the 
61 Ian Jobling, 'Olympic Proposals and Bids by Australian Cities', Sporting Traditions: 11 (1), 
1994, 48. 
62 Bennett, 'The Shaping of things to come',123-124. 
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nation state.63 
In the mid 1970s, the State Government approached the Australian 
Bicentennial Authority (ABA) to host an exposition in 1988. The ABA were 
enthusiastic for an Australian city to host a Category 'A' exposition, but they 
preferred either Melbourne or Sydney to represent Australia. The ABA were 
not interested in a Brisbane Exposition. It wanted either of the two major 
Australian cities to host an Expo.64 Either the ABA did not believe Bnsbane 
could successfully host the event, or it felt Brisbane was unlikely to win the 
bidding process because it did not have sufficient international credibility. 
Despite the support of the ABA and financial assistance from the Federal 
Government, the NSW Government was not prepared to undertake the 
financial risk associated with staging a Category 'A' exposition. After Sydney 
withdrew, and Melbourne declined to apply because of financial concerns, 
the ABA approached Brisbane to host a smaller and less costly exposition. 
The Queensland Government approached the Federal Government 
for similar financial assistance to Sydney to host its exposition. But the 
Federal Government refused to give any financial support to a Brisbane 
Expo. The Brisbane Expo was a smaller. Category 'B', more specialised, yet 
still international, exposition. A Category 'B' exposition would attract less 
international and media attention than the larger Category 'A' Expo. The 
Federal Government gave no financial assistance because it considered the 
smaller Expo to be more of a local, rather than national event.65 Conversely, 
the NSW Government would have received $200 million in Federal funding. 
63 Bennett, 'The Shaping of things to come', 124. 
64 Peter Carroll, 'The Origins of Expo 88', Australian Journal of Public Administration: 48(1), 
1989, 44. 
65 Carroll, 'The Origins of Expo 88', 48. 
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if it had hosted a major Category 'A' international Expo at Darling Harbour. 
The Federal Government was concerned with the image of Australia, not the 
reputation of specific cities within Australia. Despite a lack of financial 
support, the Queensland Government was still determined to host the event, 
and decided to continue with its proposal. 
Before Expo 88 began, Llew Edwards, a former Deputy Premier and 
Treasurer, was appointed as Chairman of the Expo authority. Edwards 
succeeded in generating almost universal support for Expo 88 within the 
general Queensland community.66 The Expo motto, 'Together we'll show the 
wortd', was designed to provide a collective sense of belonging to Bnsbane 
residents and was something of a rallying cry to bond together in a common 
cause.67 The motto represented both the past and future of Brisbane. 
Edwards wanted Brisbane residents to 'show' Brisbane off to the world. This 
was the future of Brisbane, showing that Brisbane was a vibrant, international 
city. Concurrently, Edwards fed into the past through his use of the historic 
Queensland infenority complex. The Federal Government, NSW, and Victoria 
had questioned Bnsbane's capacity to host an exposition. Edwards asked 
the residents of Bnsbane to 'show the doubters' that Brisbane was capable of 
hosting the exposition. 
For six months in 1988, Expo was the veritable life and soul of 
Brisbane. It gave the residents of Brisbane new, unforeseen experiences. It 
captured the public imagination. Expo 88 was particularly successful among 
local residents. Sixty-five percent of all Expo visitors were from Brisbane or 
66 Jennifer Craik, 'Expo 88: fashions of sight and politics of site', in Tony Bennett, Pat 
Buckridge, David Carter & Colin Mercer (eds), Celebrating the Nation: A critical study of 
Australia's Bicentenarv: Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, 146. 
67 Bennett, 'The Shaping of things to come', 125. 
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the south-east comer of Queensland.68 The number of people who visited 
Expo 88 exceeded all expectations. The event organisers had anticipated 
just 8 million visitors over six months. Instead 16.5 million people (including 
staff) visited the Expo site. Expo attracted large numbers of overseas, 
interstate and intrastate visitors. One caveat, though, was that a large 
proportion of outside visitors rescheduled their already planned tnps to 
Queensland to coincide with Expo. There were an additional 170,000 
international tnps to Queensland, 894,000 interstate trips to Queensland, and 
306,000 intrastate trips within Queensland during the Expo penod.69 
Commercial accommodation in Brisbane was almost entirely full for the 
duration of the event.70 
The Queensland State Government focused on the positive aspects of 
hosting Expo 88, concluding that it was an absolute success. Despite their 
rhetoric, the Queensland Government did incur significant loses from hosting 
Expo 88. Jennifer Craik (1992) believes there was a direct cost of $229 
million and an indirect cost of $493.2 million to the Queensland public.71 
Nonetheless, the residents of Brisbane had successfully challenged the 
accepted 'outsider" representation of Brisbane. Expo 88 allowed the 
Brisbane media and politicians to proclaim the city's transformation. No 
longer was Bnsbane infenor to Sydney and Melbourne. After Expo, Brisbane 
joined the 'same' international league as Sydney and Melbourne. Expo 
68 Craik, 'Expo 88: fashions of sight and politics of site', 149. 
69 These figures are less impressive for the financial viability of Expo 88, explains Craik. A large 
promotion of overseas, interstate and intrastate visitors had already planned to come to 
Brisbane. They rescheduled their visit to coincide with Expo. Consequently, the number of 
visitors would not have increased the overall tourist numbers. Jennifer Craik, Government 
Promotion of Tourism: the role of the Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation: Brisbane 
Research Paper No.20, Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, Brisbane, 1991, 10. 
70 Craik, 'Expo 88: fashions of sight and politics of site', 155. 
71 For a more complete discussion of the costs associated with hosting Expo 88, see Craik, 
'Expo 88: fashions of sight and politics of site', 145-159 and Craik, Government Promotion of 
Tourism: the role of the Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation. 
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challenged these cities' historic dominance over Brisbane. Expo 88 
announced Bnsbane's 'arrival'. 
Throughout the 1980s, the backward image of Queensland was 
transformed by the successes of the annual State of Origin contests, the 
1982 Commonwealth Games, World Expo 88, and Brisbane's bid for the 
1992 Olympic Games. These events generated widespread public support 
and created a greater sense of belonging to the city and state. The success 
of these events challenged the notion of backwardness and inferiority. No 
single event fundamentally altered these common sense images. Each event 
reinforced the preceding, challenging and in some respects overturning the 
previously dominant and negative images. By 1990, the thoughts and values 
of Queenslanders had altered. They were no longer a 'bunch of brown cows', 
but a more sophisticated people who could hold their own with 'anyone'. 
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Chapter Two 
The Emergence of a National Sporting 
Infrastructure in Brisbane 
The structure and sophistication of the Brisbane sports marketplace in 1980 
reflected the limited and localised development of the city. In 1980 there 
were only three teams, the basketball team the Brisbane Bullets, and the 
soccer teams the Brisbane Lions and Brisbane City who competed in a 
national league. Prior to 1980 only two sports, soccer and basketball, had 
actually established national leagues in Australia. This chapter investigates 
the emergence of a national sporting infrastructure in Brisbane in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. The key sports in this process have been soccer, 
basketball, rugby league, and Australian Rules. Soccer was the first sport to 
establish a national league in 1977, though neither of the two Brisbane 
teams generated popular support in Brisbane, even when Brisbane City won 
a major knock-out competition. The Bullets basketball team became the most 
influential sporting club in Bnsbane in the 1980s. They captured a large base 
of popular support which shaped the promotion and marketing of sporting 
events in Brisbane in the following years. Subsequently, the Brisbane 
Broncos rugby league club adopted many of the Bullets' ideas of promotion 
and marketing. By the end of the 1980s, the local suburban sporting 
competitions were eclipsed in importance by national or quasi-national 
leagues. 
Brisbane's Involvement in the National Soccer League 
Histoncally, soccer in Australia has been culturally marginal because of the 
large migrant influence on the sport, especially since World War Two. After 
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the Second World War, a large number of southern and central Europeans 
migrated to Australia. Soccer was the dominant sport of these new 
Australians. The game quickly became associated with Croatians, Greeks, 
and Italians as they began to establish their own local clubs in Australia. The 
new migrants, even more strongly than before, reinforced and perpetuated 
the idea that soccer was not part of mainstream Australian sport. Indeed, 
since World War Two, soccer has been commonly referred to as 'wogball'.i 
Despite the ethnic associations that evolved around soccer, it was 
played extensively throughout Australia. Soccer is the second most popular 
football code in all the Australian states.2 However, it has never posed a 
serious challenge to the popular appeal of the foremost winter sport in each 
state. In the southern and western states, Australian Rules is by far the 
dominant and most popular winter spectator sport. In Queensland and NSW 
rugby league has been the leading winter spectator sport. So while soccer is 
the second most popular sport in each state, it has not captured large 
popular attention. 
In 1974 the Australian national team, the Socceroos, qualified for the 
World Cup in West Germany. For the first time the Australian media did not 
reinforce the negative stereotypes of soccer, but instead focused upon the 
positive Socceroo performances in reaching the World Cup for the first time. 
The mainstream media now treated soccer with some respect.3 The 
recognition of the Socceroos' success in competing in West Germany and 
the existence of solid local competitions in Queensland, NSW, South 
1 Philip Mosely & Bill Murray, 'Soccer' in Sport in Australia: A Social Historv. Wray Vamplew & 
Brian Stoddart (eds), Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994, 214. 
2 Mosely & Murray, 'Soccer", 214. 
3 Mosely & Murray, 'Soccer', 227. 
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Australia, and Victoria influenced the decision to form a national soccer 
competition. In 1977, only three years after the Socceroos' success in 
reaching the Wortd Cup Finals, the Australian Soccer Federation (ASF) 
established the NSL. It was the first national sporting league in Australia. The 
ASF (now Soccer Australia-SA) invited established teams from the local 
competitions of the eastern and southern states to join the NSL. Fourteen 
teams competed in the inaugural season of the NSL. 
Two clubs from Brisbane, Brisbane City (City) and Brisbane Lions 
(Lions), contested the NSL's inaugural season. Both clubs had strong 
histoncal connections with Brisbane soccer prior to 1977. Likewise, both 
clubs were associated with a particular ethnic group. City typically 
represented the Italian community in Brisbane, while Lions had strong ties 
with the Dutch population. Hence the supporter base for each team was 
drawn mainly from these respective ethnic minority communities. Both clubs 
were reasonably well supported in their first years in the NSL. In 1977, City 
attracted an average crowd of 5,500 (see figure 2.1).4 Lions averaged slightly 
less with 3,900 (see figure 2.2).5 After their first season, however, local 
support for the two teams quickly dissipated. In 1978, City averaged only 
3,700 a game, while Lions could draw only 3,300 a match. Over the next two 
seasons. City's average crowd declined to 2,500. Between 1980 and 1986 
(their last season in the NSL), City's attendance fluctuated between 1,500 
and 2,500 per match. They never again repeated their 1977 average 
attendance of 5,500. 
4 Interview with Andrew Howe on 9 Qctober 1997. Andrew Howe compiles statistics of the 
NSL. He provided me with average attendances for City, Lions, Brisbane United and Brisbane 
Strikers. 
5 Interview with Andrew Howe on 9 October 1997. 
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Figure 2.1: Average attendance of Brisbane City 1977-1986 
Average attendance 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Year 
Lions followed similar average attendance patterns as City. By 1979, Lions 
declining attendance had plateaued. After 1979, Lions figures fluctuated 
between 1,000 and 2,500 per game. 
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At no time did either NSL team in Brisbane captivate the general Brisbane 
sporting public. Even when City won the Phillips knockout Cup competition in 
1977, they attracted only 7,000 supporters to the final at Perry Park. In 1978 
they replicated their 1977 achievement, defeating Adelaide City 2-1 in the 
final. Yet only 5,200 people watched this victory at Perry Park.6 During the 
late 1970s and the 1980s, soccer in Brisbane was still an ethnic minority-
based, and hence culturally marginal sport.7 
By the middle of the 1980s, the economic viability of both soccer clubs 
continuing in the NSL was questionable. A major source of revenue had 
declined rapidly after their first season of competition. Crowd attendances 
only averaged between 1,000 and 2,500 per match after 1979. Under their 
contractual arrangements with the Queensland Soccer Federation (QSF) at 
Perry Park, City and Lions did not receive all the revenue from their gate. 
Instead, each club split the gate with the QSF.8 Furthermore, neither club 
received any revenue generated from the bar or catering trade. Financially, it 
was a drain on both clubs. Consequently, City redeveloped their home 
ground at Spenser Park in the inner northern suburb of Newmarket. This 
gave them financial autonomy from the QSF. Lions also relocated, moving to 
the outer south-western suburb of Richlands. 
During the 1980s, the NSL and its clubs were suffering from a lack of 
public interest. There was a general malaise in the national competition.9 In 
1984, the NSL was split into two leagues of twelve teams in an attempt to 
generate greater popular support. The two leagues were based 
6 Interview with Andrew Howe on 13 Qctober 1997. 
7 Interview with Pam Simeone, the Secretary of the Brisbane City Soccer Club, on 8 October 
1997. 
8 Interview with Pam Simeone on 8 October 1997. 
9 Interview with Andrew Howe on 13 October 1997. 
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geographically around region to curb travel costs and to create more local 
derbies - which were useful for generating local rivalnes.10 City and Lions 
were included in the same league as teams from Melbourne and Adelaide. 
The other pool consisted primarily of teams from NSW. This second pool 
successfully reduced transportation costs and created more local derbies, yet 
it weakened the 'national' status of the competition. The only occasion a 
team from one pool would play against a team from the other pool was if both 
teams won their different groups. Then the two pool winners would play each 
other in the grand-final. The NSL now resembled a combination between a 
state league and a quasi-national league. Ultimately, the two pool structure 
was discarded because it was unsuccessful. 
In 1987, the NSL reverted to its original format, a one league 
competition. However, Brisbane had no representative in the remodeled 
NSL. Neither City nor Lions competed in 1987. City had withdrawn 
completely at the end of the 1986 season. The club could not afford to 
organise and run a team in the NSL. Revenue had decreased, while the 
players demanded an increase in financial compensation.11 At the end of the 
1988 season. Lions also withdrew. So Bnsbane was again without an NSL 
representative. After a reasonably successful inaugural season. City and 
Lions failed to generate interest outside the traditional soccer community. 
Their most lasting contribution to soccer in Queensland was player 
recruitment, especially City. Both teams recruited overseas, luring players 
from Argentina, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.12 While both clubs failed to 
establish themselves in the NSL and to integrate within the Brisbane 
commercial sports marketplace, they were at least the first teams from 
10 Interview with Andrew Howe on 13 October 1997. 
11 Interview with Pam Simeone on 8 October 1997. 
12 Interview with Pam Simeone on 8 October 1997. 
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Bnsbane to compete in a national competition. In the 1990s, another two 
Bnsbane teams, Bnsbane United and the Brisbane Stnkers, have entered 
the NSL. 
The organisational structure of the inaugural NSL was different to the 
later organisation of national sporting competitions in Australia in the late 
1980s, which were essentially expanded regional, suburban-based leagues. 
Not until the late 1980s were expansion teams created artificially to represent 
a city or region. By 1995 the Australian Rugby League (ARL) had expanded 
their competition to include teams from Auckland, Bnsbane (two), Canberra, 
Gold Coast, Newcastle, Perth, Townsville, and Wollongong. Each team was 
established to represent a city or region. The new teams were not an 
amalgamation or a merger of clubs, they were created as new entities. The 
Australian Football League (AFL) developed slightly differently. South 
Melbourne, a traditional Melbourne club, relocated to Sydney. In 1987 two 
new privately owned teams were created in Perth and Brisbane, both of 
which are now in public hands. In 1991 the member based Adelaide Crows 
football club joined the AFL competition as a newly formed team consistent 
with rugby league's expansion. Port Adelaide, the final team to join the AFL 
in 1997 has a long association with the premier Australian Rules competition 
in South Australia, the South Australian National Football League (SANFL). 
In 1991-92 a new Bnsbane team was entered into the NSL - Brisbane 
United. United's establishment followed the model for expansion clubs in 
Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was designed to represent the 
city Brisbane, and thus to try to capture the imagination of the Brisbane 
sporting public. Brisbane's first entrants in the NSL had been established 
soccer clubs in Brisbane. By contrast United was created as a separate and 
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unique entity much like the Brisbane Bears and West Coast Eagles in 
Australian Rules, and the Brisbane Broncos in rugby league. Hence the club 
conformed to the new model of national league expansion in Australia. It did 
not draw any identity from an historical soccer club in Brisbane. Between 
1988 and 1991, the NSL altered fundamentally its structure and 
configuration. The ASF switched the NSL from a winter to a summer league. 
It tried to avoid direct competition with the dominant winter football codes in 
each state.13 The ASF thought soccer could increase its popular support in 
summer because there was little direct competition from other spectator 
sports - except for cricket. 
Yet Brisbane United lasted just two years. The club folded at the end 
of the 1992-1993 season. Despite their objectives. United had failed to attract 
spectators from outside the Brisbane soccer community. They averaged just 
over 2,000 spectators in each season (see figure 2.3).14 
Figure 2.3: Average attendance of Brisbane United/Strikers 1991/92-1996/97 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 
Year 
13 The reasons of Justice Burchett from the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales 
District Registry, General Division, concerning the case of NG 197 of 1995, Sydney, 23 
February 1996, 109-110. 
14 Interview with Andrew Howe on 9 October 1997. 
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These crowd numbers were significantly lower than the attendance figures 
for City and Lions in their first two seasons. After United folded, another team 
with similar playing and administrative personnel played in the NSL the 
following season. The Brisbane Strikers assumed the mantle of the now 
fortorn Bnsbane United. The Strikers generated about as much public 
support as United, until they relocated from Perry Park to the popular 
Suncorp Stadium. In 1995-96 the Strikers' average attendance almost 
doubled from 2,600 to 5,100 (see figure 2.3). However, the Strikers' average 
attendance in both 1995-96 and 1996-97 was less than Brisbane City in their 
inaugural season. In 1977 City's average attendance was 5,500. 
Yet the Stnkers went on to achieve something City never did. In 1997 
the Strikers generated unprecedented local interest in a national soccer 
game in Brisbane. The Strikers reached the final of the national Ericsson 
Cup against Sydney United. In the days preceding the final, the local media 
covered the event as it would cover any sporting event of major significance. 
Previously, soccer was excluded from such intensive media coverage 
leading up to a final. This match, however, was promoted as an historical 
event, the first of its type in Brisbane. With such widespread media 
promotion, the match at Suncorp Stadium attracted a record gate of 40,466 
for a NSL grand final.is The match was sold out. Significantly, this event 
attracted many non-soccer supporters to witness the historic achievement of 
Bnsbane winning its first NSL title. For the week prior to the final, and a few 
days after it, soccer emerged for the first time as a competitive sport in the 
Bnsbane sports marketplace. Yet it was the prestige of the event as a 
national sporting final involving a local team which attracted the 
unprecedented interest in the Brisbane public. In the new 1997-98 season 
15 The Australian: 26 May 1997, 25. 
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the Stnkers have yet to capitalise on the popular support they generated 
through the grand final. In their first home game of the season, they attracted 
just over 5,000 people, or their average crowd in 1996-97. 
The Rise of the Brisbane Bullets 1983-1992 
Basketball in Australia was a minor sport at the beginning of the 1980s. It 
could not compete with the dominant sports of rugby league in NSW and 
Queensland, or Australian Rules in the southern and western states of 
Australia. There was little historic attachment to basketball by Australians. In 
the late 1970s, the winter football leagues were based upon local, suburban 
competitions. The Victonan Football League (VFL) comprised teams from the 
environs of Melbourne. Likewise, the elite rugby teams of Sydney and 
Brisbane were established along local suburban boundaries. All football 
teams around Australia competed within their city and its immediate 
surrounds. There was no national competition in any of the dominant winter 
football codes. However, basketball was the second sport to establish a 
national competition in Australia in the late 1970s. Teams were established 
throughout Australia. They were based upon city or regional centres in 
Queensland, NSW, and the southern and western states of Australia. Teams 
drew their identity from the city or region they represented, and not their 
suburban locality. 
The Brisbane Bullets were a foundation member of the NBL when it 
began in 1979. The Bullets were established within the North American 
model of professional team sports. They were the sole basketball 
representative in the Brisbane sports marketplace, representing the city of 
Bnsbane. However, the Bullets were not an immediate success. This 
reflected the general lack of interest in basketball in Brisbane during the late 
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1970s and earty 1980s, and the underdeveloped nature of the Brisbane 
sports market. The Brisbane Bullets were a small sporting organisation prior 
to 1984. The club could raise only $1,500 in total sponsorship in 1983. 
Player payments were modest, totalling between $10,000 to $12,000 for the 
team in the 1984 season.i6 Of even greater concern, the Bullets had 
accumulated debts of approximately $30,000 from 1979 to the end of the 
1983 season. Such was their poor financial situation that there were no 
funds to pay the new coach they hired at the end of 1983.17 The new coach 
had to find funds for his own salary! Between 1979 and 1984, the Bullets 
were a small, underdeveloped organisation that averaged less than 300 
spectators per match. They played in an antiquated stadium in the inner 
western suburb of Auchenflower. At the end of 1983, the Bullets were a team 
with a small public profile. But they represented a progressive city that had 
just successfully hosted the Commonwealth Games. The Games caused a 
philosophical shift; Brisbane looked beyond the local environment, now 
competing and measuring themselves outwardly, rather than introspectively. 
At the end of 1983, Brian Kerle was employed to coach the Bullets for 
the 1984 season. But his role with the organisation extended beyond merely 
coaching the team in the NBL. He promoted the team, he approached and 
secured sponsors for the organisation, and he ran the basketball stadium at 
Auchenflower. Although he was not employed specifically as the general 
manager of the Bullets, this was effectively Kerle's role. However, his most 
important role was to establish a competitive team. 
Kerle was instrumental in transforming the Bullets from a small 
16 When Brian Kerle left the Bullets in 1992, there was no player who earned less than 
$50,000 a season. 
17 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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sporting organisation into the most progressive sports outfit in Brisbane 
dunng the late 1980s. When Kerle joined the Bullets, the off court operation 
of the Bullets was very small. In fact, the entire administration of the Bullets 
consisted of just two people - Kerle and a secretary. Between them, they ran 
the organisation.18 As the Bullets generated more sponsorship and larger 
crowds, Kerle recruited more people. By 1990, Kerle had employed three 
people in each of the marketing and the promotions sections. He also hired 
one permanent media relations officer. 
Kerte recognised the potential of marketing and promotions from his 
many tnps to North Amenca. He visited many sporting events in Australia to 
broaden his knowledge base, while critiquing the promotion, marketing, and 
administration of the different sport products in Brisbane. He synthesized all 
these different ideas and formulated distinct techniques he thought would 
promote basketball effectively in Brisbane in the 1980s.is Initially, Kerle had 
to convince people to come to watch the Bullets. He wanted to attract people 
to attend basketball. He sought to show the Brisbane public that basketball 
was a great game. In 1983, the crowds attending Bullets games were very 
sparse. Only 200 to 300 people were attending matches games before Kerle 
arrived. He felt promotion and marketing were the key to increase the profile 
of the Bullets, and, therefore, the attraction of the Bullets in the Brisbane 
sports marketplace. The 1982 Commonwealth Games had been a success 
because it was recognised as an event of public importance. Kerle tried to 
place heightened public importance on a Bullets basketball game to attract 
spectators. 
Kerle used a number of different marketing techniques to raise the 
18 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
19 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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profile of the Bullets in Brisbane. He attempted to situate the players - and 
therefore the club - within the general community. He wanted the players to 
be recognised publicly as 'Bullets'. Situating the players in the community 
took two forms. First, Kerle associated the players with prominent charity and 
fund raising events.20 The players associated themselves with the 
humanitanan and compassionate roles of charity work. They were highly 
visible in the general community in these roles and through the media 
attention that went with them. The Bullets were seen in a favourable way as 
supporting groups less fortunate than themselves. Second, Kerle increased 
public awareness of the players by creating distinctive 'characters' for the 
players. Kerte felt the public would hold greater attachment to and 
recognition of the players if they were characterised.21 The media were quick 
to acknowledge and reinforce the different caricatures. 'Ronnie the Rat' and 
'Leaping Leroy' became sporting icons for the Bullets throughout the late 
1980s. 
Kerle targetted the youth of Brisbane as the best potential pool for 
spectators and supporters. Again the Bullets players were placed 
strategically in the sphere of the general community. The players were sent 
to schools to participate in coaching clinics. In school holidays the Bullets 
held junior basketball camps. Hence both the players and coaching staff 
were involved with coaching the children. These camps were extremely 
popular, attracting between 600-800 children.22 Kerle also introduced 
incentives for registered junior basketball players in Bnsbane to play the 
game, and to attend Bullets matches. In each registration pack there were 
samples of the sponsors' products and a number of free tickets to any Bullets 
20 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
21 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
22 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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game. This strategy not only encouraged the sponsors' products to be 
sampled and purchased subsequently, but the recipients of the pack would 
probably be accompanied to a basketball match by a parent. 
The media played a key role in the Bullets' development. Initially, 
Kerte found the media unreceptive to his offers. He learned that the media 
had been approached before by the Bullets and were treated inconsiderately 
by them in the past. So Kerle invited journalists to matches and explained the 
rules and nuances of the game. He also provided the correct terminology of 
the game and gave them ideas about the suitable structure and content for a 
basketball story.23 Kerle educated the media on the game of basketball. He 
recognised the importance of a co-operative media and the advantages that 
a willing media could bnng. He actively developed a close working 
relationship with the media, employing an assistant to liaise with the media 
and cultivate a working relationship. 
Once Kerte attracted an audience to watch basketball, he sought to 
provide spectators with a broader experience than just a basketball match. 
However, Kerle did not alter the actual game of basketball, he simply turned 
each game of basketball into a cultural event. He provided the spectators 
with entertainment over and above the game itself.24 At each home game a 
steel band played, the cheer girls danced, and the team mascot amused. The 
Bnsbane sporting public were not familiar with these forms of entertainment. 
At other sporting contests in Brisbane, half time entertainment ranged from 
the non-existent to the unsophisticated. The forms of entertainment Kerle 
introduced were not unique; he borrowed these ideas from the North 
American model of promotion and marketing. But they had a novelty in 
23 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
24 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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Brisbane, so they were particularly effective in garnering consumer interest. 
Kerte de-emphasised the importance of the actual sporting contest 
between the two competing teams. The basketball match was constructed as 
an entire event or an occasion to be experienced by fans. The basketball 
match was now one of many parts of the total entertainment 'package'. The 
entertainment was designed to attract the non-sporting or non-basketball 
spectator who was interested in the experience or the occasion that Kerle 
developed through the many and varied forms of attractions at each Bullets 
match. He challenged conventional ideas about entertainment and sport in 
Bnsbane, and he transformed the Bullets from a sporting organisation into a 
leisure product. The Bullets not only competed with other sports for financial 
and crowd support, they were in competition with other forms of mainstream 
entertainment for this support. So Kerle's planning and strategy needed to be 
astute and enduring. 
The key group Kerle targetted was the family. He wanted to promote 
Bullets' matches as a family onentated event. In the early 1980s, rugby 
league crowds were notorious for their hyper-masculine behaviour. The 
predominantly male crowds often swore, drank, and threw objects at other 
sections of the crowd. Consequently, rugby league did not attract many 
family groups to their matches. The Bullets did not want to attract the 
excessively masculine element inherent in rugby league crowds. It targetted 
the family group and sought to provide them with a safe and friendly 
atmosphere free from obscene language, excessive alcohol, and flying 
objects. A Bullets game was an event in which men, women, and children 
would not be concerned about their personal safety. 
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Kerte's numerous promotion and marketing strategies proved very 
successful. They attracted a 'new' spectator to watch the Bullets play. Kerle 
joined the Bullets at the end of 1983. By the end of 1984, the crowds had 
increased from an average of less than 300 in 1983 to approximately 1,100. 
The largest crowd in 1984 was about 1,500.25 Games were even relayed via 
television cable on to the second court at Auchenflower, for the Basketball 
Stadium at Auchenflower could only seat 600 people. Total sponsorship also 
increased from about $1,500 in 1983 to approximately $4,000 in cash and 
product endorsement in 1984. Kerle's promotion and marketing success was 
reflected in the Bullets' playing performances in 1984. The team reached its 
first grand final. Hence, after only one season, Kerle had generated 
unparalleled support for basketball in Brisbane, and he provided a 
foundation upon which basketball could expand. 
Under Kerle's guidance, the Bullets quickly exceeded the confines of 
Auchenflower. A 600 seat stadium was clearly inadequate. Fortunately, the 
BCC was building a new indoor sports arena on the northern outskirts of 
Bnsbane in preparation for Bnsbane's bid to host the 1992 Olympic Games. 
The new stadium at Boondall assisted Kerle to achieve another objective. 
Boondall's modern facilities would provide spectators with greater comfort in 
which to enjoy a basketball game. Kerle felt spectator comfort was an 
instrumental part of their enjoyment and pleasure. Moreover, he argued that 
large numbers of spectators would not come to a Bullets match if they had to 
watch in substandard conditions as had been the case at Auchenflower.26 
Boondall's first class facilities and increased capacity fulfilled both of the 
Bullets' requirements. However, the stadium at Boondall would not be 
completed for the 1986 basketball season. In the interim, the Bullets used an 
25 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
26 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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indoor sports arena constructed for the 1982 Commonwealth Games at 
Chandler. While the sports arena at Chandler was not as large as Boondall, 
it was significantly bigger than Auchenflower. 
In 1985 the Bullets averaged between 3,000 and 4,000 spectators at 
Chandler.27They reached their second grand-final in two years. This time 
they were victorious. They were the first Brisbane sports team to win a 
national championship. The Bullets had thrust Brisbane into the national 
sporting spotlight. The local media excitement that followed was similar to the 
self-congratulatory discourse following Bnsbane's 1982 Commonwealth 
Games success. 
In 1986, the Bullets relocated from their intenm site at Chandler to 
Boondall. Between 1986 and 1991, the Bullets became the dominant and 
most influential sporting product in Brisbane. The Bullets' promotion and 
marketing departments seized upon the early success of Kerte in 1984 and 
1985, and actively promoted the Bullets in the public consciousness of 
Bnsbane. In 1986 the average home crowd increased from approximately 
3,000 to 4,000 in 1985 to 5,632 (see figure 2.4).28 The team reached its third 
grand final in three years, only to lose. Yet their highly competitive playing 
performances generated unprecedented local interest. The crowds 
increased yet again in 1987. They soared from 5,632 to 7,327. In just one 
season, the average attendance had risen by just under 2,000, or about 
40%. While these figures may not seem that remarkable in comparison to 
sports crowds in Melbourne, Sydney, or Adelaide, they are remarkable in 
Bnsbane because it did not have a tradition of high crowd attendances. 
27 interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
28 The attendance figures for the Bullets between 1986 and 1992 are from Bret Harris's article 
'Bullets attempt to rise Phoenix-like' in The Australian: 10 April 1997, 18. 
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The growth in attendance figures climbed as the Bullets continued 
their on-court success. The Bullets won their second grand-final in three 
years in 1987. In 1988 their average attendance rose another 2,000. Yet at 
no stage did the Bullets continually fill Boondall, with a capacity of 13,000. 
Unfortunately, the Bullets could not continue their on court domination. They 
finished fifth in 1988. In 1989, the crowds dropped only marginally to 9,091, 
despite the team finishing the season in eighth position. In 1990 the Bullets 
returned to their on-court dominance, reaching another grand-final. The 
average crowd again rose on the previous year. In 1991 the Bullets reached 
their pinnacle of crowd support in Brisbane, achieving their highest average 
crowd in 1991 - 9,635. Intriguingly, though, on-court performance did not 
match this achievement. They ended the season in ninth place. 
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The mid to late 1980s were the zenith of the NBL and the Brisbane 
Bullets. They reached five grand finals in seven years. But it was their off-
court success that established the Bullets as the most dominant basketball 
club in Australia and the most influential sporting organisation in Brisbane. In 
the earty 1980s, the Bullets had reflected the minor status of basketball in 
Bnsbane and Australia. They developed their later success through 
aggressive marketing and promotion, the invention of what was then a novel, 
razzamattazz atmosphere at the match, and the specific targeting of certain 
consumer groups within society. By 1991, the Bullets had driven basketball 
in Brisbane from a minor sport on the periphery of the sports marketplace to a 
most influential entertainment organisation. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Bullets had a tremendous 
influence upon the shape of other sporting organisations in Brisbane, 
especially cricket and rugby league.29 Cricket at the national level in 
Brisbane was a marginal commercial activity at the end of the 1980s. The 
Queensland crtcket team played a limited number of Sheffield Shield and 
one day games at the Gabba in a single season. The number of spectators at 
these games was quite sparse. The population of Bnsbane was not 
interested in watching the Queensland crtcket team, but they did attend 
Australian Test and One day matches in significant numbers. The 
Queensland Crtcket Association (OCA) did not market aggressively or 
promote the Queensland team to the general public or the commercial 
community. They perpetuated the typically unsophisticated strategies of 
sports promotion in Bnsbane. However, the financial and popular success of 
the Bullets illustrated to the OCA a future direction for sports promotion in 
29 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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Bnsbane. Kerte asserts that the OCA reviewed the promotion and marketing 
of the Queensland team and its position in the Bnsbane sports marketplace 
because of the Bullets success.30 They altered their marketing strategies to 
conform to the model of sports promotion that were utilised successfully by 
the Bullets. The Queensland team adopted a nickname, the Bulls. They 
produced a vast array of Bulls merchandising, as had the Bullets. The 
players became involved in coaching clinics for young children, and the OCA 
marketed the team aggressively in the corporate and financial community. 
So the OCA largely imitated the promotional strategies used so successfully 
by the Bullets, but with limited success. 
In the mid 1980s, rugby league in Bnsbane was still an isolated, local, 
suburban-based competition controlled by the QRL. This competition was in 
decline. People were choosing other forms of entertainment at the expense 
of the local competition. Attendance numbers had decreased. Senator Ron 
McAuliffe, the QRL president, attributed the decline in the Brisbane rugby 
league competition to the success and influence of the Bullets.si The Bullets 
were part of a national competition. They represented the city of Bnsbane. 
The local Brisbane rugby league competed with the national focus of 
basketball. Kerte believes that the Bullets were instrumental in altering the 
narrow, localised perspective of the Bnsbane sporting public.32 The Brisbane 
sporting public now wanted to support their own city, more so than their local 
club team. The Bnsbane sporting competitions, once a local sporting 
spectacle of some significance, were becoming feeders for national 
30 Inten/iew with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
31 Brian Kerle discussed the influence of the Bullets on rugby league in Brisbane with Ron 
McAuliffe at a sportsman's lunch. McAuliffe concluded to Kerle that the Bullets had been a 
factor in the decline of local rugby league competition. Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 
1997. 
32 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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competitions. 
In 1983 there were only two sports in Brisbane competing in national 
competitions. Neither were particularly successful. The popular competitions 
in Bnsbane were local and inward focused suburban competitions. The 
Bnsbane sports marketplace was simple, limited, and unsophisticated. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, the Bullets had altered fundamentally the direction of 
the Bnsbane sports marketplace. They introduced aggressive marketing and 
promotion, the possiblity of a commercially viable sporting product, and the 
importance of national competitions. These elements the Bullets had used so 
successfully in the 1980s were improved and refined by other sporting 
organisations. But it must be admitted that factors unrelated to the Bullets' 
success were particularly significant in the development of a national rugby 
league team in Brisbane. 
The Expansion of Rugby League in Eastern Australia 
The game of rugby league was in turmoil at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
game of rugby league was played at an elite level in just two states of 
Australia, NSW and Queensland. The premier competition was run by the 
NSWRL, which included only teams from Sydney pnor to 1982. The game 
was beset by problems, particularly its backward image and financial state. It 
was a sport still situated in working-class consciousness. It was not a game 
that attracted a wide spectrum of society. Its supporters were mainly male, 
who typically enjoyed the physical violence that often took place on the field. 
The players upheld the traditions of male-dominated Australian sporting 
culture of a bygone era. Women and families were not common at rugby 
league matches because of the heavy atmosphere of hyper-masculinity. Off 
the field, the game was tarnished by allegations of corruption. The game was 
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anchored in the past. It needed to revitalise itself and attract new supporters, 
sponsors, and a fresh image to the game. Otherwise, as Mike Colman (1996) 
argued, the game would have drifted away and died.33 
Not only did rugby league need to reconstruct its negative image, it 
also had to alter its fundamental structure. The demographics of the inner city 
communities had changed in Sydney. No longer did the working class, the 
traditional supporter base of rugby league, live close to the city. Instead, 
these suburbs were populated by an increasing number of professional 
people who were not overly enthusiastic about rugby league. Hence rugby 
league could no longer support a high number of inner city teams. The 
NSWRL needed to expand into new markets where there was potential for 
growth and development. So the revolution in rugby league came from within 
its establishment. 
Ken Arthurson and John Quayle were the two men who altered the 
image of rugby league and turned it into a financially viable competition. 
They changed the fundamental structure of the competition and in the 
process altered its image. The two men acknowledged that for its own 
sup/ival rugby league had to transcend class and gender boundaries. They 
altered the negative image of the game in three ways. First, the rugby league 
player was traditionally lionised and mythologised for his ability to drink large 
amounts of alcohol. Players would often get into trouble and would appear 
on the front pages of newspapers as larrikins. The connotations this raised 
about the game were now not so positive. So Arthurson and Quayle gave the 
media positive rugby league role models. Wayne Pearce and Andrew 
Ettingshausen (known colloquially as ET) were the complete antithesis of 
33 Mike Colman, Super League: The Inside Ston/: Ironbark, Sydney, 1996, 11. 
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traditional rugby league players. They transcended class and gender 
boundaries as the media focused on their sportsmanlike behaviour and 
educated background. Second, while the public relations helped alter the 
game's negative hyper-masculinity, according to Colman "it was an 
Amencan grandmother, two catchy tunes and a brilliantly audacious 
advertising campaign which really catapulted the game out of the past".34 By 
this statement he is referring to the use of rock star Tina Turner signing rugby 
league's unofficial anthem, 'you're simply the best'. Third, in 1980 the first 
State of Origin game between New South Wales and Queensland was 
played. These matches catapulted the game into the national consciousness. 
It was a hard, tough game of rugby league, the highest standard game of 
rugby league played in the world each year. It not only comprised the best 
players, but the players played with passion rarely displayed in club games. 
Even many people from the Australian Rules heartland of Melbourne turned 
on their television sets and watched. 
The Origins of the Brisbane Broncos 
Arthurson and Quayle built upon the marketing and advertising success by 
creating a more 'national' competition.35 ln 1982 they expanded the 
competition to include teams from Canberra and Wollongong. In 1983, they 
excluded Newtown from the following season's competition and tried to 
exclude Western Suburbs. Western Suburbs competed in the 1984 
competition because of a technicality in the NSWRL articles of association. 
The NSWRL were determined to exclude Wests from the competition 
34 Colman, Super League.18. 
35 There is no real 'national' competition in any of the football codes in Australia. In 1997, the 
ARL competition was confined to the eastern seaboard between Brisbane and Wollongong. 
The Super League competition included all mainland state capital cities, with the exception of 
Melbourne. At the end of the 1997 season, Perth was omitted from the 1998 Super League 
competition at the expense of a proposed new team in Melbourne. The AFL has teams in all 
State capital cities, except Tasmania. Tasmania are wanting to bid for an AFL licence. There are 
no teams in Tasmania, DanA/in or Hobart in any of the national football competitions. 
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because Wests were now located in an increasingly 'gentrified' community in 
the inner suburbs of Sydney. In June 1984 the NSWRL sent letters to each 
club requesting a written submission to compete in the 1985 competition. All 
13 clubs requested the right to play. The League rejected Wests' application 
on 13 September 1984. This was the first time the NSWRL had sent out such 
a request to the clubs. Wests went to court to halt their omission from the 
1985 season. The court ruled in favour of the NSWRL, but the League 
admitted Wests to the 1985 season on the condition they relocate from 
Lidecombe to the growing and expanding outer western Sydney suburb of 
Campbelltown.36 
In the early to mid 1980s, the NSWRL realised that its survival 
required a reduction in the number of inner city Sydney teams and 
expansion into sites where rugby league was already popular. The NSWRL 
saw three immediate sites of expansion - Newcastle, the Gold Coast, and 
Brisbane. Brisbane was a particularly favourable site of expansion for the 
NSWRL because it had a large population by Australian standards. The city 
supported and sustained a local rugby league competition and demonstrated 
its support of high quality rugby league through the annual State of Origin 
contests. The NSWRL felt Brisbane was the ideal site of expansion. In 1986, 
the NSWRL approached the QRL, and asked it to submit a proposal to enter 
a Bnsbane team to compete in the NSWRL competition. 
The NSWRL thought the QRL would find its request a considerable 
complement.37 However, the NSWRL completely misjudged the QRL 
reaction. The QRL did not find the proposal at all complimentary. In fact they 
thought the proposal would undermine the Brisbane competition. If Brisbane 
36 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 19. 
37 Colman, Super League. 22. 
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did enter a team in the NSWRL competition, the impact on the Brisbane club 
competition would be disastrous. Moreover, a Brisbane team in the NSWRL 
would strengthen the NSWRL competition.38 Queensland traditionally placed 
great emphasis on the local at the expense of the national. Queenslanders 
were not particularty interested in the national implications of sporting 
decisions. But they were extremely concerned about the local implications of 
such decisions. The intense aversion Queensland felt towards NSW was a 
factor the NSWRL hierarchy had not expected to encounter. 
Despite their reluctance to establish a team in the NSWRL 
competition, in 1986 the QRL examined the implications of entering a 
Bnsbane team into the NSW competition. The QRL asked for proposals from 
interested parties. Only one consortium, organised by the coach of the 
Redcliffe Rugby League Club Darryl Van de Velde, registered a formal 
proposal with the QRL.39 But the proposal was destined for failure because 
the QRL did not support the concept of a Bnsbane team competing in the 
NSWRL competition. The QRL stalled negotiations with the Van de Velde 
consortium and other interested parties, and eventually it ran out of time.40 
Consequentially, the QRL announced to the NSWRL that it would not submit 
an application to enter a Brisbane team in the 1987 competition. The NSWRL 
believed this was the perfect opportunity for the QRL to enter a team in the 
strongest rugby league competition in the wortd. So the NSWRL was 
annoyed.41 Once again, the QRL had undermined its plans. 
38 Similar arguments were used by the SANFL and Western Australian Football League 
(WAFL) to resist AFL expansion into Adelaide and Perth. 
39 Darryl Van de Velde was the first general manager of the South Queensland Crushers when 
they entered the ARL competition in 1995. The NSWRL changed the name of its competition 
from the NSWRL premiership to the ARL premiership to provide a more inclusive national title 
for its competition. 
40 Colman, Super League. 23. 
41 Colman, Super League. 23. 
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In 1987, the NSWRL once more approached the QRL to submit an 
application to enter a Brisbane team in their competition. The QRL received 
three proposals to form a team to compete in the 1988 NSWRL competition. 
The Van de Velde consortium again tabled a proposal. The second proposal 
came from outside the State. The two individuals behind the proposal were 
Jim McKay, once the VFL licensing and marketing authority, and Alister 
Non^vood, a Western Australian businessman, and the bid financier. The third 
proposal was intensely local. It comprised former Brisbane and Queensland 
rugby league and rugby union players, who had established successful 
businesses after their retirement as players. 
Among this third group was Paul Morgan who toured with the 
Queensland rugby union team before an injured ankle curtailed his playing 
career. He established a firm of stockbrokers and a number of hotels in 
Brtsbane.42 His firm of stockbrokers was particularly successful, underwriting 
the internationally known Australian film Crocodile Dundee. Morgan brought 
three crucial elements to the proposal, in addition to finance. He had a 
background in the game of rugby union and Brisbane's sportscape, a 
knowledge of the local culture of Brisbane and Queensland, and a 
background in business. He speculated that a Brisbane team would lose 
money in its formative period in the league, but once it began to establish 
itself in the Brisbane sports marketplace, it would return a profit.43 
Barry Maranta was another who developed a business career after his 
football playing days. By contrast to Morgan, Maranta had played rugby 
league. At one stage he was selected in a Bnsbane representative side for 
42 The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 103. 
43 Colman, Super League. 23. 
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Queensland state competitions. He too became a very successfully 
businessman after he retired from football. After speculating on the real 
estate market, he established Queensland's largest private funds 
management company.44 Gary Balkin's sporting and business background 
was similar to the other two consortium members. He was the top try scorer in 
the Bnsbane rugby league competition in 1964. He owned a number of 
restaurants, including the pair of floating restaurants on the Brisbane River, 
the Kookaburra Queens. The fourth member of the consortium, Steve 
Williams, played rugby league for North Sydney and Queensland. He bought 
unique attnbutes to the organisation the others did not possess. He owned a 
marketing and advertising agency.45 
All four members brought similar qualities to the consortium - local 
knowledge and a history of financial success. Despite these attributes, the 
consortium lacked an individual who had experience in the bidding process 
and knowledge of the intricacies of rugby league administration. The 
consortium recruited John Ribot with the guarantee that he would became 
the club's first chief executive if the bid was successful.46 Ribot played rugby 
league with three Sydney club's - Newtown, Wests, and Manly. He 
represented both Queensland and Australia as a rugby league player. After 
he retired, Ribot returned to Queensland and the QRL and, in 1986, had 
assisted the Van de Velde proposal. He had the experience the Morgan et al 
consortium required. 
The three consortia lobbied the QRL. However, the QRL was still 
concerned about the impact that a Brisbane team in the NSWRL competition 
44 Colman, Super League. 24, The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 103. 
45 Colman, Super League. 24, The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 103. 
46 Colman, Super League. 25. 
78 
would have on the local Brisbane competition. Maranta allayed their fears. 
He tied the leagues and the consortium together. The local leagues would 
have a financial stake in the consortium.47 But fortune also favoured the 
Morgan et al consortium. Senator Ron McAuliffe had recently announced his 
retirement from the QRL presidency. He had aligned himself with the West 
Australian consortium of McKay and Nonfood. Unfortunately for the 
consortium, McAuliffe's support was more a hindrance than a benefit. With 
his retirement, the QRL believed it had finally rid itself of the conservative and 
rather dictatorial McAuliffe. The QRL would not support the West Australian 
proposal because of the former president's support.48 |f he had a role with 
the new club, McAuliffe might have greater power over the QRL than he did 
before. The QRL nominated the Morgan et al consortium to the NSWRL. On 
30 Apnl 1987, the NSWRL officially endorsed the Morgan et al proposal. 
They called their team the Brisbane Broncos. 
The Broncos: the first Brisbane 'national' rugby league team 
On 21 December 1983, the NSWRL was incorporated as a company limited 
by guarantee. The NSWRL transferred all power and control to the new body, 
the New South Wales Rugby League Limited (NSWRL Ltd.). It took over the 
assets and the financial liabilities of the unincorporated body.49 It was 
responsible for the organisation, administration, and development of rugby 
league in NSW and the Australian Capital Territory. It had similar aims and 
objectives as its predecessor. The NSWRL would foster and control rugby 
league, while developing it in the code's best interest.so The NSWRL 
believed the code's best interest would not be served by unrestrained 
47 Colman, Super League. 25. 
48 Colman, Super League. 25. 
49 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 21. 
50 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 21-22. 
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commercialism. The NSWRL was organised as a utility, rather than profit 
maximising organisation. Any profits that were created would be transferred 
to the NSWRL, or other institutions that would develop and benefit the code 
of rugby league. Under incorporation, the game of rugby league was not 
driven by the financial gain of its member or shareholders. Commercial profit 
was not a central motivating factor in the decision-making process. 
On 9 December 1987, the Brisbane Broncos Rugby League Club Ltd 
was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee.51 As a condition of 
entry, they established memorandum and articles of the company. These 
were closely aligned to the NSWRL memorandum and articles. The Broncos 
agreed to foster, encourage, and promote rugby league, to play and compete 
in the NSWRL Premiership, and to abide by the memorandum and articles of 
the NSWRL.52 These memoranda and articles were duly accepted by the 
NSWRL. The Brisbane Broncos were subject to all NSWRL memorandum 
and articles. Therefore, if the Brisbane Broncos generated a profit, they 
would be obliged to transfer any profits to the NSWRL or a similar institution. 
But the Bnsbane Broncos were not established as a non-profit entity. The 
owners established the Broncos as a commercially driven company. 
To establish this objective, the Brisbane Broncos were structured very 
differently from all other clubs in the NSWRL Premiership. The Brisbane 
Broncos Rugby League Club Ltd was just one of a number of companies that 
formed part of the privately owned Brisbane Broncos group.53 Brisbane 
Broncos Management Corporation Pty Ltd was the operational division of the 
Broncos. It was responsible for administertng the football club. Brisbane 
51 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 30. 
52 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 30-31. 
53 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 32. 
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Broncos Corporation Pty Ltd was the commercial branch of the club. It 
generated and collected revenue from sponsors, gate takings, and corporate 
boxes. Its key role, moreover, was to distribute a portion of its revenue to the 
Brtsbane Broncos Management Corporation Ltd to cover its expenses. 
The Brtsbane Broncos Rugby League Club Ltd did not record a profit 
initially. All of its expenses were reimbursed by the Bnsbane Broncos 
Corporation Ltd. If this company had generated a profit, it would have been 
transferred in accordance with the memorandum and articles of the NSWRL. 
Instead, any excess revenue was hidden away from the Brisbane Broncos 
Management Corporation Ltd in the Brisbane Broncos Corporation Pty Ltd. 
This company acted as trustee for the Brisbane Broncos Corporation Trust. It 
was the Trust that recorded any profit. As I will show later, the profits became 
quite large in the years that followed. 
So by 1988, the NSWRL had admitted three more clubs to its 
competition - a team each from Newcastle, the Gold Coast, and Brisbane. 
These three cities were all strongholds of rugby league in the two states. The 
NSWRL expansion was hardly a reaction to basketball's popularity, but 
essentially a reaction to problems in rugby league within Sydney. While all 
the rugby league expansion clubs complied with the NSWRL articles of 
association, the team from Bnsbane complied more in theory than in practice. 
It was the first privately owned rugby league team in Australia. It was 
established to return a profit to its directors, which contravened the NSWRL 
articles of association. More than any other club in rugby league, the 
Bnsbane Broncos were a mirror of the North American model of professional 
sports teams. The Broncos were a one team, one town side. They enjoyed 
huge corporate, media, and popular support. The match day entertainment 
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resembled entertainment at any American football game. The Broncos 
exemplified the success of rugby league in Australia in the pertod of the late 
1980s to the mid 1990s. The Broncos proved to the administrators of the 
game, and any watching business people, that rugby league in this format 
had a future. The game of rugby league was transformed between 1980 and 
1995. The ARL resembled a large co-operative corporation. All its clubs, 
except the Broncos, returned revenue to the ARL, directing any profits to 
activities which benefited rugby league, and not club owners or 
shareholders. 
The Brisbane (Gold Coast) Bears 1987-1992 
Pnor to 1980, Australian sport had not adopted the unrestrained commercial 
model of sports organisation, development, and promotion. The NSWRL and 
VFL were commercially unsophisticated in their organisation and structure. In 
rugby league, the NSWRL did not contract its first sponsor until 1962. Eastern 
Suburbs was the first club to receive corporate sponsorship in 1976. The 
NSWRL did not have a naming rights sponsor for its premier competition until 
1982. The League did not become an incorporated body until 1983.54 The 
VFL was more advanced. By the mid 1970s, most clubs were aware of the 
need to pursue alternative forms of revenue. VFL clubs could no longer 
survive just on memberships and attendance revenue. They needed to 
secure corporate sponsors and media attention. However, the business side 
of sport in both codes was still in its infancy in the first few years of the 1980s. 
Then began a transitional period for the two codes. During the 1980s, the 
leagues and the clubs developed from small local competitions into a form of 
national league. 
54 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 9. 
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Australian Rules football faced similar problems to rugby league. 
Australian Rules was dominant in the other four states of Australia - Victona, 
South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania. The Victonan competition 
was the premier competition in Australia because it attracted the best players 
through large compensation packages, the largest crowds, and the largest 
sponsorship agreements. Before 1984 the Victorian competition only 
included teams from Victona. It was organised and administered by the VFL. 
The twelve clubs that were part of the VFL competition in the early 1980s, 
were all based in Melbourne or its close environs. To the uninformed 
observer, the state of the competition might have looked quite healthy. In 
1981, attendance was its highest levels, and the VFL increased admission 
pnces by 17%. The rise in admission prices, however, was a symptom of the 
problem rather than a sign of its health. The Victorian Corporate Affairs 
Commission carried out an investigation into the financial state of the twelve 
clubs. It found that five of the twelve clubs were technically bankrupt, while 
another three were on the verge of it.55 The admission pnces were not 
increased to take advantage of the game's success; the increase occurred to 
generate greater revenue for the struggling clubs. 
The structure of the Victorian competition was a fundamental problem 
for the VFL and its clubs. The VFL had developed in the inner city suburbs of 
Melbourne, but since the competition began in the late nineteenth century, 
the demographics of the inner city communities had changed. The 
population of Melbourne was forced out of inner city areas as the city 
expanded. There were no longer large suburbs of working-class people 
living close to the city, the traditional heartland of Australian Rules. The VFL 
competition could no longer support the high number of Melbourne teams. 
55 Linnell, Football Ltd: 27. 
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Twelve teams, all competing in the same market for spectators, sponsors, 
and corporate support, was too many. The VFL needed to expand into new 
markets where there was potential for financial growth and development. 
Despite its obvious problems, the VFL was very reluctant to change the 
fundamental structure of its competition. The catalyst for change did not come 
the VFL. Instead, it came from beyond the established institution. 
There were a number of differences between the expansion of rugby 
league and Australian Rules in the 1980s. The VFL required each expansion 
club to pay a license fee to the VFL. The fee would be distributed between 
the twelve Victortan clubs. The VFL needed the revenue to support itself, but 
also to convince many of the Melbourne based teams to accept expansion. 
Some of the weaker Melbourne clubs were violently opposed to interstate 
expansion. These clubs did not want teams from traditional Australian Rules 
centres of Adelaide and Perth competing in their league. They believed that 
any team from Adelaide or Perth would have an extraordinary advantage. 
These clubs would have the public and financial support of the entire state. 
Ultimately, they would win the premiership, the 'divine rtght' of Victorians. 
The weaker Melbourne clubs were appeased by the license fee, the initial 
expansion into non-Australian Rules states - NSW and Queensland - and the 
promise of increased television contracts. 
In 1982, South Melbourne played eleven matches in Sydney. Before 
the 1983 season began, an insolvent South Melbourne became the Sydney 
Swans and relocated permanently to Sydney. The VFL financially supported 
the Swans for the next three seasons. But it was not a harmonious 
relationship. The Swans were a financial drain on the VFL, who began to 
rethink about their interest in the Swans. In late 1984, Bob Pritchard, a 
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Sydney businessman raised the idea of private ownership of the Swans to 
other Sydney entrepreneurs. Pritchard sold the idea effectively.56 |n the 
middle of 1985, the VFL sold the Swans to Pritchard's consortium. The 
Swans were the first privately owned team in the VFL. Traditionally, VFL 
clubs were administered and organised by elected officials from the club 
membership and the clubs were co-operative, rather than share-holding 
capital ventures. The Swans were the first of four private ownership 
expenments in the 1980s. Another was the Brisbane Bears. 
On 6 October 1986, the Brisbane Bears Football Club was granted 
one of two expansion licenses. A pnvate consortium of media identity Paul 
Cronin, and the Queensland Australian Football League (QAFL) was 
successful in acquiring the $4 million license from the VFL. But, almost 
immediately, the Bears began their seemingly endless financial troubles.57 |n 
late November 1986, the consortium was scheduled to pay the $4 million 
license fee.58 Unfortunately, a couple of weeks before the payment was due, 
the consortium's backers withdrew their financial support. David Dunn, a 
solicitor who represented Paul Morgan, approached business leader 
Chrtstopher Skase for financial assistance. Morgan's stockbroking firm had 
underwritten the $4 million license fee and would be liable if the revenue 
could not be raised through another source.59 Skase obliged, paying the fee 
through a subsidiary company, Queensland Merchant Holdings Ltd. This 
gave him access to the Bears' board. He became their inaugural deputy 
chairman. Essentially, Skase's financial interest in the club gave him virtual 
control of the club. He had become the first private owner of the Brisbane 
56 Gary Linnell, Football Ltd: The Inside Ston/ of the AFL: Ironbark, Sydney, 1995, 99. 
57 After just three seasons of football, the Bears had accumulated debts of approximately $27-
28 million. The Bears were a financial disaster. Linnell, Football Ltd: 240. 
58 Linnell, Football Ltd: 227. 
59 Linnell, Football Ltd: 228. 
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Bears. 
In 1987, the Brisbane Bears played their first home game. The game 
was not, however, played in Brisbane. It was played at Carrara, on the Gold 
Coast. The Bears had located at the Gold Coast because a suitable arena 
was not available in Brisbane. To play at the Gabba would have required a 
major upgrade, with the greyhound track removed and the size of the field 
increased. Other options were investigated, but neither Kedron nor a major 
redevelopment at Boondall were appropriate or achievable in the short 
period before the start of the season.6o The Bears' relocation to Carrara was 
supposed to last only one year. But by the middle of their first season, Skase 
decided Carrara would be the long term location for the club. There was 
much opposition to this decision. The QAFL and the VFL did not believe an 
Australian Rules team on the Gold Coast would generate popular support 
amongst the Queensland public. The QAFL and the VFL both argued that the 
Bears should be located in Brisbane. Despite this opposition, Skase had 
strengthened his resolve to remain at Carrara. The Bears accumulated debts 
of approximately $12 million in their first season, but a determined Skase 
threatened to withdraw his financial support of the club if the VFL forced them 
to leave the Gold Coast.61 So the Bears remained on the Gold Coast until 
1992. In the interim, Skase left after the collapse of this financial empire in 
the middle of 1989. Cronin resigned as chairman amid player and financial 
problems, and in early 1990 Reuben Pelerman bought the club after Skase's 
demise. He fared little better than Skase. He lost approximately $5 million in 
just two seasons of football.62 He withdrew his support for the Bears at the 
end of 1991. In 1992, the Bears were again restructured. The club was 
60 Linnell. Football Ltd: 23a 
61 Linnell, Football Ltd: 231. 
62 Linnell, Football Ltd: 327. 
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returned to the traditional ownership structure of Australian Rules clubs. The 
members rather than a private individual ran the club. In August 1992, the 
club signed a 33 year lease with the State Government to play at the 
Gabba.63 The State Government had agreed to a $44 million redevelopment 
of this arena. In 1993, the Bears relocated to the Gabba - and, as I will 
discuss later, with greater success. 
63 The Brisbane Bears Football Club, The Annual Report 1996: 1996, 8. 
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Chapter Three 
The Ascendancy of Rugby League in the 
Brisbane Sports Marketplace, 1988-1995 
During the 1980s there emerged a national sporting infrastructure in 
Bnsbane. As part of this process, the Brisbane Bullets were instrumental. But 
their influence declined as other more established Australian sporting 
leagues expanded their competitions into the Brisbane market. In particular, 
the Brisbane Broncos immediately surpassed the Bullets in crowd, financial 
and media support when they were established in 1988. Yet they imitated 
and modified a number of promotional and marketing strategies employed 
so successfully by Brian Kerle. The Broncos were extremely successful in 
exploiting the limited nature of the Brisbane sports marketplace between 
1988 and 1995. By 1995, they became the most popular and successful 
rugby league club in Australia. This chapter investigates and explains the 
development of the Broncos as Australia's most successful rugby league 
team, and it accounts for the wane in popularity of the Bullets. 
The Decline of the Brisbane Bullets 1992-1996 
Durtng the mid to late 1980s, the NBL and the Brisbane Bullets reached their 
zenith of success and popular support. The Bullets reached five grand finals 
in seven years. There on-court success was unequaled by any other 
Bnsbane sports club. But it was their off-court success that established the 
Bullets as the most influential sporting organisations in Brisbane in the late 
1980s. Other sporting teams in Brisbane imitated the Bullets' marketing and 
promotion strategies. However, their popular support declined as these other 
sporting organisations successfully adopted the Bullets marketing model, 
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and so the Bullets lost much of their previous support. From 1991 to 1992 the 
Bullets average crowd dropped from 9,635 to 7,813 (see figure 3.1 ).i 
Figures 3.1: Average attendance of the Brisbane Bullets 1991-1996 
At the end of the 1991 season, the Bullets' organisation increased the price 
of season tickets by a whopping 180 percent. They tried to generate much 
needed revenue through this process. By 1992, the Bullets began to lose 
touch with their supporters, Kerle claims.2 The average attendance figures 
recovered slightly in 1993. The team performed well that year, finishing 
fourth and just missing a place in the grand final. The organisation's decision 
to replace Kerle as coach seemed vindicated. The attendance figures for 
1994 and 1995 rose and returned to the levels of 1991, approximately 9,500. 
On this evidence, the Bullets were far from in decline. But the figures after 
1991 are deceiving. The increased attendances figures were based upon 
the allocation of many free tickets. The Brisbane population had, in reality. 
1 The Australian: 10 April 1997,18. 
2 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997 
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largely abandoned the Bullets in favour of other forms of sports 
entertainment from 1991. To overcome the image of falling attendances, the 
Bullets gave away tickets to try to fill the stadium. The Bullets did achieve an 
impressive average home crowd of 9,463 in 1995. But after the policy of 
allocating free tickets was terminated in 1996, the average crowd figures 
became less than impressive. In 1996, the average crowd was just 5,642 or 
approximately half the number of spectators in 1991. The average crowd had 
dropped 4,000 or some 45% in just 5 years. 
There are two main reasons for this sharp decline. The Bullets' 
competition in the Brisbane sports marketplace in the early and mid 1980s 
was negligible. The Bullets were one of only two sports and three teams in 
Brtsbane competing in a national competition. Soccer, still seen as a 
marginal sport, could not compete with the new culturally vibrant American 
game of basketball. The sport of soccer was marginalised by the large 
central and southern European involvement of the game. It was an enclave 
for ethnic minority interests to perpetuate their culture, while inadvertently 
precluding mainstream 'Australian' culture. The game, explains Philip 
Mosely and Bill Murray (1994), "had not entered the Australian soul".3 
Soccer in Brisbane reflected this situation. It was a game played and 
watched largely by ethnic minorities. Conversely, the Bullets actively 
encouraged the entire community to attend their matches. Kerle tried to 
eliminate exclusion, either intentionally or subconsciously.4 Soccer provided 
little or no competition to the Bullets. 
Rugby league, the sport that traditionally held the greatest spectator 
3 Philip Mosely & Bill Murray, 'Soccer" in Sport in Australia: A Social History. Wray Vamplew & 
Brian Stoddart (eds), Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994, 214. 
4 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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appeal in Brisbane, was not played in a national framework. Teams 
represented a suburb or a collection of suburbs in Brisbane in the early 
1980s. State of Ongin was the only occasion in which Queensland competed 
with NSW in rugby league. They played just three matches annually. These 
matches proved incredibly popular. They gave Queenslanders the 
opportunity to compete against and defeat NSW. Only a national competition 
could generate this type of state or city rivalry on a week by week basis. The 
Bullets encapsulated these intense regional rivalrtes every time they played. 
Each week they played a team from another state or city of Australia. As the 
1980s progressed, the Bnsbane community relished vartous national 
sporting contests. Until 1988, the Bullets had virtually no local rival in the 
national sporting competition marketplace. By 1988, though, the Brisbane 
Broncos were admitted to the NSWRL premiership. The virtual monopoly the 
Bullets had was over in the Brisbane national sports marketplace. 
The Bullets were not able to sustain their pre-eminent position as the 
most popular sporting team in Brisbane in the 1990s. They could not counter 
the increased competition from other sporting teams. Kerte claims that once 
they reached their pinnacle, they should have applied themselves with even 
more vigour and determination.s Yet they took their position for granted. They 
treated the public and their supporters badly. They increased the pnce of 
season and admission tickets to counter lost crowd numbers due to the 
added competition from rival sports. Fundamentally, they lost touch with their 
fans. The Brisbane sporting public could now choose to attend a number of 
different sporting fixtures with a national profile. 
5 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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The Basis of the Broncos' Popular Appeal 1988-1992 
In 1988, the Brtsbane Broncos were established as the first privately owned 
rugby league club in the NSWRL Premiership. Although private ownership 
contravened the NSWRL articles of association, the NSWRL wanted a team 
from Bnsbane in their competition to increase the national focus of the 
league. Pnvate ownership became a great source of animosity between the 
two organisations in the subsequent years. It emphasised the fundamental 
difference between the two institutions. The Broncos were contemporary, 
dynamic, and undaunted by change. Their directors saw the club as just 
another commercial enterprtse. Fundamentally, the club existed to return 
maximum revenue to its directors, who were the only shareholders. 
Conversely, the NSWRL was conservative, introspective, and apprehensive 
of new concepts. Here lay the philosophical difference. The NSWRL 
hierarchy nurtured and administered rugby league. They based their 
decisions on its overall impact on all the clubs. The Broncos were just one of 
16 clubs in the NSWRL. The NSWRL had to balance the interests of the 
Broncos against the overall impact on the league. Neither the Broncos nor 
the NSWRL could understand each others' viewpoint. Despite the 
antagonism, or possibly because of it, the Brisbane Broncos became the 
most influential and dominant rugby league club in Australia in just six 
seasons. 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Queensland State Premier, Joh 
Bjelke-Peterson, used Queensland parochialism to generate popular voter 
support in defiance of the Australian Government. Bjelke-Peterson argued 
that everyone and everything was against Queensland. Every decision that 
was unfavourable to Queensland was labelled a conspiracy. The Federal 
Government, likewise, saw Queensland as a threat to its overall authority. 
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Therefore, it conspired to stop Queensland challenging the Federal 
Government's power. Within Bjelke-Peterson's argument, there was an 
implicit assumption that Queensland was not inferior to the other Australian 
States. His rhetoric created a common link between Queenslanders by 
constructing collective grass-roots opposition to such viewpoints. Through 
this process, Queenslanders had tangible 'evidence' that they were not as 
infertor as the southern states assumed. Bjelke-Peterson used Queensland 
parochialism as a political weapon. 
From their inception in the NSWRL in 1988, the Broncos also used 
Queensland parochialism to generate popular support in Queensland. 
Instead of targetting the Australian Government and the southern States of 
Australia, the Broncos blamed the NSWRL and NSW. This fed into 
preconceived notions that Queenslanders held towards the NSWRL and 
NSW. For many years, the best players in the Brisbane rugby league 
competition left to play in the Sydney competition. They were seduced by 
larger wages, a better competition, and the cosmopolitan life style of Sydney. 
Queenslanders resented losing their best players to Sydney. It denuded the 
local competition of quality players, and reinforced perceptions that their 
competition was inferior. However, the successful introduction of a Brisbane 
team in the NSWRL offered the opportunity to challenge such an inferiority 
complex. 
In 1987, the Broncos consortium signed an agreement with the 
NSWRL.6 This document bound them to certain conditions, a number of 
which the Broncos' administration thought were unfair. First, they incurred 
expenses that no other team in the NSWRL competition was required to pay. 
6 The Courier-Mail: 6 March 1989, 9. 
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The Broncos had to pay the accommodation and travelling expenses of 
every visiting team. Second, they did not receive all the income they raised. 
The Broncos generated $1 million in merchandising revenue in 1988. Yet 
they received only $10,000 from the NSWRL after the majority of funds were 
distnbuted between the other clubs. In 1988, the Broncos negotiated a 
$150,000 television contract, though they were required to give the money to 
the NSWRL for redistrtbution. Before the 1988 season commenced, the Lang 
Park Trust increased the Broncos' rent from $104,000 to $180,000 per 
season. But the NSWRL did not allow the Broncos to relocate to an 
alternative, less costly venue. Third, the Broncos were required to pay 
$70,000 to local Brisbane rugby league clubs as compensation for lost 
sponsorship caused by their introduction to the NSWRL competition. 
Barry Maranta believed the 1987 agreement was unfair and unjust.7 
Maranta's criticisms fed into Queensland parochialism. He believed the 1987 
agreement would undermine the future success of the Broncos. He believed 
that the NSWRL conspired against the Broncos. Maranta argued that the 
NSWRL considered the Broncos an adversary, one that needed to be 
controlled. The Broncos finished seventh in their first season. It seemed that 
the strategy of limiting the financial power of the Broncos was limiting their 
on-field success. As the Broncos were essentially a privately controlled 
rugby league club, profit maximisation was the fundamental objective of the 
Broncos organisation. At every opportunity they tried to increase their profit. 
Therefore, they had every reason to be upset when the NSWRL restricted 
their potential revenue. Maranta believed the agreement was yet another 
example of the NSWRL implementing strategies to stop the Broncos 
becoming a competitive force in the NSWRL premiership. 
7 The Courier-Mail: 6 March 1989, 9. 
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Throughout the 1988 season, the Broncos bickered with the NSWRL 
and the Lang Park Trust over sponsorship rights. Their major sponsor. 
Powers, was a Queensland owned and operated Brewing company. Like the 
Broncos, they represented the small, local company competing against 
major national rivals. Shortly before Powers was launched as a Broncos' 
sponsor, the Queensland Brewing icon, Castlemaine Perkins (Fourex), was 
sold to the West Australian businessman Alan Bond. Before Bond bought 
Fourex, the brewing company was inextricably linked to Queensland 
masculine culture. It was the only beer a 'real' Queensland male drank. It 
differentiated Queensland males to their southern counterparts. However, 
Bond undermined this parochial link by changing the address on Fourex 
products from Brisbane to his home of Perth. Hence Powers was launched in 
an atmosphere of commercial antipathy and cultural defiance. In 1988, 
Powers Brewing joined the Broncos as their major sponsor. 
However, the Broncos were severely restricted in the amount and 
quality of service they could provide for their major sponsor. The Broncos' 
dispute with the NSWRL and the Lang Park Trust centred on sponsors' 
nghts. The Broncos believed their major sponsor Powers was unfairly 
treated. Powers could neither advertise its product nor sell its beer at Lang 
Park. The major tenant of Lang Park was the QRL. Its major sponsor was 
Fourex. Fourex had the sole advertising and product rights at Lang Park. No 
other beer could be publicised or sold. The Broncos appealed to the Lang 
Park Trust and the NSWRL. Neither body conceded. But the Broncos did not 
accept their decision. At half time in their match against St. George, the 
Broncos did not leave the field. Instead, they stayed on the pitch. The players 
congregated in a circle to listen to their coach, Wayne Bennett. As Bennett 
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talked, the players were enveloped by banners bearing Powers Brewing 
logos. It was a unique strategy to service their sponsors. Yet the strategy 
incurred the indignation of the NSWRL. Fourex was also the sponsor of the 
Australian Rugby League Team. The day after the match, the general 
manager of the NSWRL, John Quayle, told John Ribot it was not to happen 
again.8 Yet the Broncos persisted with the promotion even after the NSWRL 
threatened to fine the Broncos. They only cancelled this form of promotion 
when the NSWRL actually served the fine. 
Ribot defended his decision to promote the Broncos' major sponsor 
through banners at Lang Park. He believed it was a sound commercial 
decision.9 He needed to serve his sponsor. All other avenues of promotion 
were restricted by Lang Park's association with Fourex. This was the only 
approach available. Ribot was quite critical of the NSWRL because they 
based their decisions on political rather than economic considerations. Ribot 
was also critical of the NSWRL judiciary. 
The Broncos believed the judiciary applied double standards to the 
Broncos. This generated popular support in Queensland because it 
reinforced common perceptions of a NSW conspiracy. In August 1989 a 
Bronco player, Greg Dowling, was cited by the NSWRL. The Broncos' coach, 
Wayne Bennett, denounced the credibility of the judiciary, claiming it lacked 
consistency. He called Dowling's suspension a joke.10 The following day 
Bennett explicitly linked Dowling's suspension with a NSWRL conspiracy. 
He claimed that virtually all NSWRL judiciary decisions had gone against the 
Broncos. Courier-Mail sports editor, Barry Dick, advanced Bennett's 
8 Mike Colman, Super Leaoue: The Inside Ston/: Ironbark, Sydney, 1996, 46. 
9 Colman, Super Leaoue. 46. 
10 The Sundav-Mail: 6 August 1989, 70. 
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conspiracy theory. Dick argued that the Broncos should challenge the 
authority of the NSWRL on the basis that its judiciary was being unjust and 
unfair.li The NSWRL was, according to this view, avowedly biased against 
the Broncos. 
In 1990, Bronco Mark Hohn was cited for bringing the game into 
disrepute. He was cited by the NSWRL because he withdrew his eye 
gouging complaint against the Balmain player John Ellas. Ellas had lodged 
an eye gouging complaint against another Bronco Wally Lewis. When the 
Lewis case was dismissed, Hohn dropped his complaint against Elias. The 
NSWRL then cited Hohn. Hohn's citing sparked an outrage in Queensland 
rugby circles. Queenslanders could not believe anyone could be cited for 
withdrawing a complaint. This 'proved' there was a conspiracy against the 
Broncos and Queensland. A Courier-Mail columnist told his readers that the 
NSWRL was biased against the Broncos: 
Hohn is an appropriate whipping boy for the NSWRL...Not a 
high profile player from the inner-sanctum Sydney clubs, he 
is a perfect target with which to strike fear into players and 
clubs who might want to make similar allegations.12 
The Broncos accused Greg McCallum, a referee, of bias. McCallum's 
appearance and background fed the NSWRL conspiracy theory. He was 
slick, confident, and brash - certainly qualities to fuel Queensland doubt. 
McCallum's bias against the Broncos seemed to be highlighted by an 
incident in 1991. He sent off Kerrod Walters, a Broncos player, for using a 
forearm in the tackle. Walters denied using a forearm and pleaded not guilty. 
11 The Courier-Mail: 7 August 1989, 33. 
12 The Courier-Mail: 7 April 1990, 94. 
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Walters admitted, instead, he had punched Western Suburbs fonward 
Graeme Wynn out of frustration after the ball was stolen.13 Even though 
Walters admitted his guilt, the Broncos focused upon McCallum's so-called 
inherent prejudice. 
Under McCallum, the Broncos won only 50% of their games. Yet their 
overall success rate was 67%. The Broncos linked their poor results under 
McCallum to his apparent lack of objectivity. Of the fourteen games refereed 
by McCallum, the Broncos received more penalties than their opponents on 
only four occasions. Of the other ten, two were drawn while the other eight 
were lost.14 The statistics seemed to confirm that McCallum was biased 
against the Broncos. The Broncos directly linked their poor playing 
performances with McCallum's discrimination. They lost, it was said, 
because McCallum was biased. After the Walters' incident, the Broncos 
asked the NSWRL to ban McCallum from refereeing their games. They said 
that all that they wanted from referees was a 'fair go' for the Broncos. 
The Broncos' shrewd use of McCallum, the NSWRL and its judiciary, 
generated significant popular support in Queensland. Again the figures 
would be unremarkable at AFL fixtures in Melbourne or Adelaide, but they 
are most significant in Brisbane. From 1988, the Broncos attracted large 
home crowds. An average of 16,111 attended Broncos home matches in 
1988 (see figure 3.2).i5 Average attendance increased by 2,114 in 1989 and 
by another 4,224 in 1990. In just two seasons average attendance had risen 
6,338 to just under 22,500. Crowds declined slightly in 1991 but rose again 
13 The Courier-Mail: 27 April 1991,84. 
14 The Courier-Mail: 29 April 1991, 32. 
15 Information supplied by Lewis Ramsay, acting marketing manager of the Brisbane Broncos, 
on 6 August 1997. 
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in 1992. The average television ratings for Broncos' matches also increased 
between 1988 and 1992 (see figure 3.3).16 jn 1988 a Broncos' game 
averaged 20 ratings points. By 1992 this figure had climbed to just under 30 
points, an increase of almost 50% in just four seasons. 
Figure 3.2: Average attendance of the Brisbane Broncos 1988-1993 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Year 
Figure 3.2: Average television ratings of the Brisbane Broncos 1988-1993 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
Year 
1992 1993 
16 Information supplied by Lewis Ramsay on 6 August 1997. 
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The Broncos were acutely aware of the potential to generate popular 
support through the parochialism of Queenslanders.17 The Broncos 
capitalised on Queenslanders' parochialism through the club's extensive 
media exposure. This developed a strong cultural link between the Broncos 
and the Queensland community, thus creating a large and diverse supporter 
base.18 The Broncos actively perpetuated the parochialism of 
Queenslanders through their treatment by the NSWRL. 
The Development of 'UniversaT Broncos support 1992-1993 
Between 1988 and 1992, the Broncos developed a large parochial support 
in Brisbane. However, events at the end of 1992 and in 1993 substantially 
increased the Broncos' popularity. In 1992 the Broncos won their first minor 
premiership. They were victorious in 18 of 22 games.19 This was their best 
league position since their inception. They had beaten the best rugby league 
teams in Australia. There was great anticipation of a Broncos grand-final 
appearance and a grand-final victory. The local media, radio station B105, 
Channel Nine Queensland, and the Courier-Mail generated unprecedented 
interest in the Broncos in September 1992. The local radio station and 
Broncos sponsor, B105, gave away finals tickets and finals packages in 
listener competitions in conjunction with Powers. The 'whole' community 
seemed to unite together to cheer on the Broncos. The Broncos were 'our' 
team competing against those 'others' from south of the border. The Broncos 
reached their first grand-final after only five years in the NSWRL competition. 
17 Ian Guthrie & Gina Kahler, The Brisbane Broncos Customer Report: Investigation and 
Analysis for Strategic Insight: an internship report prepared by students of Griffith University 
for The Brisbane Broncos Football Club, 1993, 9. 
18 Guthrie & Kahler, The Brisbane Broncos Customer Report: 9. 
19 Brisbane Broncos Rugby League Club, Bronco I: Brisbane Broncos Rugby League Club, 
Brisbane, March 1997, 18. 
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By September 27, Brtsbane and Queensland had thrown their unqualified 
support behind the Broncos. It was now a matter of state pride. 
The Broncos beat St. George in the Grand Final in Sydney. They had 
won their first Winfield Cup. In the week after their victory, the mutual 
affection between the Broncos and Brisbane intensified.20 Thousands of 
people greeted the players at Brisbane airport. The Broncos were swamped 
by supporters at their clubhouse at Red Hill and outside the Brisbane Town 
Hall. Wherever the Broncos travelled in the next week, their was a crowd of 
supporters to honour their new heros. The Brisbane Lord Mayor, Jim 
Soorely, organised a civic reception and parade for the Broncos. Thousands 
lined the city streets. The city, the media, and politicians were captivated by 
the Broncos. Their victory seemed on the surface to have unified the city. It 
also dispelled any traces of Queensland inferiority. As the Courier-Mail put it: 
Queensland has almost put behind it any sporting inferiority 
cringe which sometimes surfaced during the 1970s when 
our best players almost always were lost to New South 
Wales...Any side which treats a Queensland team with 
anything other than respect does so at its peril. This state 
has become a sporting powerhouse in a multitude of 
disciplines and will only increase its standing as it grows in 
size and relative importance.21 
The Broncos' success in 1992 did not end with victory in the Winfield Cup. In 
late 1992, the Broncos travelled to England to play the World Club 
Champions Wigan. The Broncos qualified because they won the Winfield 
20 The Sundav-Mall: 4 October 1992, 57. 
21 The Courier-Mail: 27 September 1993, 8. 
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Cup in September. In the short history of the World Club Challenge 
Championship, no Australian team had won. But the Broncos were 
victorious, so by the end of 1992 they were lauded as the best club rugby 
league team in the world. The Broncos duplicated their playing pertormance 
with large commercial and popular support. However, 1993 was to surpass 
even this earty success. 
From their creation in 1988, the Broncos felt restricted and impeded at 
Lang Park. They had long and protracted disputes with the Lang Park Trust 
and the NSWRL over the use and control of this stadium. The Broncos 
continually fought with the Trust and the NSWRL over sponsorship, ground, 
and financial restrictions. However, the Broncos had little alternative but to 
accept the uncompromising situation because they had signed an 
agreement in 1987 to play at Lang Park. In 1990, the Broncos did win a 
minor concession form the Trust. Prior to 1990, Powers could not sell its 
product anywhere in the ground. It could not even serve its product in its own 
corporate box. Powers clients and representatives had to drink Fourex 
products. At the Broncos match on Apnl 3 1990, Powers products were 
distributed throughout all corporate boxes without the Trust's permission. 
They believed they had a rtght to distribute their product in the corporate 
boxes because they gave the Broncos one million dollars in sponsorship a 
year.22 The Trust was infuriated that their agreement was broken. However, 
after State Government arbitration. Powers Brewing was allowed to distribute 
its product throughout all the corporate boxes. The State Government had a 
distinct interest to appease both parties, and specifically the Broncos. It 
wanted to reassure and satisfy their only permanent tenant at Lang Park. 
Despite this concession, the Broncos' relationship with the Trust remained 
22 The Courier-Mail: 3 April 1990, 3. 
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tense. 
The conflict between the Trust and the Broncos lay dormant until earty 
March 1991. In March 1991, the Broncos increased their pressure on the 
Trust. They threatened to leave Lang Park unless the Trust removed a new 
clause. Under the new agreement, the Trust would receive a percentage of 
television and merchandising rights as well as other benefits.23 The Trust 
required the Broncos to sign the revised contract by March 8. They refused. 
Consequently, the Trust considered they had the legal authority to evict the 
Broncos from Lang Park. The Broncos considered OEM stadium, a legacy of 
the 1982 Commonwealth Games, as an alternative playing venue which was 
operated by the BCC. Their relocation to OEM would allow the Broncos to 
service their sponsors, while generating additional sponsorship and 
corporate revenue. OEM had no prior contractual arrangements with any 
sponsors. However, the Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Sallyanne Atkinson, 
opposed the Broncos' relocation to QEII.24 So the Broncos did not relocate to 
QEII in 1991. However, the Trust granted a number of concessions to the 
Broncos. They provided Power Brewing with advertising space. In return, the 
Trust received a greater percentage of gross gate receipts.25 
In late 1991, Sallyanne Atkinson lost the BCC elections to the Labor 
politician, Jim Soortey, who became the Lord Mayor of Brisbane. 
Immediately, he instigated a user-pays philosophy into the BCC. Under 
Soorley, Council services were not provided at heavily subsidised rates. 
Instead, Council increased the costs of many services to the Brisbane 
community. His user-pays philosophy extended to Council-owned and 
23 The Courier-Mail: 9 March 1991,1. 
24TheSundav-Mail: 10 March 1991,1. 
25 The Courier-Mail: 13 March 1991, 3. 
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operated sporting facilities. By 1992, the QEII Stadium needed major 
redevelopment. It was a major drain on the BCC. According to BCC 
estimates, it cost approximately $1 million a year to operate.26 This did not 
conform to Soortey's market-driven prtnciples. He threatened to demolish 
QEII unless a major tenant to share the cost was found. The BCC actively 
pursued the Broncos as the major tenant. But the Trust and the State 
Government trted to halt the Broncos' relocation. They offered the 
construction of 40 additional corporate boxes within a $14 million 
redevelopment of Lang Park. But the Broncos, through a sertes of financial 
inducements by the ANZ Bank and the BCC, relocated to QEII in 1993. 
The financial benefits of relocation were considerable. The 
redevelopment of QEII included the construction of 160 corporate boxes. 
Between 1994 and 1996, the cost of corporate boxes in the western stand 
was $24,500 and in the eastern stand it was $14,000.27 Under their 
agreement with the BCC, the Broncos received all the revenue from the sale 
of the first 110 corporate boxes. The revenue raised from sales between 110 
and 160 would be divided equally between both parties. A further advantage 
of the QEII stadium was that it had a greater attendance capacity than Lang 
Park. It could hold just under 59,000, while Lang Park could only hold just 
over 32,000.28 Most importantly, QEII was a venue that had no prior 
contractual arrangements with any company or organisation. Hence the 
Broncos could service all their sponsors. The lack of contractual obligations 
allowed the Broncos to generate greater financial support from their 
sponsors. The Broncos' relocation to QEII confirmed their status as one of the 
26 The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 102. 
27 Louis Ramsay, the acting marketing manager of the Brisbane Broncos, supplied this 
information in an interview on 6 October 1997. 
28 Broncos, Bronco!: 30. 
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most progressive sporting organisations in Australia in the early 1990s. The 
Broncos had an international reputation which prominent Australian Rules 
clubs could not duplicate. 
Despite the undisputable financial benefits of QEII, there was no 
assurance the relocation would be a success with the public and commercial 
sponsors. Lang Park was the sanctified residence of rugby league in 
Queensland. The site had developed an aura, constructed symbolically 
through a long histoncal association with rugby league. The Broncos 
undermined this relationship by disturbing the traditional links 
Queenslanders held towards the arena. Yet the Broncos' administration held 
no trepidation of tradition or links with the past. Instead, they were concerned 
with the future, and particularly with the future of the Broncos at QEII. If the 
Broncos were successful at Lang Park, they would be indomitable at QEII. 
The Broncos used a series of promotional techniques to attract a new 
and diverse audience to QEII. They lured an enthusiastic media to promote 
and popularise the Broncos, so much so that by 1993 the Brisbane sports 
community was virtually saturated by the Broncos and its publicity 
machine.29 Images of the Broncos seemed to be everywhere: they were 
associated with a wide range of commercial and promotional companies that 
used the players and the club's image to sell their product, and indirectly, the 
Broncos. Advertisers sold their product and this also popularised the 
Broncos. In 1994, the media in Brisbane developed an even closer 
relationship with the club. Queensland Newspapers Ltd., the owners of the 
Couner-Mail and the Sundav-Mail. became major sponsors of the club. In 
this respect both newspapers resembled a promotional newsletter for the 
29 Colman, Super League: 53. 
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Broncos, rather than a serious, independent journal involving sports news. 
It is important to note that the Broncos imitated the promotional 
techniques of Brtan Kerte at the Brisbane Bullets. Shane Edwards, the 
marketing manager at the Broncos, wanted to encourage a new type of 
spectator. Traditionally, rugby league had been associated with males, 
alcohol, and physical violence. Edwards tried to alter this traditional culture. 
He wanted women, children, and families to attend, not just men.30 Hence he 
promoted a Broncos match as entertainment, and, like Kerte, he did not rely 
exclusively on the actual rugby league contest to attract new supporters. 
Edwards augmented the match with live entertainment, fireworks, music, and 
good facilities.31 Initially, he wanted a non-rugby league audience to be 
attracted by the peripheral entertainment or spectacle at Broncos games, 
and to be encouraged to return by the actual rugby league contest.32 The 
extraneous entertainment influenced their initial visit to QEII, but the contest 
would make them return. 
The Broncos actively pursued the non-rugby league supporter. They 
were encouraged to attend by complimentary tickets and low admission 
prices. Under cross examination in Federal Court, Edwards admitted that an 
astonishing 20,000 complimentary tickets were issued to each Broncos 
home game in 1993.33 He believes that not all tickets were necessarily used, 
but the fact that they were issued at all tells us much about the Broncos' 
stage management of crowds at home games.34 Edwards used promotional 
30 The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 103. 
31 The reasons of Justice Burchett: 104. 
32 The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 103. 
33 According to Louis Ramsay, this figure has declined substantially since 1993. However, he 
could not provide an accurate figure of the number issued in 1997 because of the difficulty in 
determining how many are actually distributed per match. 
34 The reasons of Justice Burchett: 103. 
106 
tickets to increase the core audience of the Broncos. Moreover, the Broncos 
charged the lowest admission prices of the three football codes in Brtsbane 
to attract and retain their supporters.35 These promotional techniques used 
by the Broncos were reminiscent of North American ideas of sports 
marketing. The rugby league contest was just one element of the total 
entertainment spectacle. 
The strategies the Broncos employed in attracting a diverse range of 
supporter were extremely effective. In 1992, the Broncos' average 
attendance was 21,687. In 1993, it had rtsen to 43,200, an increase of 
21,513 or approximately 100%.36 However, the profundity of these figures 
must be treated with caution. The Broncos distributed approximately 20,000 
complimentary tickets per match in 1993. This represents not only the 
average attendance increase between 1992 and 1993, but theoretically, just 
under half the attendance at the stadium. Unquestionably the Broncos 
attracted unprecedented levels of interests in a sporting team in Brisbane, 
but there appears to be strong evidence of stage-management at their home 
games. 
At the Broncos' final home game in August 1993, the Broncos 
surveyed 220 supporters. Their aim was to compile a demographic 
representation of their fans. They found a large proportion of women 
spectators attended Broncos games. Forty percent of the 220 spectators 
surveyed were female.37 The survey identified that the Broncos attracted 
some white collar workers. Previously, rugby league was considered an 
essentially blue collar or working-class game. The market research surveys 
35 The reasons of Justice Burchett: 94. 
36 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 October 1997. 
37 Guthrie & Kahler, The Brisbane Broncos Customer Report: 56. 
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suggested that changes had occurred. The Broncos replicated these studies 
in 1994 and 1995.38 The results are relatively consistent across the three 
years. While anecdotal evidence supports the general trends of these 
surveys, it does not support the high levels of cross-class involvement, nor 
the large percentage of female spectators at Broncos matches.39 jt would be 
dangerous to conclude more definitively about the surveys, other than that 
they identify a trend of greater crowd diversity amongst Broncos spectators. 
By 1993, the Broncos had built up a large number of sponsors through 
active and persistent recruitment. Their promotional documents claimed that 
the Broncos were the ideal agency to promote a product or service to the 
wider community. The club, they asserted, transcends age, gender, and 
socio-economic parameters.40 Sponsors enthusiastically endorsed the 
Broncos promotional strategies. Power's Brewing, the club's naming rtghts 
sponsor, contributed more than $1 million a year. TDK, a premier sponsor, 
gave more than $300,000 a year. Another 15 major sponsors provided at 
least $100,000 a year. In 1993, there were over 200 sponsors.4i The 
Broncos developed into a profitable organisation by 1993. The Brisbane 
Broncos Corporation Trust returned a profit of $2.41 million to the year ended 
31 October 1993.42 The Broncos were a successful sporting organisation on 
and off the field. In 1993 they won their second Winfield Cup. 
38 Ben Copcutt, Michael Defteros, Mark Moffitt & Christine Wilson, 1994 Brisbane Broncos 
Internship: an internship report prepared by students of Griffith University for The Brisbane 
Broncos Football Club, 1994. Michael Brook, Toni Bush, Cathy Pfeffer & Ramanan 
Rajasingham, 1995 Brisbane Broncos Internship Project: an internship report prepared by 
students of Griffith University for The Brisbane Broncos Football Club, 1995. 
39 The Broncos are unconvinced by the reliability of these surveys. They do not feel the 
sample size, nor the sampling technics are all that consistent. Certainly, they identify trends, 
but not specific percentages. 
40 Ben Copcutt, Michael Defteros, Mark Moffitt & Christine Wilson, 1994 Brisbane Broncos 
Internship: an internship report prepared by students of Griffith University for The Brisbane 
Broncos Football Club, 1994, i. 
41 The Bulletin: 8 June 1993, 103. 
42 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 32. 
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The Broncos Prepare for Competition 1994 
In 1994, the Broncos secured the News Limited companies, Traveland and 
Queensland Newspapers Ltd., as sponsors. The Broncos developed a close 
relationship with Queensland Newspapers. One Brtsbane sportswriter 
believed the association went too far: 
Every Broncos wedding, every baby born or birthday, it was 
drop everything and get out there. It was front page news no 
matter what grade they were in. You started wondertng 
whether you were reading a newspaper or a Broncos 
newsletter.43 
But Mike Colman (1996) accuses the newspaper of far worse.44 The 
newspaper began editonalising political statements supporting the Broncos 
in their disputes with the ARL. It resembled propaganda. In one story John 
Ribot claimed the Broncos had lost money in 1993, despite record crowds 
and sponsorship levels. In fact the Broncos returned a generous profit to their 
directors of $2.41 million in 1993 and $2.06 million in 1994.45 Yet this 
'propaganda' was no different from the stories the Courier-Mail ran about the 
Broncos between 1988 and 1992. In the intenm, though, the Broncos had 
fundamentally changed their ideological representation. They could no 
longer blame the NSWRL, the judiciary or individual referees in a conspiracy 
against the Broncos. In 1992 and 1993, they had won the Winfield Cup, 
defeating every team in the NSWRL Premiership. How could they claim they 
were still being conspired against? Despite this ideological quandary, the 
Broncos administration, through the medium of the Courier-Mail, still tned to 
43 Colman, Super League: 54. 
44 Colman, Super League: 54. 
45 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 32. 
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generate popular support through this parochial technique. 
At the start of the 1994 season, the Broncos collected just one point in 
their first three matches. The Broncos diverted attention from their poor form 
by developing suspicions of a NSWRL conspiracy. In early AprtI 1994, the 
NSWRL announced changes to the salary cap. The reforms were designed 
to brtng more equality to the competition. It aimed to restrict the financially 
stronger clubs dominating the player transfer market. The salary cap was not 
designed to disadvantage one particular club. Yet the Broncos argued it 
would. Wayne Bennett believed the changes to the salary cap would 
decimate the Broncos.46 They would undermine the Broncos' competitive 
strength. Bennett overtly linked the salary cap changes with a NSWRL 
conspiracy. The Broncos had won two premierships, but they would not be 
'allowed' to win any more. 
Even before 1994, the Broncos were bitterly opposed to the 
introduction of more teams in Brtsbane. They claimed the NSWRL should 
reduce the number of teams in Sydney, not expand the league. Brisbane 
could only support one local rugby league team, authorities claimed. In May 
1994, the NSWRL proposed to expand the number of teams in the south-
east region of Queensland. Once again, the Broncos claimed the NSWRL 
wanted to curb their success. Barry Maranta overtly fed the conspiracy 
theory: the Broncos were too successful; we (the NSWRL) will stop your 
success with these salary cap restrictions.47 
In early July 1994, confrontations between the NSWRL and the 
Broncos peaked. Two Broncos players, Kerrod Walters and Allan Langer, 
46 The Courier-Mail: 20 April 1994, 60. 
47 The Courier-Mail: 7 May 1994, 29 & 32. 
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were reported to the judiciary for a spear tackle. Walters was suspended, but 
Langer was exonerated. The Courter-Mail framed their headline for 
Queenslanders: "Bias on Broncos: Walters, Latest suspension fuels 
'conspiracy'".48 The article summarised the Broncos' judiciary record since 
1988. Between 1988 and 1993 only four Broncos players were suspended 
by the judiciary. Yet in just half the 1994 season, a further four Broncos were 
suspended. Surely this confirmed that the NSWRL wanted to halt further 
Broncos achievements? The evidence appeared to endorse the Broncos 
claims. However, the article focused only on 'proving' the conspiracy theory, 
not the issue of Walters' guilt. 
Two days later the relationship between the newspaper and the 
Broncos against the NSWRL intensified. The Sunday Mail prtnted a letter 
'thanking' John Quayle for his unequivocal support of the Broncos. The 
newspaper asked all Broncos supporters to send their thanks to Quayle: 
Dear Mr. Quayle, 
Thank you for your efforts in running rugby league 
this season, and in particular, what you have done for the 
Bnsbane Broncos, your back-to-back premiers and your 
competition's most popular and greatest revenue-earning 
team. 
THANKS for those Sydney efforts which saw changes in 
the international laws of the game to stop Allan Langer's 
tackling style. 
48 The Courier-Mail: 1 July 1994, 46. 
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THANKS for citing five Brisbane players to the judiciary so 
far this season. We remind you that four were found guilty 
for total suspensions of 16 games, while Bob Fulton's Manly 
side has had four players cited, one found guilty for a total 
of no suspensions. 
THANKS for what I see as the lack of a proper explanation 
for the public on how Ian Roberts escaped suspension after 
sending Queensland's Jason Smith to hospital by tackling 
him without the ball, yet Kerrod Walters gets two weeks for a 
tackle on David Furner, who later said it was okay. 
THANKS for the NSWRL review of the salary cap, which if 
changed would discnminate against successful sides like 
the Broncos and would be in favour of battling Sydney 
clubs. 
THANKS Mr. Quayle, thanks heaps.49 
49 The Courier-Mail: 3 July 1994, 55. 
112 
Chapter Four 
The Hyper-Commercialisation of the Brisbane 
Sports IVIarketplace 
In 1994, Rupert Murdoch's News Limited attempted, through the courts, to 
establish a rival rugby league competition to challenge the ARL, formerly the 
NSWRL. The competition was, in almost every detail, a replica of the North 
Amencan professional sports model. Teams would be privately owned, they 
would be based on geographic areas, and, most importantly, they were 
designed as profit-making ventures.1 The News Limited proposal would 
reduce the number of teams from 20 to 12, rationalising the Sydney teams 
from 11 to 4, and planned new franchises in the AFL cities of Melbourne and 
Adelaide. The clubs would collaborate on marketing, media, and player 
contracts.2 Super League planned for more than a partial implementation of 
the North Amencan model. News Limited wanted to transplant the entire 
concept on to Australian and English rugby league. Super League was a 
global strategy to establish a world-wide rugby league competition. 
On 23 February 1996, Justice Burchett thwarted News Limited's 
project when he found against them. News Limited appealed against this 
decision, and before the full bench of the Federal Court, their appeal was 
upheld. The court's decision gave News Limited permission to establish 
Super League. Over the first weekend of March 1997, the Super League 
competition began. There are currently two rival competitions of rugby 
league operating in Australia: the ARL and Super League. The Super 
1 The reasons of Justice Burchett: 17. 
2 John Nauright & Murray Phillips, 'Us and Them: Australian Professional Sport and Resistance 
to North American Ownership and Marketing Models', Sport Marketing Quarteriy: 6(1), 1997, 
38. 
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League proposal outlined by News Limited in 1995 was very similar to the 
actual organisation of the 1997 competition. A significant difference, 
however, was in the geography of the teams. There was no team playing in 
Melbourne, but, as from 1998, Super League will have a franchise in 
Australia's dominant sporting city. The Perth team has already been omitted 
from the 1998 competition to accommodate the Melbourne team, though the 
Adelaide Rams have remained - at least for the moment. 
The Causes of the Super League Split 
Relative to the earty 1980s, rugby league in the 1990s had developed into a 
successful professional sport. To the year ending 31 October 1994, it had 
recorded profits of $1,602,553 and had accumulated revenue of $16.4 
million.3 In 1995, the ARL's Winfield Cup was played in two countries, across 
four states and territories and involved 20 teams. The League hierarchy was 
very optimistic about the game's future. Ironically, though, its success 
contributed to its downfall. Other organisations were evaluating the success 
of the game and investigating avenues for increasing their company's profits 
through an association with rugby league and the Winfield Cup.4 
The company that evaluated the potential financial benefits of 
becoming involved with the League was News Limited. Rupert Murdoch is 
an individual with global ambitions. He sees the larger issues, the effect of 
buying another organisation and its ramifications on the global financial 
landscape. Initially this process began with Murdoch's newspapers. As Mike 
Colman (1996) suggests, he did not just want to own the newspaper. He 
3 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 55. 
4 Mike Colman (1996) and Justice Burchett (1996) both conclude that the game's success 
was a contributing factor that made it an attractive business venture for Rupert Murdoch. 
However, possibly the most important factor was its international links. While Australian Rules 
is much more popular and economically viable, it is not as attractive to investors because it has 
no international links of any substance. 
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wanted to own the forests that produced the paper on which the newspapers 
were prtnted.5 But it has not stopped with newspapers. 
To paraphrase George Sage (1990), Murdoch is creating the perfect 
symbiosis between sport and his interests in the media. Owning both 
professional sporting teams and numerous media outlets provides an 
integration for Murdoch's diversified corporate interests.6 Murdoch now 
owns, through his associated companies, pay or terrestrial television stations 
in Asia (Star), Australia (Foxtel), The United Kingdom (BSkyB), and North 
Amertca (Fox). Murdoch also owns the rights to a vast library of films and 
popular entertainment programs through his association with Twentieth 
Century Fox. 
It is the rights to certain sports that determines the success of the pay 
or terrestnal media outlets. Pnor to acquiring the rtghts to Premier League 
soccer in the United Kingdom, the financial viability of BSkyB was very 
insecure. After acquirtng these rtghts, the pay television station generated 
vast profits. Murdoch learnt from this expertence when he challenged the 
domination of the three major television networks in the United States. Fox 
purchased rtghts to the National Football League games and Major League 
baseball games. The Fox network gained instant credibility with audiences 
and advertisers through this venture. Once Murdoch acquired a pay 
television station in Australia, he wanted a popular sport to broadcast on his 
pay-television service. He actively pursued rugby league. 
The acquisition of sporting rights for Murdoch's media outlets is not 
5 Colman, Super League: 28-29. 
6 George Sage, Power and Ideoloav in American Sport: a critical perspective: Human Kinetics, 
Champaign (111.), 1990, 155. 
115 
the end of his symbiosis between sport and the media. The Super League 
concept was the next logical step in the growth of Murdoch's sporting 
interests. In May 1997, Murdoch tabled a bid to purchase the Los Angeles 
Dodgers Baseball Team. The Dodgers play 162 baseball games every year, 
not including playoffs. One of Fox's affiliated stations operate within the 
greater Los Angeles area. Buying the Dodgers would provide that television 
station with a huge number of games for its television schedule. Not only 
does this deal create a direct profit for Murdoch by buying a profitable 
baseball team, it gives the opportunity for another of his companies to 
generate a greater profit as well. 
Murdoch is acutely aware of the relationship between sport and his 
media organisations. But the initial proposals for the Super League concept 
did not transpire from News Limited. It was John Ribot, the chief executive of 
the Bnsbane Broncos Rugby League Club, who first proposed the idea to 
representatives of News Limited. The Broncos were the most successful 
rugby league club in the Winfield Cup since their inception in 1988. They 
had set record crowd attendances in the NSWRL, attracting a 'new' group of 
fans to their matches and generating vast profits for their directors.7 However, 
throughout the Broncos' short history, they were continually fighting against 
the NSWRL and then the ARL. The ARL had a totally different agenda from 
the Broncos. The League's articles stated that they existed to serve the best 
interests of the ARL and all the clubs. They were strictly a non-private 
business co-operative.8 The Broncos were the complete antithesis of the 
ARL, since they operated to generate profits for their directors and 
shareholders. 
1 The Broncos generated a profit of $2.41 million in the year ended 31 October 1993 and 
$2.06 million in the year ended 31 October 1994. The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 32. 
8 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 22. 
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There was resentment and bitterness on both sides. Ribot was highly 
critical of the League. Most of the bitterness arose because the Broncos 
thought the League was trying to stop them from being successful. A 
comment by Ribot illustrates the differing philosophies: 
It was like they had no idea of running a business or 
making a sound commercial decision...From day one 
we would try to make good business sense and they 
would stop us for political reasons. The League 
would never make a decision without first considering 
how it would impact on Manly or Easts or who would 
get offside. We were running a business, they were 
playing politics.9 
The situation deteriorated when the Broncos proposed to the League that 
Brtsbane should host the Grand Final. The Broncos Board guaranteed the 
League twice as much revenue as the League had generated from the final 
the year before. Yet the League turned them down. The Broncos could not 
understand it. The League and the other clubs, concluded Ribot, would do 
just about anything to stop the Broncos success. It was the tall poppy 
syndrome, he lamented.10 The Broncos were disenchanted and disillusioned 
with the League, so they decided to act, before (as they saw it) they were 
pushed. 
The Broncos and News Limited already had a close working 
relationship. News Limited, through one of its subsidianes, Queensland 
9 Colman, Super League: 46. 
10 Colman, Super League: 47-48. 
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Newspapers, sponsored the Broncos in the 1994 season. Ribot first 
proposed the Super League concept to News Limited in April 1994. The 
proposal included News Limited administering and owning the competition 
for a 10% fee.11 It conformed nicely to the News Limited strategy. News 
Limited could link the teams, Foxtel, and the administration of the game 
under its control. It would provide the perfect economic relationship. 
News Limited were not the only multi-national who were concerned 
with pay television subscrtptions. The two telecommunication companies in 
Australia, Telstra and Optus, also had an interest. After a series of events, 
Optus aligned itself with television magnate Kerry Packer, and Telstra with 
Murdoch. They were not concerned with the programs that each station 
aired, they just wanted their cables running into the houses and not those of 
their partner. Cables meant profits. Not only does each cable carry television 
signals, but also information relevant to telephone lines, facsimiles, 
computers, the internet, home shopping, and home banking.12 
Events did not transpire as News Limited hoped. The ARL had signed 
a pay television contract with Channel Nine owner Kerry Packer, giving him 
exclusive rtghts until the year 2000. The League told News Limited that it 
would not breach its contract with Packer, nor would Packer agree to give up 
the rights. The only option left for News Limited was to start a new 
competition to run as a rival with the ARL. After a series of legal cases. Super 
League's competition began in March 1997. The Super League split was 
caused to a large degree by pay television and the need to use sport to 
attract subscribers. But Ribot's proposal conformed to News Limited's larger 
ambitions and gave that organisation an initial sports/media nexus in 
11 The reasons of Justice Lockhart et al: 60. 
12 Colman, Super League: 41. 
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Australia. However, the Super League dispute did not just affect the sport of 
rugby league. As I now discuss, rugby union fundamentally altered its basic 
amateur ethos to combat, what it believed, was a substantial threat from 
Super League and the ARL. 
The Commercialisation of Rugby Union in Australia 
Rugby union in Australia was inextrtcably linked to the amateur ideals of 
middle and upper class society during much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centunes.i3 Rugby was not played for financial or monetary compensation. 
Instead the players gained physical and psychological rewards. 
Administrators strongly resisted any player payments because they felt it 
would diminish the game's moral and educational value. In 1907 
disenchanted Australian rugby union players switched to rugby league, a 
game established in England in 1895 to compensate players for time lost at 
work through injury. Rugby union administrators expelled these 'rebels', who 
simply sought compensation for playing injuries that kept them from earning 
their normal wage. The authorities hoped to discourage further defections, 
thereby crushing the 'professional' game. This attitude toward player 
defections continued for much of the twentieth century. No player was 
allowed to return to the amateur game, if they had switched to play rugby 
league. Yet rugby union players were quite willingly to play league if the 
financial rewards were acceptable. Rugby league clubs actively pursued 
union players because they were not paid, and were thus susceptible to 
financial inducements. This provided a serious quandary for rugby union 
officials. Pnor to the 1980s, their retention strategy was based upon future 
earning possibilities after their retirement from the game. 
13 Murray Philips, 'Rugby' in Sport in Australia: A Social Historv: Wray Vamplew & Brian 
Stoddart (eds), Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994, 193-212. 
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Durtng the mid 1970s and early 1980, rugby union began to alter its 
governing ethos. It started to adopt many elements of commercialisation that 
were affecting other Australian sports during this period.i4 Previously, rugby 
union only generated revenue through gate takings. After the 1970s, rugby 
union raised additional funds through sponsorship, television rtghts, and, in 
NSW, licensed clubs. Similarly, rugby league generated revenue through 
these sources. However, rugby league received more revenue than rugby 
union because of league's greater popularity throughout all social classes. 
This gave rugby league clubs greater financial power to attract union 
players. To counteract the continual plunder of rugby union's best players, 
administrators started to reward their elite players covertly. During the 1980s, 
the remuneration of Australian rugby union players became increasingly 
complex. They received money from endorsements, employment from major 
sponsors, and appearance fees. However, at no stage did rugby union 
administrators actually provide players directly with match fees. In 1991, the 
International Rugby Board (IRB) changed its definition of an amateur.i5 
Rugby union players could now earn income from personal promotions, 
rugby-related writing, and advertising. In effect, the IRB officially ratified 
players' revenue sources that had developed throughout the 1980s. 
The movement of elite rugby union players to rugby league lessened 
in Australia with the nse of indirect player compensation and the increase of 
regional and international competitions. In 1986, six teams from three 
countries Australia (NSW and Queensland), Fiji and New Zealand 
(Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury) competed in the Super-six 
Championship.16 Each team played the other five in a round-robin 
14 Philips,'Rugby', 208. 
15 Philips,'Rugby', 212. 
16 Jack Pollard, Australian Ruabv: The Game and The Plavers: Ironbark, Sydney, 1994, 599. 
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competition. The inaugural winner was Canterbury. The Super-six 
competition was superseded by the Super-10 Championship in 1993, as the 
number of teams increased from six to ten. New teams entered the 
competition and existing teams withdrew. Canterbury, Wellington, and Fiji 
were replaced by Otago, Waikato, and Western Samoa. However, events in 
South Africa in 1991 and the beginning of 1992, fundamentally altered the 
composition of the championship. South Africa is the third major rugby union 
country in the southern hemisphere, and union is the dominant sport 
amongst the white male population. Yet, prior to 1992, South African sporting 
teams were barred from official international competition because of sporting 
sanctions imposed by the Gleneagles Agreement to protest against 
apartheid. But after the release of Nelson Mandela and the emergence of 
multi-race elections. South Afrtcan teams were finally readmitted into 
international competition. Natal, Northern Transvaal, and Transvaal joined 
the other seven teams in the Super-10 Championship. Teams were split into 
two pools of five competitions. The two pool winners played each other in a 
final. The winners of the Super-10 competitions were Transvaal in 1993 and 
Queensland in 1994 and 1995. These competitions enabled players to 
compete against teams from other regions on a regular basis. 
Despite the efforts of rugby union administrators in Australia, the 
threat of their players defecting to rugby league did not disappear. In fact in 
AprtI 1995, the threat increased substantially. In late 1994 and early 1995, 
Rupert Murdoch's News Limited trted to persuade the ARL to adopt its Super 
League concept. The ARL and its members rejected the News Limited 
proposal, effectively ending any collaboration between the two parties. But 
News Limited was determined to establish its competition. On 31 May 1995, 
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News Limited implemented its alternative strategy. 17 It approached selected 
clubs, coaches, and players they thought might be amenable to the Super 
League concept. However, it was the players that were crucial. Without any 
elite players the ARL would have no competition to administer. 
Consequently, the ARL would be forced to compromise with News Limited. 
Therefore, News Limited wanted to contract as many elite players as 
possible to undermine the ARL's control. After the initial success of News 
Limited over the weekend of 1-2 April, the ARL managed to halt News 
Limited signings. Within two weeks, the vast majority of elite rugby league 
players in Australia were contracted with either News Limited or the ARL. Yet 
News Limited had not signed enough players to force the ARL into 
compromise. Moreover, the competition between the two organisations for 
players artificially increased player salaries. In contract negotiations players 
could demand and would receive massive increases on their current 
contracts. Each side was desperate to have more and also better quality 
rugby league players under contract. 
Australian rugby union administrators were worried about 
developments in rugby league. For the past decade they had restricted the 
number of defections to league through surreptitious player payments. But 
new levels of remuneration for rugby league players could ultimately 
threaten the code of rugby union in Australia. Rugby union administrators felt 
they would not be able to compete with rugby league under the current 
'amateur' structure. On Apnl 8, just one week after News Limited first began 
to sign players, rugby union officials from Australia and New Zealand held a 
17 For a detailed description of this aspect of the Super League process, see Colman, Super 
League. 
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secret meeting to discuss the threat posed by Super League.18 The meeting 
established three resolutions to oppose the impact of Super League. The 
unions had to establish a competition, or series of competitions, that would 
attract significant interest and money from a television organisation. Prtor to 
1996, rugby union did not organise its matches and tours to compliment 
television. There was little consistency between seasons. Television wanted 
a product that would take place at the same time and involve the same teams 
every year at a regional and national level. A suitable rugby product would 
generate significant revenue for rugby administration. Without these new 
funds, rugby union could not compete with the increase in rugby league 
player payments. Increased television revenue would restrict player 
defections to rugby league. However, match payments for rugby union 
players was still unlawful under the IRB constitution. 
On 10 April, the New South Wales Rugby Union (NSWRU) Board 
removed the fundamental tenet of its constitution. It resolved to abandon the 
concept of amateurism.i9 Within a couple of days, the Queensland Rugby 
Union (QRU) reinforced the NSW stance on amateurtsm. At least within 
Australia, rugby union players could be paid for playing. They could be 
remunerated as professional athletes. The NSW and Queensland stance 
challenged the essential pnnciple that had differentiated the code from rugby 
league. Ian Ferrter, the Chairman of the NSWRU, was optimistic about rugby 
union's survival. The game's administrators, he believed, could now 
compete with rugby league in the retention and acquisition of players without 
18 At the meeting were the Australian Rugby Union (ARU) Chairman Leo Williams, ARU 
president Phil Harry, ARU Director Dick McGruther, ARU Chief Executive Officer Bruce 
Hayman, New South Wales Rugby Union Chairman Ian Ferrier and other mgby administrators 
and officials from Australia and New Zealand. Peter Fitzsimons, The Rugby War: Harper 
Collins, Sydney, 1996, 15. 
19 Fitzsimons, The Ruobv War: 20. 
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one hand tied behind their back.20 
The Emergence of the Queensland Reds. 1995-1997 
In the last few days of April 1995, rugby union administrators from Australia 
and New Zealand completed their 'ideal' rugby product.21 The regional 
competition they developed built upon the Super-10 competition, which drew 
teams from Australia (two). New Zealand (four). South Africa (three) and one 
South Pacific Island nation. To modify the competition to be more desirable 
for a television organisation, the concept planners altered the number and 
composition of the teams from the Super-10 competition. They increased the 
number of teams from ten to twelve. Australia (3), New Zealand (5) and 
South Afnca (4) had the number of teams representing their country 
increased by one. To accommodate the three team increase but still maintain 
a twelve team competition, the planners withdrew their sanction of a South 
Pacific Island team. While the public support a South Pacific Island nation 
receives is large, it could not compete with the corporate support or 
television demographics that another team from Australia, New Zealand, or 
South Afrtca could provide for a media organisation. The South Pacific 
Island nation was expendable in the pursuit of greater television revenue. 
Throughout May and June 1995, rugby union administrators from 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Afnca negotiated the sale of television 
rtghts to the Super-12 and the Tri-nations test series with News Limited in 
Australia and News Corporation in Britain.22 News Corporation decided to 
purchase the global rights to broadcast the regional Super-12 competition 
and the international Tri-nations series for $555 million (US) for ten years 
20 Fitzsimons, The Ruabv War: 20. 
21 Fitzsimons, The Ruabv War: 29. 
22 News Limited is the Australian division of News Corporation International. 
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beginning in 1996.23 However, it was not until 27 August that the IRB 
endorsed the decision of the NSWRU and the QRU to abandon the concept 
of amateurism. Officially, rugby union players around the world could now be 
paid to play rugby union. 
In 1996, the Queensland Reds participated in their first season of 
professionalism in the Super-12 competition. Full professionalism completed 
the QRU's transformation from a limited, minor sporting association in the 
1980s into a progressive, financially driven corporate organisation. Their 
place within the commercial Brisbane sports marketplace reflected this 
change. Since 1993, the absolute attendance at Reds matches has 
increased significantly (see figure 4.1).24 





























In 1993, only 74,285 spectators watched the Reds play. In 1997, the overall 
23 Fitzsimons, The Ruabv War: 95-98. 
24 Jason Greenhaigh, marketing manager of the Queensland Reds, supplied this information 
in an interview on 8 August 1997. 
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figure had increased to 114,756. These attendance figures do not seem that 
impressive when they are compared to AFL crowds in Melbourne and 
Adelaide. But in the context of Queensland sport, and compared to rugby 
union elsewhere in Australia, they are significant. While an increase of just 
over 40,000 in four years seems very impressive, these figure are distorted 
by the increased number of games at Ballymore. The absolute attendance 
figures do not account for the increased number of home matches the Reds 
played in 1997. They played more home matches in 1997 than in 1993. 
However, there is little doubt the popularity of the Reds has increased since 
1993. 
Jason Greenhaigh, the marketing manager of the Queensland Reds, 
attrtbutes the increased popularity of rugby union to a sertes of related 
factors.25 In 1996, Super-10 was modified and expanded to form the Super-
12 competition and rugby union embraced professionalism. The Reds 
operated as a highly developed non-profit commercial operation similar to 
the ARL. It actively pursued supporters, corporate sponsors, and the media. It 
entered the professional sports domain and conformed to the dominant 
structure of commercial sport in Australia. Previously, the Queensland Rugby 
Union team represented a penpheral code in the Brtsbane sports 
marketplace. After 1996, the Reds developed into a mass media 
entertainment product. 
In 1997, the Reds averaged between 14,000 and 14,500 at their home 
games.26 The absolute attendances and average attendance only increased 
marginally between 1996 and 1997. Perhaps the Reds should have 
averaged more than 14,500. The developments in the rugby league split 
25 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
26 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
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between News Limited and the ARL caused the Broncos and Crushers 
crowds to decline dramatically in 1997. Rugby union was similar in style and 
structure to rugby league. Yet rugby league crowds did not transfer to rugby 
union en masse.27 jason Greenhaigh, however, was unconcerned by only a 
marginal increase in average attendance between 1996 and 1997. He 
attributes only a slight increase to the poor results of the Reds in the first six 
matches of the Super-12 competition.28 The Reds managed to win only one 
of their first six matches. Four of their first six matches were played away from 
Ballymore. Previously, the Reds had been very successful. They won the 
Super-10 competition in 1994 and 1995. In 1996, the team reached the 
semi-finals of the Super-12 competition. Their semi-final match against 
Northern Transvaal attracted 28,500 spectators, their largest crowd that 
year.29 Despite the poor results in the first six games, the Reds finished 
strongly. The crowds reacted to the Reds' performances and the crowd 
attendances increased as the season progressed. The Reds' administration 
was pleased with the consistency of the crowd attendances.30 in 1996, three 
Reds games attracted less than 10,000 people. In 1997, only their match 
against France attracted less than that figure. 
The increase in support for the Reds was not only limited to absolute 
and average crowd attendance. Between 1994 and 1997, season tickets 
holders increased by just over 1,000 (see figure 4.2).3i 
27 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 7 May 1997. 
28 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
29 The Australian: 20 May 1996, 27. 
30 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
31 Information supplied by Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
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Figure 4.2: Number of Queensland Reds season ticket holders 1994-1997 
Season ticket holders 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Year 
In particular, there was a marked increase from 1995 to 1996 in the number 
of season ticket holders. In 1995, the Reds completed a very successful 
season. They had defended their Super-10 championship. They could claim 
to be the best provincial rugby union side in the southern hemisphere. 
Logically, their on-field success should have translated to greater crowd 
loyalty and support in 1996. Yet the Reds' on-field success in 1994 did not 
encourage more loyalty and greater crowd support in 1995. In fact the 
numbers of season ticket holders marginally decreased. Yet the cost of 
season tickets, a possibly reason for non-renewal, increased by less than 
5%. Absolute crowd figures decreased quite appreciably over this period 
with a 9% decline. So an increase in support for the Reds in 1995 did not 
materialise as a result of their 1994 Super-10 success. Therefore, it would 
appear unlikely that playing results influenced the increase in crowd support 
and season ticket holders between 1995 and 1996. Instead, the advent of 
professionalism in 1996 seems to have improved crowd and season ticket 
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holder support. This upward trend of support continued in 1997. The greatest 
increase in the number of season ticket holders occurred between 1996 and 
1997. The Reds acquired an additional 589 season ticket holders in just one 
year, representing an 11% increase. 
Between 1994 and 1997, the Reds could not duplicate the 
considerable increase in crowd attendances and season ticket numbers with 
corporate boxes holders. There were only 69 boxes available at Ballymore, 
and from 1994 to 1996 all 69 corporate facilities were full.32 At the end of 
1996, the number of corporate boxes at Ballymore was increased to 74. The 
additional five boxes were sold even before the 1997 season commenced. 
Every season between 1994 and 1997 there has been a waiting list for 
corporate boxes. Jason Greenhaigh did not elaborate on any waiting list 
figures because he felt they could be misleading.33 The companies on the 
waiting list had no obligation to purchase a corporate box if one became 
available. He was skeptical of a company's support for the Reds until he 
received payment for the corporate box. A waiting list was no guarantee of 
financial support. 
The levels of sponsorship of the Reds remained relatively consistent 
between 1994 and 1996 (see figure 4.3).34 
Figure 4.3: Number of Queensland Reds sponsors 1994-1997 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Sponsors above $100,000 4 4 4 9 
Sponsors below $100,000 25 26 28 26 
32 Information supplied by Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
33 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
34 Information supplied by Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
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There were no new sponsors who contributed more than $100,000. The only 
change occurred in the second category (those who contributed less than 
$100,000). This category acquired an additional three sponsors. Between 
1996 and 1997, sponsorship levels appeared to change significantly. There 
was more than a 100% increase in the number of sponsors who contributed 
more than $100,000. In 1997, nine companies gave the Reds more than 
$100,000. The increase in category one came mainly from category two. 
Four of the five new sponsors in category one were not new sponsors to 
rugby union in Queensland.35 in 1997, they decided to increase their level of 
financial support to the Reds. This caused the numbers of sponsors in 
category one to increase dramatically. The Reds did gain one completely 
new category one sponsor. Before 1997, this sponsor had never been 
associated with rugby union, and their financial support had not been 
anticipated by the Reds administration. Despite the small decrease in 
sponsor levels in category two, the overall number of sponsors increased 
from 32 to 35. This was a major financial benefit for the Reds. Not only did 
the absolute number of sponsors increase, but there was a large increase in 
the overall levels of sponsorship revenue. 
Jason Greenhaigh attributes the increased popularity and corporate 
support to the professionalisation of rugby union, rather than public 
dissatisfaction about the Super League split.36 Yet it is difficult to be 
conclusive because rugby union institutionalised professionalism at virtually 
the same time as the troubles between the ARL and Super League 
commenced. However, the figures supplied by the Reds place greater 
emphasis on the professionalisation of rugby union, rather than the Super 
League split, as the pnmary cause for its increased popular and corporate 
35 inten/iew with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
36 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 7 May 1997. 
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support. 
The heightened popularity of rugby union seems to have occurred 
from within the code's traditional area of support. Histortcally, demand in 
corporate boxes has surpassed supply. In 1997, new corporate boxes were 
purchased as soon as they became available. Only one completely new 
sponsor joined the Reds between 1994 and 1997. Yet there was a large 
increase in absolute sponsorship levels. In terms of crowd support the 
majority of patron increase appears likely to have been from loyal rugby 
union supporters, rather than disillusioned rugby league supporters. The 
consistency of the Reds crowds was better in 1997, than 1996. More rugby 
union fans were attending more consistently. In 1997 there was only one 
game under 10,000, while there were three in 1996. The majority of the 
increased Reds support came from the traditional rugby community and 
seems to have been prompted by widespread support for the 
professionalisation of rugby union. 
The Decline of the Broncos 1995-1997 
In 1995, the ARL expanded the Winfield Cup. It increased the size of the 
competition from sixteen to twenty teams. This expansion converted a largely 
regional competition into a quasi-national competition. Before 1995, all 
sixteen teams in the Winfield Cup were confined to just two States, NSW and 
Queensland. Moreover, all the teams were located within a 1000 kilometre 
radius of Sydney. In 1995, the west Australian capital of Perth, the north 
Queensland centre of Townsville, the largest city in New Zealand, Auckland 
and another team from Brisbane were all invited to join the competition. The 
ARL expansion improved the national focus of the competition. But it was still 
far from a truly national competition because there were no teams from 
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Adelaide, Darwin, Hobart or Melbourne - all Australian Rules strongholds. 
Since they were established in 1988, the Broncos had always been 
fiercely opposed to the introduction of another Winfield Cup team in 
Brtsbane. They did not believe Brisbane had the financial or supporter base 
to sustain another team. The Broncos argued that the number of teams in the 
Winfield Cup should be reduced, not increased. The ARL were unconcerned 
by the Broncos arguments. They thought Brisbane could support a second 
team. In 1994 the ARL endorsed the QRL aligned proposal. The QRL were 
extremely committed to the new club because they felt the Broncos had 
developed too much power and influence over rugby league in 
Queensland.37 |n 1995, the South East Queensland Crushers provided the 
Broncos with direct and tangible competition. Before 1995, the Broncos had 
no sertous competitor in the Brisbane commercial sports marketplace. The 
Reds played only a handful of games at Ballymore each year and the Bears 
had completed just two full seasons at the Gabba. In 1995, increased 
competition from a rival rugby league club was likely to cause a decrease in 
overall Broncos support. Yet the Broncos development as the most 
progressive and influential sporting organisation in Brisbane reached its 
zenith durtng 1995. It is after 1995 that there has been a marked decrease in 
financial and popular support for the Broncos. Louis Ramsay, the acting 
marketing manager of the Broncos, attributes the decline to the impact of the 
Super League dispute.38 
The genesis of the Super League dispute began in April 1994. John 
Ribot approached News Limited with a proposal to organise and administer 
37 Colman, Super League: 229. 
38 Interview with Louis Ramsay, acting marketing manager of the Brisbane Broncos, on 6 
August 1997. 
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an elite rugby league competition in Australia. Over the next six months, 
negotiations between the clubs and News Limited were kept largely secret. 
While a number of newspaper articles investigated the development of an 
elite rugby league competition in Australia, the ARL was unconcerned about 
the Super League threat. They placed little credence on the opinions of 
these journalists. But as elements of the News Limited proposal were 
disclosed to rugby league officials, the ARL realised the threat from Super 
League was genuine. On November 9, Ken Arthurson was recalled from his 
officials duties in England to counter the threat of Super League.39 The ARL 
asked all clubs, except the rebel Broncos, to sign a Commitment Agreement. 
The Agreement would bind the clubs to the ARL competition for five years. 
The clubs gained an assurance the ARL would not rationalise the 
competition, and the ARL effectively blocked any club from defecting to 
Super League. After a series of News Limited presentations to the clubs and 
the ARL in early 1995, they rejected the News Limited proposal. At the 
conclusion of the News Limited's final presentation on February 6, the ARL 
asked the clubs to return an updated version of the Commitment Agreement. 
The Loyalty Agreement strengthened the contractual conditions that the 
Commitment Agreement had made between the clubs and the ARL in late 
1994. The ARL asked that the Loyalty Agreements be returned by 9am the 
following day, otherwise they would consider it an act of gross disloyalty.40 
This time all twenty clubs, including the Broncos, signed and returned 
the Loyalty Agreement to the ARL, although Brisbane and Canberra felt the 
entire process was unjust. The ARL believed the Super League threat was 
now over. Yet News Limited pursued alternative strategies. On 30 March, 
News Limited initiated legal action against the ARL. They claimed that the 
39 Colman, Super League: 73. 
40 Colman, Super League: 85. 
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Loyalty Agreements breached the Trade Practises Act. The following 
evening News Limited tried to undermine the ARL competition by luring elite 
players across to Super League. On the first weekend of April, the Super 
League dispute entered the public consciousness, causing a large rift 
between rugby league supporters. As the player recruitment and court cases 
continued, supporters' disenchantment increased. 
On 23 February 1996, Justice James Burchett thwarted News 
Limited's Super League proposal. Burchett's judgment prevented News 
Limited from establishing an elite rugby league competition in Australia. Over 
the Christmas pertod of 1995-1996, the Super League aligned clubs 
prepared themselves for the start of a Super League competition in March 
1996. Yet Burchett's finding of February 1996 ordered the clubs to return and 
play in the ARL Premiership. News Limited appealed Burchett's decision 
before the Full Bench of the Federal Court. In late 1996, the Full Bench of the 
Federal Court overturned Justice Burchett's decision. They found in favour of 
News Limited. The court's decision gave News Limited permission to 
establish an elite rugby league competition in Australia. Over the first 
weekend of March 1997, the Super League competition began. Rugby 
league's popularity suffered throughout much of the Super League dispute. 
In 1995 and 1996 rugby league crowds had decreased significantly on 
preceding years. Yet the Broncos' average attendance, season ticket 
holders, and sponsorship levels maintained pre-Super League levels in 
1995. After 1996, though, the Broncos popular and economic support 
declined significantly. 
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In 1996 and 1997, there was a substantial decrease in the average 
attendance at Broncos matches (see figure 4.4).4i 






In 1995 the Broncos' average home crowd was 35,817. By 1996, it had 
decreased to 23,632. Between 1995 and 1996, 12,185 or 34% less people 
attended Broncos home matches. The decline continued in 1997. Average 
attendance in 1997 decreased to 19,298. Within just two seasons, average 
attendance had dropped 16,519 or 46%. 
Over this period the number of complimentary tickets for Broncos 
matches has declined substantially. In 1993, the number of tickets issued per 
game was 20,000. In 1997, the figure is closer to 6,000 per game.42 
However, as Louis Ramsay explains, it is hard to ascertain exactly how many 
41 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997 and 18 November 1997. 
42 Interview with Louis Ramsay on 24 April 1997. 
135 
are promotional tickets and how many are sponsors tickets because the 
Broncos do not differentiate between the two. For example, a Broncos major 
sponsor might receive 12,000 tickets per year as part of their sponsorship 
agreement. This translates to 1,000 'free' tickets per match. However, they 
are not free tickets per say. They are usually included within the overall 
sponsorship contract. This relationship is common throughout all levels of 
Broncos sponsorship. If a company carries out some work for the Broncos, 
they might be paid in complimentary tickets, instead of cash. Therefore, at 
any particular Broncos match, 3,000 tickets might be complimentary, and the 
other 3,000 might 'free' sponsors tickets. Undoubtedly, however, the number 
of promotional and 'free' sponsors tickets has declined, and, concurrently, 
the overall attendance at Broncos matches has fallen. 
Between the end of September 1995 and the handing down of 
Burchett's decision in Februan/ 1996, the ARL and Super League 
competitions were in a state of flux. In April 1995, the Broncos became 
officially aligned to the Super League concept. At the end the 1995 season, 
they did not anticipate playing another season in the ARL Premiership. 
Instead, all their preparations were aimed towards the start of the Super 
League competition in March 1996. Justice Burchett's decision forced the 
Broncos to resume their place in the ARL Premiership. Louis Ramsay 
believes the uncertainty of Burchett's decision adversely affected Broncos' 
crowd support.43 They were confused by the uncertainty of the Super 
League dispute and the Broncos' future. At their last home game in 1995, the 
Broncos attracted 54,645 supporters to their match against Auckland.44 The 
Broncos averaged 35,817 people to their matches in 1995. Supposedly the 
43 Interview with Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997. 
44 Brisbane Broncos Rugby League Club, Bronco!: Brisbane Broncos Rugby League Club, 
Brisbane, March 1997, 30. 
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Super League dispute generated an enormous amount of public reaction in 
1995. Yet this reaction did not adversely affect Broncos support. Public and 
corporate support either peaked or remained relatively constant in 1995. 
Between 1994 and 1995, the Broncos acquired an additional 839 
season ticket holders, or a 7.5% increase. After 1995, the Broncos number of 
season ticket holders followed the declining trend of average attendance 
over the same period (see figure 4.5).45 
Figure 4.5: Number of Brisbane Broncos season ticket holders 1994-1997 
Season tickets holders 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 
Year 
In 1995, there were 12,039 season ticket holders. One year later, this figure 
had declined by 3,539 to 8,500, almost a 30% decrease. The downward 
pattern continued in 1997. The number of season ticket holders fell by 2,000 
or 23.5%. Within just two years, the total number of season ticket holders 
declined by more than 5,500 or 46%, 
45 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997. 
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The downward trend in average attendance and season ticket holders 
after 1995 was replicated in the number of Broncos sponsors, and also the 
total sponsorship levels during this penod (see figures 4.6 and 4.7).46 
Figure 4.6: Number of Brisbane Broncos sponsors 1994-1997 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of Sponsors 15 22 20 20 
However, the decline in the number and amount of sponsorship was not as 
pronounced as average attendance and season ticket holders. The number 
of major Broncos sponsors peaked in 1995 with 22. In 1996, there was an 
insignificant decline, though one key sponsor, Channel Nine, withdrew its 
sponsorship to appear impartial in the Super League dispute. Between 1996 
and 1997 the Broncos lost two major sponsors, but also gained two new 
major sponsors. Therefore, the overall number of major sponsors was 
constant in 1996 and 1997. 
Despite a relatively constant number of major sponsors between 1995 
and 1997, the absolute levels of Broncos sponsorship did decrease durtng 
this penod (see figure 4.7). 
46 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997. 
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In 1994 and 1995 the revenue generated from Broncos sponsorship peaked. 
After 1996, the downward trend in popular and financial support continued. 
Overall there was a 10% drop in total sponsorship from 1995 to 1996. 
However, this fall was accentuated by the Broncos' contractual 
arrangements with Super League. Under their Super League contract, the 
Broncos relinquished certain rights to place sponsors logos on prominent 
parts of the Broncos playing strip. Super League negotiated the sponsorship 
agreements for the entire competition, and it distributed the revenue to all the 
Super League teams. Unfortunately for the Broncos, the Super League 
competition did not begin in 1996 as planned. That year the Broncos were 
required by law to play in the ARL competition and they did not receive 
revenue from Super League negotiated sponsorship agreements. According 
to Ramsey, this contributed quite significantly to the decline in total 
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sponsorship between 1995 and 1996.47 
In 1997 the Super League competition finally began. Therefore, all the 
extra revenue generated from Super League negotiations would be valid in 
1997. It could thus be expected that Broncos total sponsorship ought to have 
increased or at least held constant between 1996 and 1997. Yet the 
downward trend continued. Another 13% of total sponsorship was lost in this 
period. Even though the number of major Broncos sponsors did not decline 
significantly between 1995 and 1997, there was a decline of about 20% in 
total Broncos sponsorship. 
Between 1994 and 1997, there has been a significant drop in the use 
of Broncos corporate boxes (see figure 4.8).48 
Figure 4.8: Number of Brisbane Broncos corporate box holders 1994-1997 
Corporate box holders 
1994 
47 Interview with Louis Ramsay on 18 November 1997. 
48 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997. 
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In 1994, 142 out of 160 were occupied. The occupancy rates declined by a 
steady amount, and, by 1997, only 101 were used. This represents a 29% 
decline in just four seasons. Consequently, Broncos' administration are now 
contemplating the removal of a number of corporate boxes, replacing them 
with more comfortable public seating. 
In 1995, the Broncos were the most popular sporting team in 
Brtsbane. Within just three years, though, their popularity and, to a lesser 
degree their financial support, declined significantly. Between 1995 and 
1997, there were large decreases in the average attendance and the 
number of season ticket holders. Over this period, both decreased by 46%. 
The demand for corporate facilities also declined, but it was significantly less. 
There was only a 29% decline over this period. The least affected vanable 
durtng this pertod was sponsorship. The Broncos lost very few major 
sponsors. However, the levels of sponsorship did decline by 22% between 
1995 and 1997. But this could well have been caused by medium and long 
term sponsorship contracts between the Broncos and their sponsors. The 
evidence strongly suggests that the Super League dispute has adversely 
affected the Broncos. Yet on two occasions in 1997, the Broncos attracted 
more than 42,000 spectators to ANZ Stadium to watch them play. 
The Rise of the Brisbane Bears (Lions) 1993-1997 
Between 1993 and 1997, the Bears (now Lions) developed into a 
competitive and influential member of the Brisbane sports marketplace. In 
1993, the Bears relocated from Carrara to the Gabba. Their relocation 
rejuvenated public interest in the 'Brisbane' Bears and provided a spectating 
alternative to the Broncos and the Reds. Despite the Bears being a relatively 
new sporting phenomenon, they have attracted relatively large attendances 
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for the Brisbane sports marketplace since their location. 
In their first season at the Gabba in 1993, the Bears average 
attendance was 11,097 (see figure 4.9).49 
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An average crowd of this size was comparable to Queensland rugby union 
fixtures prior to professionalism. Both were, nonetheless, incomparable to 
Broncos attendances during this period. The Bears' average attendance 
increased marginally in 1994. However, two home games against Essendon 
and Collingwood both sold out.so The Gabba capacity in 1994 was just 
under 19,000. Even before the Bears started to be competitive on the field 
(they finished fourteenth on the ladder in 1994), they still attracted 
reasonable local support. 
49 Information supplied by Judy Kilby on 4 December 1997. 
50 The Bears, The Annual Report 1996: 9. 
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The 1995 Bears average attendance was affected by the construction 
of the new Northern Stand at the Gabba. The Northern Stand was rebuilt to 
accommodate more spectators and also to increase the number of corporate 
facilities. It reduced the capacity from 18,500 to 12,500. Therefore, the 
average attendance decreased by just over 2,000 to 10,318 spectators. 
However, six out of eleven home games drew capacity crowds in 1995.51 
According to the marketing manager of the Bears, Judy Kilby, the final two 
home games of 1995 generated unprecedented levels of interest in the 
Bears.52 The second last game of the season was against Essendon, a 
traditionally well patronised game. The game took on added importance as 
the Bears had to continue winning to make the finals. Additionally, it was the 
first game under lights at the Gabba. The Essendon, and the Melbourne 
game the following week, sold out as the Bears swept to the finals for the first 
time. Kilby recalls that she had never expertenced anything like it in 
Brisbane.53 Suddenly the mainstream Brisbane media wanted information 
about the Bears. They ran stories and covered the event like it was a rugby 
league finals sertes. The Bears capitalised on their 'success' in 1996. Their 
average attendance rose significantly to 18,672, representing a 45% 
increase. In 1997, the average attendance rose again, by just under 1,000 to 
19,550. The 1997 average attendance represented 89% of the total 
occupancy of the Gabba. 
The general upward trend in Bears and Lions support was reinforced 
by the substantial increase in members between 1992 and 1997 (see figure 
4.10).54 
51 The Bears, The Annual Report 1996: 9. 
52 Interview with Judy Kilby on 27 May 1997. 
53 Interview with Judy Kilby on 27 May 1997. 
54 Information supplied by Judy Kilby on 4 December 1997 and The Bears, The Annual 
Report 1996: 11. 
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Figure 4.10: Number of Brisbane Bears (Lions) members 1992-1997 
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In their last year at Carrara, the Bears had only 800 members. Within just four 
seasons at the Gabba, Bears membership had risen to 10,201. Between 
1993 and 1996, an additional 7,601 people became Bears members. In just 
three seasons at the Gabba, membership rose by approximately 400%, and 
attendance had climbed by 40%. At the end of 1996, the Bears became the 
Lions. The Lions acquired an additional 6,568 members before the 1997 
season began, representing a 39% increase on 1996 membership figures. 
The Gabba had less than 90 corporate boxes prior to its 
redevelopment in 1995. In 1994 and 1995 the occupancy of these corporate 
boxes was very high (see figure 4.11).55 
55 Information supplied by Judy Kilby on 4 December 1997. 
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Figure 4.11: Number of Brisbane Bears (Lions) corporate box holders 1994-1997 
Corporate box holders 
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Eighty-one out of 85 were filled in 1994. The following year two corporate 
boxes were added in the Clem Jones Stand, and all except one corporate 
box was filled, representing an occupancy rate of 99%. The construction of 
the Northern Stand was completed before the 1996 season commenced, 
adding another 44 boxes. All 135 corporate boxes were sold before 
Christmas 1995, for the 1996 AFL season.56 Another corporate box was 
added between 1996 and 1997 season. All 136 corporate boxes were 
occupied during the 1997 season. Currently, the Lions hold a waiting list of 
120 companies who wish to purchase a Lions corporate box. This situation 
could be alleviated by the completion of the Eastern Stand, which will 
increase the seating and corporate capacity of the Gabba. Since they 
relocated to the Gabba, the Bears and Lions have had a strong and loyal 
corporate support. 
56 The Bears, The Annual Report 1996: 11. 
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The timing of the Bears (Lions) emergence as a competitive force in 
the Brtsbane sports landscape coincides with the Super League dispute and 
the decline of the Broncos' popular support. However, the evidence does not 
appear to support an assertion that the significant increase in Bears support 
comes from disaffected rugby league supporters. While some most certainly 
will be, the majority appear to be traditional Australian Rules supporters. 
Prtor to 1995, the Bears attracted significantly large attendances to more 
than one match. In 1994, games against Essendon and Collingwood were 
sold out. Just over 18,000 came to both of these matches. While this only 
represents the 'average' attendance in 1996, it suggests there has been 
considerable support for Australian Rules in Brtsbane prior to the Super 
League dispute. 
Possibly the most astonishing increase was in the Bears (Lions) 
membership. Between 1993 and 1996 it increased by 400%. Over 4,000 
members joined between 1995 and 1996. Yet the last Broncos game in 1995 
attracted a crowd of over 50,000 people. It would appear unlikely that rugby 
league supporters would invest in a Bears season ticket or transfer their 
allegiance so rapidly. Moreover, the average attendance increase between 
1994 and 1996 was just over 6,000. The increase in season ticket holders at 
the Gabba accounts for almost two-thirds of this increase. Greater corporate 
support came immediately after the Bears performed so successfully in the 
closing stages of the 1995 season. Significantly this was before the Super 
League dispute adversely affected the Broncos. Undoubtedly, the Bears 
support has benefited from the Super League dispute. However, the majority 
of increased support appears to have come from outside the rugby league 




The Changing Nature of the Brisbane Sports 
IVIarketplace 
The Development of a Super Stadium 
In the second half of 1997, the Queensland Government publicly proposed 
the development of a super stadium in the north-eastern Brisbane suburb of 
Eagle Farm. The stadium would occupy the vacant site of the old Brisbane 
international airport. In 1995, a new international airport was opened on the 
opposite side of the runway from the old terminal. The terminal's relocation 
left a large, unused site on the outskirts of Brisbane. Despite its distance from 
the CBD, the site's location was extremely accessible to the Gateway Artertal 
Freeway that by-passes the Brtsbane CBD and links the Gold and Sunshine 
Coasts. 
The Eagle Farm proposal by the Queensland Government drew 
predictable criticism from the Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Jim Soorley. He 
believed the development of a new super stadium was pointless. The BCC 
already owned and controlled ANZ Stadium, the largest sporting arena in 
Queensland. ANZ Stadium is part of the QEII Sports Facility, which is located 
in the southern Brtsbane suburb of Nathan. QEII was later renamed the ANZ 
Stadium after the bank acquired the naming rights to the stadium. The funds 
allocated for the super stadium at Eagle Farm, Soorley argued, should be 
redirected to improve ANZ Stadium, not the construction of a new stadium. A 
new stadium would undermine the ANZ arena's financial viability, since it 
would compete directly with it for premier sporting events and public 
spectacles. That would make the ANZ Stadium less important and less 
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lucrative - even though it has a capacity of just under 60,000 spectators. 
The tension created between the BCC and the Queensland 
Government over the proposed super stadium is not new. Mayor Soorley and 
the State Government have a long history of disagreements about sporting 
facilities. In 1991, Soorley won the Brisbane Council elections. Almost 
immediately, he implemented an economic rationalist policy on Council 
owned sporting facilities. In 1993, he lured the Broncos to QEII Stadium 
through a sertes of economic incentives. Before 1993, the Broncos had 
played at Lang Park, a State Government owned and operated facility. The 
State Government was annoyed because they lost their major tenant at Lang 
Park. Their frustrations were compounded by the fact that Lang Park was 
now in a relatively dilapidated condition. 
Lang Park obviously needed a major redevelopment to provide 
spectators with adequate amenities. But the financial means for 
redevelopment were not forthcoming given the Broncos' relocation to QEII. 
Without a major tenant, it appeared that large expenditure could not be 
justified. Nonetheless, the Queensland Government still funded a major 
redevelopment of Lang Park, including subsidised funding of a new stand, 
which was built to replace the western or main stand. Suncorp Building 
Society acquired the naming rtghts to Lang Park. It was renamed, as a 
consequence, Suncorp Stadium. 
The Queensland Government's redevelopment of Lang Park was 
limited to the construction of one new stand. Three-quarters of the stadium 
was left largely untouched in terms of structural improvements. The northern 
and southern outers were still unseated terraces. These areas are 
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reminiscent of the former antiquated terraces of inner city football stadiums in 
the United Kingdom, rather than a modern, sophisticated stadium.1 The 
partial redevelopment of Lang Park was caused by uncoordinated planning, 
lack of cooperation between the BCC and the State Government, and the 
need for differing shapes of playing arena required by Australian sports. 
Lang Park accommodated the rugby codes and soccer, but was too small to 
cater for Australian Rules football, cricket and baseball. 
In 2000, Sydney will host the Olympic Games. At recent Olympics, the 
group games of the soccer competition have been played in centres outside 
of the host city. In 1992 and 1996, Barcelona and Atlanta awarded other 
Spanish and Amertcan cities the right to host soccer matches. The Sydney 
Olympic Games Organising Committee (SOGOC) presented Australian cities 
with similar opportunities. It proposed to the Queensland Government that 
Lang Park should host one group. However, the ground did not comply to the 
World Footballing Body's (FIFA) strict seating regulations. FIFA regulations 
demand all football stadiums that host international fixtures must be all seater 
arenas. In 1997, Suncorp Stadium could not meet these criteria. So in 
October 1997, the State Government announced it would upgrade Suncorp 
Stadium to comply with FIFA regulations. Yet the proposed developments at 
Suncorp Stadium will not provide Brtsbane with a large, multi-purpose sports 
arena, such as the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG), the Sydney Cricket 
Ground (SCG), and the Adelaide Oval provide for other Australian cities. 
Historically, Brisbane has never had one large stadium able to host a 
vartety of sporting codes. Yet Brisbane, like Sydney, has a greater variety of 
football codes than the other Australian States. Rugby union and rugby 
1 In the United Kingdom, the Premier League clubs are now required by law to provide patrons 
with all-seater stadia. 
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league only developed popularity in Queensland and NSW, not in South 
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, or Western Australia. Both cities built additional 
sporting facilities to accommodate the vartety of football codes. Unlike 
Sydney, though, Brisbane did not have the population to support large 
sporting facilities. The city's population has always been significantly smaller 
than Sydney's. Therefore, vartous sports in Brisbane developed their own 
sporting facilities. This created a number of small, sport-specific stadia. 
Rugby league was located at Lang Park, rugby union at Ballymore, soccer at 
Perry Park, Australian Rules and cricket at the Gabba. In the early 1990s, a 
number of these grounds underwent considerable redevelopment to support 
the commercialisation of the Brtsbane sports marketplace. Despite their 
redevelopment, none of these facilities has emerged as the dominant 
sporting facility in Brisbane. 
At the beginning of 1993, construction commenced on a $44 million 
redevelopment of the Gabba. Prtor to that year, state and international cricket 
matches, greyhound racing, and the occasional Australian Rules match were 
played at the Gabba. The playing surtace of the Gabba is oval in shape, 
rather than rectangular. Cricket and Australian Rules require an oval shaped 
playing surface. Rugby union, rugby league, and soccer play on rectangular 
shaped pitches. The stands at the Gabba conform to the oval shape playing 
surface. But the stands at the Gabba are unsuitable for rugby union, rugby 
league, or soccer spectators. A rectangular shaped pitch centred in the 
middle of the playing surface would leave spectators a considerable distance 
from the spectacle. In Brtsbane, therefore, two different shaped playing 
arenas emerged to satisfy the particular spatial requirements of different 
sporting activities. 
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As I have argued previously, the commercial Brisbane sports 
marketplace has increased substantially in size and structure since the late 
1980s. During this period, three stadiums were redeveloped to attract the 
increasing number of sporting teams. The Gabba, Suncorp Stadium, and 
ANZ Stadium were all improved. Critical to their redevelopment was 
increased spectator capacity and the number and standard of corporate 
facilities. However, the population of Brisbane, the variety of sporting 
facilities, and the competition between the BCC and the Queensland 
Government, limited the size and sophistication of these redevelopments. 
The Gabba, Suncorp Stadium, and ANZ Stadium are medium sized facilities 
that adequately serve the public and commercial sporting teams in Brtsbane. 
Between September 1996 and September 1997, there were only four 
occasions on the Brtsbane sporting calendar where these facilities were 
inadequate. Three of these occasions set historical precedence in Brisbane. 
On 6 September 1996, the Bears played Essendon in their first finals match 
at the Gabba. The games sold out in a couple of days. Judy Kilby believes 
the Gabba's capacity of 22,000 was inadequate for this match. She feels she 
could have sold 40,000 tickets to the Essendon finals game.2 Just one week 
later, the Bears played Carlton in their second finals fixture at the Gabba. 
While the game did sell out, the tickets were not bought at the rate of the 
previous week. Kilby believes there was too much football at the Gabba in 
such a short space of time. Financial restraints affected the spontaneity of 
demand for tickets to the second match, though it was eventually a sell-out. 
In May 1997 the Brtsbane Strikers generated unprecedented interest 
in a national club soccer game in Brisbane and Australia. In the days 
2 Interview with Judy Kilby on 27 May 1997. 
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preceding the final, the local media covered the event as it would cover any 
other sporting event of major significance. Previously soccer was excluded 
from the type of intensive media coverage it received in the days leading up 
to the final. The match was promoted as an historical event, the first of its type 
in Brtsbane. Consequently, the match at Suncorp Stadium attracted a record 
gate of 40,466 for a NSL grand final.3 The game was sold out, attracting 
many 'non-soccer' supporters hoping to witness the historic achievement of 
Brtsbane winning their first NSL title. For the week prior to the final, and a few 
days after it, soccer emerged as a competitive sport in the Brisbane sports 
marketplace. Yet the Strikers' success has failed to stimulate anything like 
the same public interest at the beginning of the 1997-98 NSL season. 
In September 1997, the ANZ Stadium hosted the inaugural Super 
League grand final. The Broncos played Cronulla in the first major rugby 
league grand final to be played outside Sydney. The lure of this inaugural 
event attracted a capacity crowd of just under 60,000 to ANZ Stadium. Only 
one week later, the Broncos played English club St Helens in a World Club 
Challenge quarter final at ANZ Stadium, but the game drew only 6,438 
spectators.4 
In January every year in Brtsbane, the Australian Cricket Team play a 
limited overs match against one of the two international touring cricket teams. 
Traditionally, the match is held on a Sunday. It is the only day of crtcket that 
attracts a capacity crowd to the Gabba. Tickets to the game sell out within a 
few weeks. This is the only sporting event in Brisbane where demand 
regularly exceeds supply. The other three events discussed previously were 
unique occasions for the Brisbane sporting public. In 1996-1997, the 
3 The Australian: 26 May 1997, 25. 
4 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 18 November 1997. 
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Broncos and the Strikers averaged significantly less than their grand final 
attendances. However, the Lions did much better, averaging marginally less 
than the Gabba's total capacity. It is timely therefore, that the Queensland 
Government plans to continue the Gabba redevelopment over the next two 
years. The capacity of the stadium will increase from 22,000 to approximately 
34,000. This will alleviate the current undersupply in crtcket and provide 
sufficient capacity for additional fans at Lions matches. In this respect, the 
construction of a super stadium with a capacity of 80,000 for Brisbane seems 
unnecessary. AFL, NSL, ARL, or Super League teams do not average such 
large attendances. The current state of the Bnsbane sports marketplace 
could not justify the construction of a super stadium. Paradoxically though, if 
Brisbane wants to compete on equal terms with Melbourne and Sydney 
(which has the Olympic Stadium under construction) in the sporting event 
marketplace, it basically needs a major stadium. 
The MCG has histoncally been the premier sporting facility in 
Australia. It is the nation's largest sporting arena, and can hold approximately 
100,000 spectators. The SGC, the Sydney Football Stadium (SFS) and 
Suncorp Stadium each have a capacity of slightly more than 40,000, Football 
Park in Adelaide holds 46,000, while the ANZ Stadium holds just under 
60,000. The MCG can hold almost twice as many spectators as the ANZ 
Stadium, its closest rival. Although the BCC claims it could accommodate a 
major cricket or Australian Rules match, to date the ANZ Stadium has never 
held a significant contest in either code because of the small width of the 
arena and the recent Gabba redevelopment. The financial returns of playing 
at the MCG, and the Victorian State Government's active pursuit of major 
sporting contests, have influenced the relocation of a number of significant 
sporting contests to Melbourne in 1997. 
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The State of Victorta suffered from deindustrtalisation common 
amongst industrial cities in the 1970s and 1980s.5 Victortan manufacturtng 
industry retrenched large numbers of workers to remain competitive in the 
global marketplace. The State's negative image was directly linked to the 
economic crisis of the early 1990s. The Kennett Government placed greater 
reliance on alternative forms of commerce to counteract the decline in 
manufacturing and processing industries. Kennett used sporting, cultural, 
and entertainment festivals to generate employment and growth to stimulate 
Victoria's economy. The express focus of Kennett's economic growth is 
tourtsm. Kennett promotes Victorta and Melbourne through 'world class' 
events such as the Formula One Grand Prix (lured from Adelaide), and the 
nation's premier sports facilities such as the MCG and the National Tennis 
Centre. Kennett followed a model of economic redevelopment common to 
North American deindustrialised cities. 
In July 1997, the Australian Rugby Union (ARU) decided to play their 
Bledisloe Cup contest against New Zealand at the MCG. Histortcally, all 
rugby union internationals were held in Queensland or NSW. Since 1988, all 
major internationals held in Sydney were played at the SFS. In Brisbane, 
major internationals have been played at Lang Park. Ballymore, the 
traditional home of rugby union in Queensland, hosts the minor 
internationals. Lang Park has a larger capacity than Ballymore. In both these 
states, rugby union represents a major winter sport. In Victoria, the code has 
no popular appeal. Despite this game's relative obscurity to the Melbourne 
public, the Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett, actively pursued the Bledisloe 
Cup contest. Through a sertes of financial guarantees, Kennett persuaded 
5 Maurice Roche, 'Mega-events and micro-modernization: on the sociology of the new urban 
tourism', British Journal of Sport History: 43(4), 1992, 567. 
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the ARU to play the contest in Melbourne. Kennett used the event to promote 
the state in Australia and overseas, and attracted many Australian and New 
Zealand rugby supporters. More than 90,000 spectators watched the match. 
Kennett had made the contest an outstanding commercial success for 
Victorta, and a political point-scorer for his government. 
Kennett basked in the glory of his Bledisloe Cup success. More 
people watched the Bledisloe Cup contest at the MCG than had previously 
watched any other rugby union international in recent times in Australia. 
Large numbers of New Zealanders crossed the Tasman Sea to watch the All 
Blacks at the MCG. Rugby union supporters from Queensland and NSW 
visited Melbourne to support their team. Kennett was delighted. The event 
focussed national attention on Melbourne and emphasised its economic 
development. It provided additional revenue through the large number of 
tounsts who visited Melbourne. Kennett predicted Victonan tourism would 
increase because of its heightened profile in the national marketplace. The 
ARU was also impressed by the financial returns. The match generated a 
greater financial return for the ARU than a similar contest at either the SFS, 
Suncorp Stadium, or ANZ (if it had been available). As a result of the 
contest's financial success, the ARU hinted that the MCG could be the site of 
future rugby union internationals. 
On 29 November 1997, the Socceroos played Iran in the second leg 
of a World Cup qualifier at the MCG. Soccer Australia's (SA) decision to play 
the game in Melbourne, and not Sydney, reinforced the economic 
importance of the MCG to stakeholders. Previously, Sydney has hosted 
every important Wortd Cup qualifying match in the last two decades. In 1989 
and 1993, the Socceroos played Israel and Argentina in front of capacity 
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crowds at the SFS. Despite this large support in Sydney, the Victorian 
Government enticed SA to play Iran at the MCG. The Kennett Government 
promised SA a larger financial return if it played the match in Melbourne. 
Kennett guaranteed a gate of 62,000 spectators, othenwise the Victorian 
Government would fund the difference.6 Kennett even advanced SA 
$250,000 to promote and market the game. 
SA benefited financially from its decision to play the game in 
Melbourne rather than Sydney. The MCG crowd was more than twice as 
large as a SFS capacity crowd. The MCG contest generated approximately 
$2 million for SA. The MCG's greater capacity and the Kennett Government's 
guaranteed financial return directly influenced the decision of the ARU and 
SA to play in Melbourne. Kennett gave both sporting organisations financial 
guarantees to play in Melbourne. The wily Victorian Premier used both 
events to enhance the economic development of his state. His policy was to 
use various major sporting events to heighten national attention on Victona 
and win public support for his government from a largely sports-minded 
Melbourne community. 
After the 2000 Olympics, the capacity of the planned main stadium in 
Sydney will be around 80,000. Once the Olympic stadium is complete, 
Sydney will have a stadium with a capacity to rival the MCG. Hence the 
Victortan Government may have to provide greater incentives to sporting 
bodies if it still wants to attract soccer and rugby union internationals. To 
compete with Melbourne and Sydney, the other state capital cities may well 
have to build large sporting stadia with comparable spectator capacity and 
extensive corporate facilities. Currently, sporting stadia in Brisbane cannot 
6 The Weekend Australian: 6-7 September 1997, 62. 
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equal the financial guarantees the Kennett Government uses to entice major 
international sporting contests to Melbourne. Brisbane needs to construct a 
super stadium if it wants to compete with Melbourne and Sydney in this 
market. Yet if Bnsbane does build a super stadium, there is no assurance the 
ARU or SA will choose this city to host their major contests. Demand for the 
limited supply of these major contests could create a bidding war between 
the different stadium committees and state governments. The national 
sporting organisations would hold an extremely powerful position in the 
negotiating process. Brtsbane needs a super stadium to compete with 
Melbourne and Sydney, but does it really need to compete with these cities? 
Can Brisbane afford to join 'the stadium race'? 
The Emergence of the Stage Managed Sporting Spectacle 
As outlined previously, the Bullets generated unprecedented support for an 
insignificant commercial sport through distinct forms of marketing. Brian Kerle 
promoted the Bullets through peripheral activities unassociated with the 
actual basketball contest. He promoted the Bullets as an entertainment 
package. These strategies de-emphasised the importance of the contest, 
while accentuating the significance of the spectacle. The Broncos imitated 
many of the promotional and marketing strategies used so successfully by 
Kerle. They used entertainment unrelated to the actual rugby league contest 
to stimulate enthusiasm among non-rugby league supporters. The rugby 
league contest was just one part of the Broncos overall entertainment 
product. These strategies generated large popular support for the Broncos. 
Between 1993 and 1995, they averaged more than 35,000 spectators at the 
ANZ Stadium. Their average attendance peaked in 1993 at 43,200. The 
strategies the Broncos adopted so successfully from the Bullets reinforced 
the importance of the stage managed spectacle in a growing Brisbane sports 
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marketplace. 
Since 1993, there has been a decline in average attendance at 
Broncos matches (see figure 5A)J 
Figure 5.1: Average attendance of the Brisbane Broncos 1993-1997 
Average attendance 
1993 1997 
Broncos' crowds peaked in 1993. Between 1995 and 1996 there was a 
sharp drop in the Broncos' average attendance, and this downward trend 
continued in 1997. The Broncos average crowd in 1997 was only slightly 
greater than 1988 and 1989, their first two years in the NSWRL premiership. 
Certainly, the Super League dispute had a large impact on the Broncos' 
average support in 1996 and 1997. Yet two Broncos games in 1997 
generated large popular support in Brisbane, and these events were 
reminiscent of their halcyon period in the early 1990s. 
7 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997 and 18 November 1997. 
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On 1 March 1997, Super League chose the Broncos match against 
Auckland at ANZ Stadium to launch its competition. The Super League 
administration provided all the pre-match and half time entertainment at the 
game. Super League spent millions of dollars creating a unique spectacle at 
its first match in Australasia. International singers and dancers came to 
Brisbane to launch the Super League competition. There was fireworks and 
other forms of entertainment. The game was promoted as an event or a 
spectacle. The Brisbane public responded to the Super League promotion. 
The first Super League contest attracted 42,361 spectators to ANZ Stadium. 
However, attendances at subsequent Broncos games dropped sharply. They 
fluctuated between 6,438 and 26,103 for all Broncos home matches, except 
the Super League grand final against Cronulla (see figure 5.2). 
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The Broncos' largest attendance of 1997 was the inaugural Super League 
grand final. The matched attracted a capacity crowd of 58,912 to ANZ 
Stadium. The game generated vast interest in Brtsbane. Television ratings 
for the grand final were 34 points, almost double the average ratings points 
for Broncos matches in 1997.8 Again the Super League grand final was 
promoted as an entertainment spectacle, rather than just a rugby league 
contest. The match was marketed as an event that not only provided the 
spectator with the opportunity to see the Broncos, but also to witness an 
histortc event, the first Super League grand final. 
Only one week later, the Broncos played in front of their lowest 
attendance in a competitive match at either Lang Park or ANZ Stadium. Just 
6,438 spectators attended their World Club Challenge quarter final against 
St. Helens. The following week, the Broncos played in front of their second 
lowest ever crowd at either stadium. In their World Club Challenge semi-final 
against Auckland at ANZ Stadium, just 9,686 attended their match. Auckland 
had been their opponent in their first ever Super League contest. This match 
attracted more than 42,000 patrons. Yet, in their final match of the year 
against the same opponent, the Broncos attracted less than 10,000 
spectators. Neither Wortd Club Championship game could be promoted with 
the same degree of importance as the inaugural Super League contest, or 
the first ever Super League grand final. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Broncos promoted their matches as an 
entertainment spectacle. Prior to the Super League dispute, these strategies 
were very successful. A new and diverse range of spectators were attracted 
to ANZ Stadium. Non-rugby league spectators even followed the Broncos. 
8 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 18 November 1997. 
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The entertainment spectacle created a new and intriguing image. But after 
the Super League dispute, public interest in the Broncos declined, especially 
the television ratings. In 1996 the average television audience watching a 
Broncos premiership game was 29.1.9 In 1997, this figure had declined to 
19.8.10 Yet, as mentioned previously, there were two games in 1997 that 
generated large public interest. Both were promoted as unique experiences. 
It was the sense of razzamattazz and spectacle, not just the actual rugby 
league contest against Auckland or Cronulla, that had generated great 
interest among spectators. The Broncos had developed the 'consumer 
spectator', seemingly more interested in the overall entertainment image or 
product. When a Broncos match lacked the total entertainment product, its 
transitory fans found other forms of amusement. 
Despite the success of the Broncos in the early 1990s, the 
Queensland Reds and the Brisbane Lions did not imitate their promotional 
strategies. While the Broncos combined the sporting contest with spectacular 
entertainment, the Reds and the Lions emphasised the centrality of the 
sporting contest. Judy Kilby, of the Brisbane Lions, believes the actual 
contest of Australian Rules is the best form of promotion.11 The game is, 
undoubtedly, an entertaining spectacle in its own right. It does not need 
peripheral forms of entertainment to attract spectators. Indeed, the Lions do 
not even bother to provide pre-match or half time entertainment. They rely on 
the contest as the major promotional strategy. Similarly, the Reds have not 
adopted the Broncos marketing approach. Traditionally, rugby union has 
been very conservative. It conformed to late nineteenth century traditions of 
masculinity, amateurtsm, and class divisions. Until the 1980s the class 
9 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 6 August 1997. 
10 Information supplied by Louis Ramsay on 18 November 1997. 
11 Interview with Judy Kilby on 27 May 1997. 
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associations of rugby union were largely perpetuated and reinforced. In the 
last two decades, however, this basic tenet of rugby union has been slowly 
eroded. Players were paid indirectly for playing, as they were reimbursed 
through a series of trust funds. As I discussed in chapter four, since 1995, 
players have been paid to play. Today rugby union is a commercial, market 
drtven, professional sport. 
The radical transformation in rugby union's culture could well have 
undermined its central crowd support. The QRU realised traditional 
supporters might react negatively to professionalism. To maintain their 
traditional associations, if not the traditional structure, the QRU did not modify 
other elements of rugby's culture. The QRU took a very conservative 
approach to marketing and promotion.12 They did not clutter the Reds' 
maroon jersey with advertising or sponsorship logos. They did not alter the 
style, colour, or fabric of the maroon jersey. So the jersey gave supporters a 
link with the past, and stability in the face of commercial changes to rugby 
union. Similarly, the QRU was reluctant to introduce pre and half time 
entertainment or cheerteaders to embellish the spectacle. If rugby union had 
embraced the hyper-commercialisation of sport, their product would have 
become increasingly similar to a Bullets or Broncos match. The QRU decided 
not to pursue hyper-commercialisation at the expense of tradition. The QRU 
constrained the development of professionalism by maintaining strong 
traditional cultural links of rugby union. Yet professionalism fundamentally 
altered the playing of rugby union, for its traditional class distinctions could 
no longer be maintained. 
In 1997, the Reds and the Lions did not repeat their outstanding 
12 Interview with Jason Greenhaigh on 8 August 1997. 
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playing results from previous seasons. For the first time the Reds did not 
make the semi-finals in either the Super 10 or Super 12 competition. The 
Lions only just made the AFL finals sertes, and played inconsistently 
throughout the season. Despite these poor results, both the Reds and the 
Lions maintained their popular crowd support in 1997. There was little 
fluctuation in the number of spectators who watched from week to week. 
Conversely, the Broncos were susceptible to large variations in attendance. 
In short, the Reds and the Lions attract a core number of spectators each 
week, while the Broncos crowds became transitory. 
As the Broncos developed their entertainment-based model of 
promotion, they moved from the limited confines of the Brtsbane sports 
marketplace into the wider entertainment market. The Broncos not only 
compete with the Reds and the Lions, they also compete with other forms of 
popular entertainment. It is the entertainment or spectacle of the match that 
dictates the size of the Broncos crowd. If a Broncos match is promoted as a 
unique event or outstanding spectacle, it will attract a comparatively large 
crowd. However, as a match loses its unique entertainment appeal, the 
crowds decrease. The transitory element within Broncos crowds seem to be 
the 'entertainment consumers'. They have a choice of entertainment 
products, one of which is the Broncos, and they choose the event with the 
greatest profile or novelty. They need the promise of difference or 
extravagance to attract them to an event. By comparison, the Reds and the 
Lions have not promoted themselves to the same level within the greater 
entertainment marketplace. Conversely, they do not rely on stage-managed 
spectacles to attract patrons. As a consequence, they are not subject to the 
same level of attendance fluctuation as the Broncos. 
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Turning to basketball, the other stage-managed sporting spectacle of 
the 1980s, Brtan Kerte believes the use of penpheral entertainment to 
promote basketball in Brtsbane is now largely redundant.i3 He argues that 
the sport was unknown in Bnsbane in the early 1980s, so he used gimmicks 
to attract a crowd to watch basketball. But the gimmicks he used so 
successfully in the 1980s, are no longer as useful, as they have lost their 
novelty value. They are used at a variety of sporting and entertainment 
events in Australia. The individuality of the spectacle of basketball in 
Brisbane has thus been undermined. Kerle believes basketball should now 
promote the contest, rather than focus on extraneous forms of entertainment. 
Ultimately, the basketball contest is the essential element that differentiates 
itself from other sports. In Kerle's view, the basketball match is the future of 
basketball - which is quite ironic given his emphasis on stage-management 
in the 1980s. 
On 30 August 1997, the South Queensland Crushers played their final 
game at Suncorp Stadium. They had lasted just three seasons before 
financial limitations and poor playing performances terminated their 
involvement in the Australian Rugby League (ARL) competition. The 
Crushers joined the competition in 1995 as one of four expansions clubs 
included in the 1995 ARL competition. In 1995, the Crushers were well 
supported by the Brisbane public. They averaged approximately 20,500 
spectators per match.14 Comparatively, the Crushers' average attendance in 
their inaugural season was markedly higher than the Broncos were in either 
of their first two. In 1988 the Broncos averaged only 16,111. In 1989 they 
averaged 18,225. In 1995, the Crushers developed a niche in the Brisbane 
13 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 




Despite their initial success, the Crushers did not maintain the levels 
of popular support in 1996. In 1996, the Crushers' average attendance 
declined by just over 7,000 to 13,016.15 Undoubtedly, this decline was 
caused by the Super League dispute. In the middle of 1995, Super League 
and the ARL tned to entice each of the 20 ARL clubs to support their 
competition. In 1995, the Crushers board chose to remain in the ARL 
competition. In 1996, they played in the 20 team ARL competition. All 20 
teams who competed in 1995 were required to play in the 1996 ARL 
competition by Justice Burchett's Federal Court decision. Burchett found 
News Limited and its associates acted unlawfully in the creation of a rival 
rugby league competition. The Super League aligned clubs were ordered to 
play in the 20 team ARL competition in 1996. The beginning of the 1996 ARL 
season was disrupted as Super League players withdrew their playing 
services from their clubs. Super League aligned clubs forteited their first 
round games. 
But matters became significantly worse in 1997. By the start of the new 
season, public support for the Crushers had dwindled to such an extent that 
the Crushers' administration decided to halve the cost of entry to home 
games. In their first match against Parramatta, the Crushers attracted less 
than than 10,000 spectators.i6 Attendance figures declined throughout the 
season. By the middle of July only 2,364 spectators attended their match 
against Illawarra.i7 The Brisbane sporting public were no longer particularly 
15 The attendance figures are only approximate. They are from various 1996 editions of the 
The Australian. 
16 The Australian: 17 March 1997, 31. 
17 The Australian: 21 July 1997, 31. 
165 
interested in the Crushers. In July and August 1997, the Crushers' board 
decided to merge with the Gold Coast Chargers. The new team will play at 
Carrara on the Gold Coast. After the merger was announced publicly, the 
Crushers abolished all admission chargers for their home games. In their last 
match 11,588 non-paying spectators watched the Crushers play Western 
Suburbs.18 
The Expansion and Rationalisation of the Brisbane Marketplace 
In 1996 the Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport commissioned a 
report on the development and impact of National Sporting Leagues in 
Australia.19 The report identified three categories of National Leagues; 
professional, semi-professional and amateur. It found there were 14 different 
National Leagues that operated in Australia. The professional category 
contained the AFL, ARL, NBL and Super 12. The semi-professional category 
included the Australian Baseball League (ABL), Women's National 
Basketball League (WNBL), NSL, and Sheffield Shield Cricket. The amateur 
category comprtsed the Men's Hockey League (MHL), Women's Hockey 
League (WHL), National Fastpitch League, Netball Super League, National 
Surf-Lifesaving League, and National Water-Polo League. 
In 1997, the Brisbane sports marketplace contained 13 National 
League teams. The only National League identified in the report, but not 
represented in Brtsbane, was the National Surf-Lifesaving League. Every 
other National League was represented in Brisbane. Since the report was 
presented to the Standing Committee in October 1996, Super League 
successfully appealed to the Full Bench of the Federal Court. In 1997, the 
18 The Australian: 1 September 1997, 31. 
19 Prospect Management Consulting, National League Impact Study: commissioned by the 
Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport, 1996. 
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Super League aligned Broncos joined the inaugural season of the Super 
League competition. Super League created a fourteenth National League 
competition in Australia. In the middle of 1997, the Netball Super League 
instituted professionalism. It is no longer an amateur game; instead players 
are paid to play and perform. 
The proliferation of National Leagues in Australia has been caused by 
financial and economic survival. The AFL and ARL expanded to support the 
current members of their competitions. Super 12 was created to generate 
large financial returns to fund rugby union's adoption of professionalism. The 
majority of the other national competitions were established in response to 
the success of the initial National Leagues. To survive, national competitions 
were established to compete with other sporting organisations. These 
decisions were taken prtmanly for economic reasons. Sponsorship and 
media coverage are necessary to generate the revenue to ensure future 
survival. But to attract the media and sponsors the sport must guarantee 
adequate exposure. The media and sponsors only receive adequate 
exposure through a national competition. 
The structure and organisation of National Leagues in Australia have 
been influenced by the North American model of sports organisation and 
production. However, there is one essential difference between the North 
American model of professional sports and its counterpart in Australia. 
Professional sport in North America is built on one basic principle, the 
prtnciple of capital accumulation. Every single professional sports team in the 
USA, except the Green Bay Packers, is privately owned. The owners of each 
sports team want to make a profit. That is their primary purpose. Yet different 
teams are not in competition with one another because of the structure of the 
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individual leagues. They are, however, in competition with other forms of 
entertainment.20 This was the fundamental difference, until the introduction of 
Super League, between the North American and Australian model of the 
structure of professional sports teams. In Australia, they were run as non-
profit organisations whose major concern was winning the Grand-Final or the 
Flag. Professional sport in North Amertca was a business - the accumulation 
of profits for their owners and shareholders. 
While pnvate ownership is the essential structural difference between 
the North American and Australian models of professional sport, there are a 
number of practical differences between the two sporting environments. The 
Brisbane sports marketplace had 14 different National League teams in 
1997, competing for sponsorship, media coverage, and spectators. The 
population of greater Brisbane is approximately 1 million. The North 
Amencan city of Chicago has a much smaller number of National League 
teams representing the city. There is one basketball team, the Chicago Bulls, 
one American football team, the Chicago Bears, one ice hockey team, the 
Chicago Blackhawks, and two baseball teams, the White Soxs and the Cubs. 
Yet Chicago's population in 1994 was just under 3 million. Its greater 
population was approximately 7.5 million. Brtsbane's population of only 1.3 
million supports 14 National League teams. Chicago has seven times the 
population, yet supports one-third of the number of national teams. 
Competition for sponsorship, media coverage, and spectators is 
maximised by the timing of the National Leagues in North Amertca. Baseball 
is played between spring and autumn. As the baseball season ends, the 
American football season begins. At the end of autumn, basketball and ice 
20 George Sage, Power and Ideology in American Sport: a critical perspective: Human 
Kinetics, Champaign (III.), 1990,138. 
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hockey commence. The regular American football season ends before 
Chrtstmas, then the basketball and ice hockey finish in the middle of sprtng. 
Only the basketball and ice hockey seasons overtap. But in Chicago, they 
can never be played on the same day because they are both played at the 
same venue - United Centre Stadium. In Australia, the winter is heavily 
congested with football. Australian Rules, rugby league, and rugby union all 
compete against each other in the winter months, and they dilute the 
potential revenue pool. On 25 May 1997 in Brisbane, three different codes 
played at the same time. The Lions played Geelong at the Gabba, the 
Broncos played North Queensland at ANZ, and the Strikers played Sydney 
United at Suncorp Stadium. There was a total of nearly 75,000 spectators at 
the three games. A crowd of 75,000 spectators is the norm at American 
football matches in Chicago. 
The Super League proposal tried to emulate the structure and 
organisation of the North American professional sports model. They wanted 
to replicate the success the Broncos achieved between 1992 and 1995. The 
Broncos received saturation media coverage from the local press. They had 
little competition in the Brtsbane sports marketplace. They generated large 
financial returns for their shareholders. News Limited wanted to establish its 
own National Basketball Association or National Football League. However, 
the large number of National Leagues in Australia have diluted the amount of 
media coverage and the number of sponsors and spectators available to 
individual teams. 
The report presented to the Standing Committee on Recreation and 
Sport concluded that National Leagues and National League teams faced 
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the possibility of reaching saturation levels at some point in the future.21 They 
believed a downturn in the economy might be the catalyst for rationalisation 
of National Sports Leagues within Australia. Certainly, 14 National League 
teams appears to be an abundant number for the city the size of Brisbane. 
The Crushers' recent demise as an independent sporting organisation 
suggests supply might have already exceeded demand. Even the economic 
viability of 13 National League teams in Brtsbane is questionable. The report 
suggests the future international expansion of Australian National Leagues 
might sustain the number and structure of the existing sporting 
organisations.22 
Rugby union has been the pioneer of international expansion in 
Australasia. In 1986, the Australian Rugby Union (ARU) and the New 
Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) established the Super 6 
tournament. The Super 6 tournament was the first established international 
competition in south-east Asia between provincial or regional teams. Over 
the next decade, the competition was refined to accommodate South African 
provincial teams. By 1997, the Super 12 competition has developed into an 
international tournament comprising the traditional rugby playing nations in 
the Southern Hemisphere. 
In 1994, the ARL granted Auckland one of four expansion licenses for 
the following season's competition. Auckland was included to reinforce and 
strengthen the popularity of rugby league in New Zealand. The ARL believed 
the game had great potential in New Zealand. Rugby union has always been 
the dominant winter sport. But through effective promotion and marketing the 
popularity of rugby league increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
21 Prospect Management, National Leaoue Impact Studv: v. 
22 Prospect Management, National League Impact Studv: v. 
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ARL wanted to sustain this growth. In 1995, the ARL rival Super League 
invited Auckland to become a member of its new competition. Auckland 
accepted. When the Super League competition commenced in March 1997, 
it attracted all the non-Sydney clubs, except Newcastle, Gold Coast, 
lllawarra, and Brisbane, to its competition. By 1997, the ARL was reduced to 
a two state competition. Conversely, Super League planned to 
internationalise the game. 
International expansion and global prominence was part of Super 
League's strategy to encourage players, administrators, and clubs to support 
their competition. They would expand the competition into Asia and create 
stronger links with Europe. Super League believed the game could compete 
internationally with other professional sports. But rugby league expansion 
into regions where the game has little or no historical association is a 
fundamentally flawed policy. Essentially, Super League could only expand 
within histortcal sites where rugby league is played, which is a relatively 
small number of regions throughout the world. In Australia, it is played 
predominantly in just two states, Queensland and NSW. Although rugby 
league is played in New Zealand, it has no traditional links with the majority 
of the New Zealand public. Rugby league is only an alternative sport in New 
Zealand. In Great Britain, rugby league is only popular in northern England. 
Consequently, rugby league is a regional sport. It is not a demonstrably 
international, or even a national sport. 
Rugby league is not the only Australian sport facing similar obstacles 
to international expansion. Australian football is played exclusively in 
Australia. There is no logical site for expansion. However, its unique 
Australian character is also its strength locally. It can be promoted as a 
171 
distinctly Australian game. Australian football may provide resistance against 
the formation of global forces. It is played at an elite level in all States and 
Territortes. Only basketball and soccer, two peripheral Australian sports, are 
played so extensively. But both these sports are global, rather than distinctly 
national sporting commodities. 
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Conclusion 
The Transformation of the Brisbane Sports 
l\/larketpiace 
The development of the Brisbane sports marketplace 
In the 1970s Brtsbane was an insignificant state capital city in Australia. The 
city was not visible on the international cultural, economic, or tounst stage. 
The two Australian cities that had 'international' reputations were Sydney 
and Melbourne. Brisbane was generally considered a backwater, a haven 
for conservative attitude and opinion. The BCC and the Queensland 
Government instituted policies to alter these negative images. Throughout 
the 1980s, the backward image of Queensland was challenged by the 
annual State of Origin contests, the 1982 Commonwealth Games, Wortd 
Expo 88, and Brtsbane's bid for the 1992 Olympic Games. 
These events generated widespread public support and created a sense of 
collective belonging to the city and state. The success of these events 
challenged the traditional notion of backwardness and infenority attached to 
Brtsbane. No single event fundamentally altered these common sense 
images. Each event reinforced the other one, thereby incrementally 
challenging, even in some cases overturning, the previously dominant 
images. By 1990, the thoughts and values of Queenslanders had altered. 
They were no longer a bunch of 'brown cows', but a more sophisticated 
people who believed they could hold their own with anyone. These events 
changed Brtsbane's inwardly focused perspective by generating confidence 
in the city's ability to compete on the national and even an international 
stage. 
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Chapter one argued that the residents of Brtsbane believed they had 
undergone a substantial cultural shift durtng the 1980s. Eartier, during the 
1970s and early 1980s, the Brtsbane commercial sports marketplace 
reflected the intensely local focus of the city. Bnsbane teams competed in 
local rather than national competitions. The residents of Brisbane were more 
interested in local sporting competitions, reflecting their inward looking view 
of the world. In the early 1980s the rugby league competition in Bnsbane 
was the premier sporting league in the city. It was the most commercially 
viable, by paying players as semi-professional athletes. However, the 
Brisbane marketplace was not large enough to support a professional 
league. Moreover, the Brisbane rugby league competition reflected the 
commercially unsophisticated structure of sports leagues throughout 
Australia. But as the 1980s continued and the residents of Brisbane believed 
that their relationship to other cities and regions in Australia had changed, 
the importance of Bnsbane's local sporting competitions diminished. 
Chapter two argued that the reduced importance of local sporting 
competitions in Brisbane was exacerbated with the introduction of the first 
National Leagues in Australia. Soccer and basketball both established 
national sporting competitions in the late 1970s. Two established soccer 
clubs from Brtsbane played in the NSL from 1977 until the mid 1980s. 
Neither team was particularly successful in establishing mass appeal for 
soccer in Brisbane. Brisbane's soccer experiment with National Leagues 
was a failure because soccer was still a penpheral sport in the Brisbane 
sports marketplace. Supporters of both teams came from the traditional local 
(largely ethnic minority) football community. By 1987, both teams had 
returned to compete in the local Brtsbane soccer competition. Brisbane did 
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not have another representative in the NSL until Brisbane United joined in 
1991. 
The second sport in Australia to establish a National League was basketball. 
The structure and organisation of the NBL in Australia followed the North 
Amertcan model of professional sport. In 1979, the Brtsbane Bullets joined 
the NBL. The Bullets were an insignificant team in Brisbane until Brian Kerte 
was appointed coach in 1983. Kerte revolutionised basketball in Brisbane 
through sophisticated marketing and promotion. He modified North American 
models of promotion and marketing to generate popular support for the 
Bullets. Basketball in Brisbane entered the wider entertainment marketplace. 
The contest needed additional activities to the on-field spectacle to complete 
the entertainment package. Through these techniques the Bullets generated 
enormous public support, at least for the Brisbane sports marketplace, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The Bullets' success in the NBL altered the 
historical local focus of Brisbane sporting competitions. Brtsbane would 
support a team representing the city of Bnsbane in a national competition, 
rather than a suburban club playing in the local league. The NBL, of course, 
was not the only sport to see the potential of establishing a national 
competition in Australia. 
Chapter three discussed the expansion of the NSWRL and the VFL 
competitions into pseudo-national leagues. Both competitions needed to 
expand to support teams within their own competition. The money raised 
through licence fees, national sponsorship deals, and national television 
contracts would ensure their survival. 
Bnsbane was a prtme location for expansion because of the unsophisticated 
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and undeveloped structure of its commercial sports marketplace. While 
Brtsbane had a large population, it was not large enough to support a league 
of its own. But, of course, neither was Sydney nor Melbourne. During the late 
1980s and early 1990s there was a proliferation of national league teams in 
Brtsbane. However, a number of state sporting organisations initially resisted 
the introduction of national league teams in Bnsbane. They wanted to protect 
and maintain the strength and importance of their local competition, so they 
often impeded the expansion of national competitions. Despite their protests, 
the state bodies reluctantly accepted the introduction of national league 
teams in Brtsbane. The Bullets' success as a local Brisbane team competing 
in a national competition highlighted the importance spectators now placed 
on national rather than local sporting teams. In 1987 the QRL endorsed a 
proposal by a consortium of four Brisbane businessmen to establish a 
Brtsbane rugby league team in the NSWRL premiership. 
The Brisbane Broncos were established as the first privately owned rugby 
league team in the NSWRL competition. Private ownership had been 
introduced into the VFL four years eartier, but it was not as successful as had 
been anticipated. But the expansion of rugby league into Brtsbane was 
successful. The Broncos organisational structure, marketing strategies and 
general philosophy all reflected the North American model of sports 
production. They borrowed the marketing and promotional techniques used 
so successfully by Kerle, and they fed into common sense notions of 
Queensland parochialism to generate large popular support in Bnsbane. Yet 
it was their relocation from Lang Park to the QEII Stadium which confirmed 
their profit driven motives. Their relocation established the Broncos as the 
most dominant and influential sporting team in Brisbane in the early and mid 
1990s. Pnor to 1993, the Broncos were the only form of elite football in 
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Brtsbane durtng the winter months. The Brisbane Bears played at Carrara on 
the Gold Coast, the Queensland Reds played a limited number of games and 
had not yet embraced professionalism, while the NSWRL had yet to 
establish a second team in Brisbane. 
Between 1988 and 1994 the Broncos had little sertous competition. They 
capitalised on their monopoly in Brisbane, establishing record attendances, 
sponsorship, and profits. The Broncos' structure, promotion, and 
organisation provided a model for progressive and dynamic sporting 
organisations throughout Australia. They had copied the North American 
model of sports production which they believed was the future of sporting 
ownership in Australia. But after 1995, the Broncos' dominance and 
influence in the Brisbane sport marketplace declined. 
Chapter four argued that their decline was caused by increased competition 
from other sporting teams and also from other forms of consumer 
entertainment. As the Broncos' dominance and influence decreased, the 
Reds and the Bears (now Lions) became major competitors in the Brisbane 
commercial sports marketplace. Despite popular assumptions, the Super 
League dispute appears to have had a comparatively small impact on the 
overall popularity and support of the Reds and the Bears (Lions). For the first 
time in 1996, as rugby union embraced professionalism, the Reds officially 
remunerated their players for playing in rugby union fixtures. After 1996 the 
crowds, sponsorship, and season ticket holders all increased. Yet most of the 
increases have come from within the rugby union playing community of 
Brisbane, not from disenchanted rugby league supporters. 
Similarly, there has always been a strong Australian rules community in 
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Brtsbane. The Bears' relocation to Bnsbane occurred before the Super 
League dispute began. Its development into a more popular sporting team 
occurred in 1995. The Bears' results towards the end of the year, and their 
first finals appearance, attracted unprecedented media coverage for 
Australian rules in Brtsbane. The Bears provided an authentic Australian 
sporting option for the Bnsbane sporting public. No doubt some rugby 
league supporters had transferred their allegiance to rugby union and 
Australian rules. But the increase in Reds and Lions support can not explain 
the large decrease in Broncos crowds in 1996 and 1997. 
Chapter five argued that the large fluctuations in Broncos crowds were 
caused by the promotional and marketing strategies that they used. The 
Broncos represented North American forms of sporting culture, while the 
Reds and the Lions were concerned to represent more local forms of culture. 
Admittedly both teams had adopted a number of promotional and marketing 
strategies from North America, but they tried to avoid any similarities to North 
American sporting images. Central to all promotional strategies of the Reds 
and the Lions has been the rugby union or Australian rules contest, whereas 
the Broncos have placed greater emphasis on the overall entertainment 
product. Broncos crowds attract more 'entertainment consumers', who attend 
events based on the image and spectacle surrounding the event, rather than 
just the entertainment of the game itself. The contest is only part of the overall 
entertainment event. Broncos crowds appear to be more transitory. Their 
crowds, therefore, are more susceptible to large fluctuations. Today, the less 
extravagant promotional strategies of the Reds and the Lions have 
developed more consistent crowds than the Broncos. 
In 1997, the Broncos attracted the largest sporting crowd in Brisbane to the 
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Super League grand final. Yet they had only the second largest sporting 
crowd of the year for Queensland and of all three codes the smallest sporting 
crowd in Brisbane. The crowd at the Super League grand final suggests the 
Broncos are still capable of generating a collective sense of belonging 
amongst the Bnsbane population. But the crowds at the World Club 
Challenge matches suggest that their spectators have developed the 
greatest apathy of the three codes. The Reds and Lions have developed a 
strong and loyal group of supporters. Their supporters are less affected by 
the image or spectacle of the event than their Broncos counterparts. While 
public support is larger at some Broncos' games, it is stronger and more 
consistent at Reds' and Lions' games. Reds and Lions supporters seem to 
have a greater feeling of attachment to their team than Broncos supporters. 
The relationship between the Broncos and many of their supporters was 
created by their focus on the image and spectacle of the event. To attract a 
large number of spectators, a Broncos game must provide substantial 
entertainment over and above the rugby league contest. 
Brian Kerle feels the promotional strategies he introduced into the Bnsbane 
sports marketplace in the mid 1980s are now outdated.1 He introduced the 
promotional strategies to encourage non-basketball people to come to a 
Bullets game. In the mid 1980s the Brisbane public were not familiar with the 
sport of basketball. He encouraged them to try basketball and experience the 
basketball contest and its atmosphere. Kerte deliberately provided the 
spectators with other forms of entertainment to encourage those who did not 
enjoy the actual contest to return in the future. He now believes the Brisbane 
public is aware of basketball and that the actual contest should form the 
nucleus of the Bullets' promotional strategies. 
1 Interview with Brian Kerle on 27 August 1997. 
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The commercialisation of sport in Australia 
In 1980, Brtsbane's major sporting leagues were local, suburban based 
competitions. They were relatively minor sporting organisations, attracting 
little sponsorship and small crowds, but heavily localised media attention. 
For example, the Brisbane rugby league competition was more important 
than the NSWRL competition in Sydney. During the 1980s the influence and 
importance of these local competitions were undermined by an increased 
emphasis on national leagues. 
The expansion of pseudo-national Australian rules and rugby league 
competitions was driven by the local suburban leagues in Melbourne and 
Sydney. The Brtsbane sports marketplace was neither large nor 
sophisticated enough to resist the formation of new national teams within the 
city. However, the Brisbane marketplace was important enough for the 
NSWRL to allow several exceptions in the overall structure of the newly 
created Brisbane club. The Brisbane Broncos became the first, and until the 
introduction of Super League, the only privately owned ARL team. From 
1988 until 1995, the Broncos were the catalyst for the hyper-
commercialisation of rugby league in Australia. 
It is crucial to understand that the Broncos were established from forces 
outside of the Brisbane sports marketplace. But since their formation they 
have been instrumental in forcing changes in the overall structure of 
Australian sport. Super League's ortgins were established in Brtsbane out of 
apathy for the NSWRL's treatment of the Broncos. They proposed a new, 
highly commercial and inherently North American model for rugby league in 
Australasia. The Broncos believed they had developed the model which 
Australian rugby league should follow. Rupert Murdoch was very receptive to 
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the idea and decided to institute their concept of Super League. These local 
changes leading to the hyper-commercialisation of the Brisbane sports 
marketplace brought about change in the overall structure of Australian 
sport. 
The professionalisation of rugby union 
The hyper-commercialisation of Australian sport in the 1990s has had a 
profound affect on the sport of rugby union. Since 1995 rugby union has 
been very quick to adapt to the changes that have taken place in Australian 
sport. In less than one year, rugby union overturned the fundamental ethos 
which governed the sport and embraced professionalism. By 1996 the rugby 
boards of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa had signed a ten year 
deal with an international pay-television broadcaster. The code refined its 
international competition and paid players for their services. Notwithstanding 
the dramatic effect of the changes to rugby union, the code seems to be 
better placed than either Australian rules or rugby league. 
Rugby union is the only sport of the three that has a true international 
structure. It has an established international competition at regional and 
national level and it has strong international relationships in the southern 
hemisphere. Undoubtedly, rugby union has greater international potential 
than any of its rivals. This may cause a substantial shift in its overall 
popularity in the future. The backward and archaic structure which rugby 
union inherited was overturned for commercial survival. Today, rugby union 
is similar In structure and organisation to the other winter professional sports 
in Australia. 
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The influence of North American ideas 
One of the pnmary reasons for the popularity of the Brisbane Bullets and 
Broncos durtng the 1980s and early 1990s was their use of North American 
models of marketing and promotion. These overseas ideas created a greater 
sense of spectacle at sporting contests in Brisbane. However, the advent of a 
consumer culture has generated transitory fans who have a wide choice of 
entertainment events. The Broncos is just one of many products in the wider 
Brisbane entertainment landscape. Conversely, the promotional emphasis of 
the Reds and Lions has been on local or national sporting rivalries. They 
rejected the hype and razzmattazz of promotion. In the process the Brisbane 
Lions have surpassed the once dominant Broncos in terms of both average 
attendance and in total membership numbers. In 1997, the Lions had an 
average attendance of 19,500, marginally larger than the Broncos, and 
16,769 members, or nearly three times as many members as the Broncos. 
This is a major achievement in a city which, historically, had focused mainly 
on the rugby codes. 
The Bullets' success during the mid and late 1980s mirrors the success of 
the Broncos less than half a decade later. They used, almost exclusively, the 
same techniques to acquire popular support in Brisbane. The decline of one 
club is similar to the other, just a few years apart. In fact the similarity of the 
history of both clubs is quite extraordinary. The Bullets crowds decreased 
substantially in 1996 when they stopped giving away free tickets. Likewise, 
as the Broncos reduced the number of complimentary tickets, their average 
crowd also dwindled. The reliance on complimentary tickets at both clubs 
suggests a reconsideration of the extent to which the Bullets and Broncos 
achieved 'wholesale' popular support in the 1980s and 1990s. At least half 
the popular support that the Broncos achieved was developed artificially 
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through the large number of complimentary tickets. The Broncos' 1997 
average attendance of nearly 20,000 might realistically reflect their 
popularity in the Brisbane sports marketplace. 
During the early 1990s, the Broncos were vaunted for their success, large 
crowds, large sponsorship deals and, relative to other rugby league clubs, 
large profits. The Broncos argued that this success optimised the future 
model of professional sporting organisations in Australia: that is privately run 
and profit maximising clubs. They convinced News Limited to organise a 
competition that mirrored their structure, even though their 'success' might 
well have been limited. The global aspirations of the Broncos conformed to 
the international media objectives of News Limited.2 Both looked beyond the 
local and national Australian environment for business opportunities. 
Since their inception, the Broncos have focused on and represented 
international images. But these are not traditionally Australian. Conversely, 
the Reds and Lions personify local and national images of Brisbane, 
Queensland and Australia. They deliberately avoided 'outside' images, 
instead concentrating on the local. Both clubs conform to the traditional 
Australian model of member-based sporting clubs. The Lions' success in 
attracting large numbers of loyal supporters is common amongst all 
Australian Rules clubs. Within the Brisbane sporting culture, the evidence 
suggests that traditional forms of ownership are more successful and 
generate greater loyalty than profit-maximising forms of ownership. Hence 
local interests have been heavily influential in the development of the 
Brtsbane sports marketplace since 1980. It has developed through 
2 Barry Marranta bought a rugby league team in London, and renamed it the London Broncos. 
He thought he could repeat the success of the Brisbane Broncos in London. During 1997, he 
sold his interest in the London Broncos to Richard Bransen, the owner of Virgin Airlines and 
Virgin Records. 
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competing local, national and international factors to create a highly 
sophisticated and diverse marketplace in 1997. 
The wider implication of this thesis 
There are a number of wider implications for this thesis. Firstly, there has 
been little study into the changes of any local sports marketplace in the last 
two decades. Admittedly, there have been a number of studies that analysed 
some of the themes that have been discussed in this thesis. However, no 
study has attempted to analyse the overall structure of a sports marketplace 
and changes to it in a particular environment. 
Secondly, this thesis has shown that the changes that have taken place in 
the Brisbane sports marketplace have been various and complex. For good 
or bad, Brtsbane sporting teams have affected change in the overall structure 
of Australian sport. The concepts of private ownership and rationalisation are 
now common in Australian sport. However, these changes were resisted. It 
appears that this model may not be as effective in the Australian sports 
marketplace as in North America. The strict adoption of North American 
approaches has been very unsuccessful in Australian rules. The AFL has 
thus adjusted the North American model to suit the Australian environment. 
In 1997, the AFL is more popular throughout Australia than any of the other 
winter football codes. 
The success of the national AFL competition in the last two or three years 
highlights the third wider implication of this thesis. To label the changes in 
the overall structure of Australian sport since 1980 as Americanisation is too 
simplistic. Certainly, there has been a great deal of influence from North 
America. However, in the first instance the changes that took place were a 
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reaction to local issues and problems. Out of these changes developed an 
uniquely Australian sporting environment. 
Today, the most successful winter sporting competition is a traditional 
Australian game. It has yet to be seen if Super League has a lasting effect on 
the Australian sport scene or if Australian rules will continue to be dominant. 
One conclusion is now clear: Australian sport in 1997 is commercially 
focused. Teams are concerned about mergers, relocations and 
rationalisation in both rugby league and in Australian rules. The 
economically and financially strong will survive in reduced national sporting 
competitions. The Australian sports marketplace probably cannot support 
three or four professional sporting leagues. In the future Australia might have 
to investigate expansion into international leagues, as local leagues 
expanded into national leagues in the 1980s. As the Bnsbane sports 
marketplace was driven by commercialism in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
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